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ABSTRACT
Tanks  were  first  used  in  action  in  September  1916.  There  had  been  no
previous  combat  experience  on  which  to  base  tactical  and  operational
doctrine for the employment of this novel weapon of war. Training of crews
and commanders was hampered by lack of vehicles and weapons. Time was
short in which to train novice crews. Training facilities were limited.
Despite  mechanical  limitations  of  the  early  machines  and  their
vulnerability  to  adverse  ground  conditions,  the  tanks  achieved  moderate
success in their initial actions. Advocates of the tanks, such as Fuller and
Elles, worked hard to convince the sceptical of the value of the tank.
Two  years  later,  tanks  had  gained  the  support  of  most  senior
commanders. Doctrine, based on practical combat experience, had evolved
both  within  the  Tank  Corps  and  at  GHQ  and  higher  command.  Despite
dramatic improvements in the design, functionality and reliability of the later
marks of heavy and medium tanks, they still remained slow and vulnerable to
ground conditions and enemy counter-measures.  Competing demands for
materiel  meant  there were never  enough tanks to  replace casualties and
meet the demands of formation commanders.
This thesis will argue that the somewhat patchy performance of the
armoured vehicles in the final months of the war was less a product of poor
doctrinal guidance and inadequate training than of an insufficiency of tanks
and the difficulties of providing enough tanks in the right locations at the right
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The evolution of British tactical and operational tank doctrine
and training in the First World War
There was no guidance as to training - the entire system had to be thought
out from the beginning,  and continually modified by the experience of the
battlefield - instructors had not only to be found but trained - espirit de corps
and discipline had to be built up; and all this against time.1
INTRODUCTION
On 15 September 1916 after nearly two years of development and numerous set-
backs, 21 British tanks rolled into action on the Somme for the first time.2 Manned by
hastily  recruited  and  trained  crews,  ‘the  trickle  of  tanks  only  made  a  slight
contribution to the day’s success, such as it was’.3  The tactical employment of the
tank evolved over the following years largely as the result of experience gained on
the battlefield. The crews and commanders needed to be trained how to drive and
maintain the new vehicles; and how to navigate them over the battlefield and fight
them.  Initially, their training was rudimentary, hampered by a lack of vehicles and
1
 Elles, Hugh, Major-General. Introduction to  C & A Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps  
(Country Life, 1919 ), p.vi.
2
 There are conflicting opinions on how many tanks actually went into action on 15 
September. Harris, quoting Liddell Hart and Terraine, gives 50 tanks sent to France plus 10 
reserves, 48 fit for action of which 36 reached the assembly point. 30 of these started and 21
fought in action. Harris, J P, Men, ideas and tanks (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press: Manchester, 1995) p.65,
3
 Liddell Hart, B.H., The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its 
Predecessors, etc 1914 -1945. Volume I. 1914-1939 (Cassell, 1959), p.71.
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inadequate training facilities.4 It  concentrated on basic driving and gunnery skills,
and was given by instructors only a little more knowledgeable than their students. 
The  novel  weapon  was  untested  in  warfare  and  the  early  tactical  and
operational  employment  was based  on  the best  guesses  and  assumptions  of  a
number  of  ‘experts’.   Higher  commanders  needed  to  be  educated  in  the  most
effective use of  these weapons.  This required a body of tactical  and operational
doctrine on which to base the training requirements, doctrine that was capable of
being adapted in the light of battle experience.
This thesis explores the processes by which the training of tank crews and
commanders evolved during the course of the Great War in response to combat
experience,  enemy  counter-measures,  technical  improvements  and  the
accumulation of experience by higher command. It explores the evolution of tactical
and operational doctrine in the light of combat experience. It argues that the tanks’
patchy performance in  the Hundred Days was not  so much the result  of  flawed
tactical and operational doctrine or of inadequate training of crews and commanders
but because of the inadequate numbers and the inevitable mechanical shortcomings
of an innovative weapon of war.
SOURCES AND LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a substantial  body of academic and other literature concerning tanks in
1914-18. Generally, these fall into three categories: discussions about the origins of
the tank; works that document the technical development of the tank; and numerous
accounts of the tanks in action, their successes and failures. There is little in the
4
 Glanville, John, The Devil’s Chariots (Stroud: Sutton, 2006 [2001]), pp.215-238; 
Mitchell, Frank, Tank Warfare (Nelson, 1934), pp.68-87.
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current  historiography of  tanks in the Great  War that  deals  with the tactical  and
technical training of tank crews and commanders, nor, equally importantly, about the
education  of  senior  commanders  concerning the operational  employment  of  this
novel weapon of war.
Until relatively recently, the historiography of the evolution and employment
of the tank in the Great War was dominated by two commentators, Major-General
J.F.C. Fuller and Captain Basil Liddell Hart. Fuller’s opinions tended to encourage
the popular view that the tank could have been a war-winning weapon had it been
taken up more enthusiastically  by higher commanders.  Recently  scholarship has
taken a more nuanced view. 
Nonetheless, Fuller was as a key figure. ‘A controversial and prolific writer,
Fuller laid the conceptual foundations for the theory of armoured warfare and was
heavily  involved in  the polemic debates over the future place of  the tank in  the
structure  of  the  British  Army.’5 He  produced  numerous  papers,  instructions  and
memoranda on the employment of tanks in his rôle as a GSO1 at the HQ of the
HBMGC, (later the Tank Corps) in France from early 1917 until August 1918. ‘The
tank was a new weapon with no precedents on which to base a doctrine for tactical
employment. Fuller’s ingenuity and formidable energy were tested by the challenge
posed by this novelty.’6
However,  most  of  Fuller’s  publications  were  produced  after  1918  and
concerned  his  interest,  even  obsession,  in  arguing  for  the  pre-eminent  role  of
armoured  forces  in  future  warfare.  The  problem  for  the  historian  in  assessing
5
 Holden Reid, Brian, ‘J F C Fuller’ in Charles Messenger (ed.), Readers’ Guide to 
Military History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013 [2011])
6
 Holden Reid, B, J F C Fuller - Military Thinker (Macmillan 1987), p.30
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Fuller’s contribution to the development of tactical doctrine and training during the
First  World  War  is  two-fold.  They  must  decide  first,  to  what  extent  did  Fuller’s
extensive and forthright opinions on the operational employment of tanks influence
higher commanders? Second, how much has he influenced the post-war debate on
the use of tanks during the First World War 7  Care must be taken to consider the
papers and ideas that he actually produced during the war and treat with caution his
later writings. Bryn Hammond makes this same point: 
To reach a balanced assessment of the BEF's actual employment of tanks in
battle in the First World War, analysis must be strictly confined to ideas and
projects planned and executed during the war that were based on or used
the various tank models that actually saw service on the Western Front in the
period 1916-1918.  The reader is  enjoined to put  aside any knowledge of
post-war tank development and tactical theory and concentrate only on the
actualities of the First World War.8
However, Fuller’s 1920 book does have a useful chapter on the establishment of the
initial training centres. He also briefly described the later organisation of the Tank
Corps Central Schools.9
Basil  Liddell  Hart  had no direct connection with the Tank Corps, but was
commissioned to write the authorised history of the Royal Tank Regiment.10 Unlike
some of his other writings this work is generally regarded as being an accurate work
of scholarship, subject as it was to the ‘peer scrutiny’ of the participants of events
and actions depicted, albeit it is not referenced.11  Liddell Hart was a close friend of
7
 Holden Reid, Fuller, p.5.
8
 Hammond, B, ‘The theory and practice of tank co-operation with other arms on the 
Western Front in the    First World War.’ (University of Birmingham, PhD, 2009), p.16.
9
 Fuller J.F.C. Tanks in the Great War (New York: Dutton, 1920).
10
 Liddell Hart, The Tanks
11
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Fuller and was undoubtedly influenced by Fuller’s opinions and tended to endorse
his views.12
Care therefore needs to be exercised in using Liddell Hart as a source. Gary
Sheffield described him as ‘a vain man, determined to portray himself as a prophet
of  modern  warfare  who  struggled  against  the  forces  of  military  reaction.’13
Furthermore,  Liddell  Hart  was  not  above  using  selective  extracts  from  primary
sources to validate his opinions.14 Although, inevitably, his regimental history deals
largely with the operations and actions of the Tank Corps during the Great War, he
does also include some details of the early training of tank crews in England before
they were despatched to France.
 The new weapon of war spawned a number of near contemporary memoirs,
personal testimonies and accounts of the tank in action. Of these perhaps the most
comprehensive is a history of the Tank Corps published privately in 1919 by Major
Clough  Williams-Ellis  and  his  wife,  Alice.15  Williams-Ellis  served  as  the
Reconnaissance Officer of 1 Tank Brigade between 1917 and 1918 and had first-
hand experience of many of the events described.  There is a useful  chapter on
training at Elveden and another on the training at Bermicourt in France in late 1916
and early  1917.  He gives  a  short  account  of  training  at  the Central  Schools  at
Bovington from 1916. However, his viewpoint is that of a relatively junior regimental
 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks p.2
12
 Mearsheimer, J, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Brassey’s, 1988)
13
 Sheffield, Gary, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (Aurum, 2012 
[2011]),  p.347
14
 Sheffield, The Chief, p.347; Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart, p.13.
15
 Williams-Ellis, Tank Corps (Country Life, 1919)
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and staff officer and throws little light on the formulation of tactical and operational
doctrine on which training had to be based.
Captain D.G.Browne, a tank commander, later a reconnaissance officer, in G
Battalion arrived in France in May 1917. His book, written in 1920, largely recorded
in great detail actions that he was personally involved in together with brief accounts
of  early  training  at  Thetford  and  at  Bermicourt.  Though  somewhat  partisan,  his
writings  drew  out  many  of  the  lessons  learnt,  some  from  painful  personal
experience, from the tank actions of 1917 and 1918.16
Major William Watson, a Company Commander in D Battalion of HB MGC in
1917  and  commander  of  4  Tank  Supply  Company  of  the  Tank  Corps  in  1918,
published in 1920 an account of his experiences with tanks.17 As with the other near
contemporary  accounts,  Watson  recounted  in  vivid  detail  the  actions  he  was
personally involved in. He devoted a chapter to the problems of training the tank
crews in France and gives some useful insight into the training of the Tank Supply
Companies of which he was a commander.
Captain  Richard  Haigh  published  a  contemporary  memoir  in  June  1918
when many of the Tank Corps’ actions during the ‘Hundred Days’ were yet to be
fought. His is a short account written in the third person in a somewhat light-hearted
style. While again giving a good account of tanks in action, it also throws some light
on the training of tank crews in France.18
16
 Browne, Captain D.G., The Tanks in Action (Blackwood, 1920)
17
 Watson, Major W.H.L.,  A Company of Tanks (Blackwood, 1920)
18
 Haigh, Richard, Life in a tank  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918)
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Possibly  the  best,  near  contemporary,  first-hand  account  of  Tank  Corps
training in the UK is provided by Frank Mitchell.  Although written in 1934, Mitchell
described in detail  the progress of a young Tank Corps officer cadet’s training at
Pirbright,  Wareham  and  Wool  before  being  commissioned  and  despatched  to
France as a tank commander.19
The archives of  the Tank Museum at  Bovington provide a rich source of
largely untapped primary sources. There are a number of contemporary histories
produced  towards  the  end  of  the  war  of  the  various  branches  of  the  training
organisations in Britain and France.20 Supplementing these is the personal journal of
Fuller whilst he was GSO1 at Tank Corps HQ containing not only his sometimes
acerbic  and  candid  opinions  of  senior  commanders’  views  on  tanks  but,  more
usefully, copies of correspondence to and from Tank HQ and the higher formations
and  Tank  Brigades.  Together  with  Fuller’s  lengthy  papers  on  tank  operational
doctrine, training directives and after-action reports, they help the historian to piece
together the evolution of tank tactical and operational doctrine. 
The  Liddell  Hart  Centre  for  Military  Archives  at  King’s  College,  London
contains  additional  Fuller  material.  Although  often duplicating  the Tank Museum
material,  the  Fuller  volumes  there  also  close  many  of  the  gaps  in  the  official
correspondence. Similarly, The Liddell Hart Centre also holds the papers of Liddell
Hart and of Colonel Ernest Swinton, one of the early proponents of the tanks.
19
 Mitchell, F, Tank Warfare (Nelson, 1934)
20
 See, for example, Tank Corps History: Central Schools, Bovington; Tank Gunnery 
School, France; Tank Gunnery School, England 1916-19, etc. The archives of the Tank 
Museum, Bovington (Hereafter TM) 355.486.86 
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The National Archives hold much of the surviving official correspondence to
and from GHQ and the HQ of the Tank Corps in France and between GHQ and the
Tank Directorate in London. The National Archives also hold the War Diaries for
most Tank Corps Battalions and Brigades, supplementing those held in the Tank
Museum archives.
Many of  the more recent  Great  War historians  deal  with the influence of
tanks on tactics and operations in the latter stages of the war. Few however go into
great detail about how those tactics and operations evolved and were reflected in
the training of the Tank Corps. Of the modern academic works concerning tanks in
the Great War, Harris’s book, published in 1995, is probably the best at tracing the
early  development  of  tank tactics at  the time when the HB MGC had very little
practical battle experience to work on. He continues with the debates between the
advocates of ‘mechanical warfare’ and ‘traditional’ methods in the latter stages of
the war which will be dealt with later in the thesis.21
David  Childs’  book  deals  with  the  ‘Search  for  a  Tactical  Doctrine  of
Employment’ in Part III of his work. The organisation of the Tank Corps in France
which has some bearing on the training organisation is also described. There is also
a useful section on the subject of combined infantry and tank training, one aspect of
the overall learning process which will be explored further in this thesis.22
John Glanville’s book deals largely with the difficulties encountered in the
initial  design  and  development  of  a  practical  armoured  fighting  vehicle,  the
subsequent modifications and evolution of the tank, of the rivalries and lack of co-
21
 Harris,  Men, Ideas and Tanks
22
 Childs, David, A Peripheral Weapon? The Production and Employment of British 
Tanks in the Great War. (Westport CT & London: Greenwood Press, 1999)
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operation  between  the  service  and  government  departments  involved  and  the
practical difficulties in the supply of sufficient tanks to the users in the front line.23
Paddy Griffith argues that the effectiveness of the tank ‘was considerably
less potent in practice than its propagandists would have us believe.’  Pointing out
the need for  training in  tank and infantry co-operation both before and after  the
Battle  of  Cambrai,  his  chapter  on ‘Doctrine  and Training’  chronicles  the general
development  of  training doctrine in  the BEF through,  in part,  the system of  ‘SS’
publications. He touches briefly on the pamphlets specifically concerned with tank
training, tank co-operation with infantry and anti-tank defence. The evolution of tank
training doctrine will be examined further in this thesis.24 
Harris, in Bond and Cave’s compilation of essays published in 1999, includes
a chapter on ‘Haig  and the Tank’.  He sets out  to  challenge the view held  by a
number of historians that Haig was not receptive to new technology and did not fully
embrace the potential of the tank in breaking the stalemate on the Western Front.25
He argues that, on the contrary, it was Haig’s over-enthusiastic support of tanks that
led  to them being used too soon and in  insufficient  numbers on the Somme in
September 1916. The short essay describes some of the earlier concepts for the
use of the new weapon but does not go into any detail of the subsequent evolution
of mobile warfare doctrine at higher command.26 A recently published collection of
essays includes  chapters on practical  considerations  of  tank operations  by Bryn
23
 Glanfield, John, The Devil’s Chariots: The Birth and Secret Battles of the First 
Tanks (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2001)
24
 Griffith, Paddy,  Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack
1916-1918 (Yale University Press, 1994)
25
 See Tim Travers, How the war was won (Routledge, 1992) and Denis Winter, 
Haig’s Command: A Re-assessment (Viking, 1991)
26
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Hammond;  Tank Corps  reconnaissance  and intelligence  by  Jim Beach;  on  tank
communications by Brian N. Hall and on the aftermath of Cambrai by Alaric Searle.27
The  range  of  literature  dealing  with  specific  tank  actions  is  substantial.
Several stand out from amongst the pile. The late Trevor Pidgeon’s two books on
the various tank actions on the Somme are outstanding in the depth of research he
devoted to tracing the actions of tank units and, in many cases, of individual tanks.28
Similarly, Bryn Hammond’s book on Cambrai provides a comprehensive and critical
account  of  the  tank  actions  during  that  operation.29 For  the  tank  operations  at
Amiens in August 1918, Charles Messenger’s book is significant.30  More recently,
Ian Verrinder has produced an account of B Battalion’s experiences at Messines,
Third  Ypres  and  Cambrai  using  previously  unknown  personal  crew  testimonies
which provide some insights into tank training in France in early 1917.31 Another
recently published book by Stephen Pope traces the individual histories of some of
the tankmen who took part in the initial tank action on 15 September 1916.32 Most of
 Bond,B. & Cave,N.(eds.), Haig:A re-appraisal 80 years on (Barnsley:Pen & 
Sword,2009[1999])
27
 Searle, Alaric, (ed.) Genesis, Employment, Aftermath; First World War Tanks and 
the New Warfare, 1900-1945 (Solihull:Helion, 2015)
28
 Pidgeon, Trevor, Tanks at Flers (Cobham: Fairmile Books,1995); and Tanks on the 
Somme; From Morval to Beaumont Hamel (Barnsley: Pen & Sword,2010)
29
 Hammond Bryn,  Cambrai 1917: The Myth of the First Great Tank Battle 
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2008) 
30
 Messenger, Charles, The Day we Won the War. Turning point at Amiens 8 August 
1918  (Orion, 2009 [2008])
31
 Verrinder, Ian, Tank Action in the Great War: B Battalion’s Experiences 1917 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2009)
32
 Pope, Stephen, The First Tank Crews (Solihull:Helion, 2016)
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these accounts of specific actions, however, deal with the tactics and the outcomes
of  the actions depicted;  few concentrate on the training and preparation of  tank
crews and commanders before action or how training doctrine evolved as a result of
lessons learnt. This thesis will seek to correct this omission.
Surprisingly, there are few scholarly journal articles on the specific subject of
tanks. Travers argued in his 1992 paper that tanks could have been war winners
earlier  in  1918  had  there  been  sufficient  numbers  and  had  they  been  used
appropriately by a GHQ that was more receptive to the idea of using tanks. In short,
the  problem  was  more  ‘mental  than  mechanical’.33 This  argument  was  further
addressed in Child’s 1994 paper where he argues that, far from Travers’ suggestion
that ‘armies got no guidance from above except by suggestion’, GHQ in fact issued
a whole series of manuals and instructions regarding the tactical and operational
employment of tanks.34 This argument will be developed further in this thesis. The
paper which comes closest to dealing with the training of the Tank Corps is Bryn
Hammond’s PhD thesis which examines the question of tank co-operation with other
arms. It necessarily concentrates on this aspect rather than with other aspects of
tank training.35 
This  thesis will take a broader view of the training of the Tank Corps; the
initial training of the tank crews and commanders, the subsequent evolution of the
various tank training schools in England and France, and the development of tank
training doctrine in the light of combat experience.
33
 Travers, Tim, ‘Could the tanks of 1918 been war winners for the British 
Expeditionary Force?’,  Journal of Contemporary History, 27 (2) (July 1992), pp.389-406
34
 Childs, David, ‘Were the tank problems of 1918’as much mental as mechanical’?’ 
Bulletin of Military History Research, 44 (1994),  pp. 143-155
35
 Hammond, ‘Theory and practice’.
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In summary, although there is a considerable volume of literature on tanks
most seem to concentrate on the genesis and development of the tank or on the
conduct and outcomes of actions in which tanks were involved. There is little in the
current historiography that deals with the inseparable aspects of the evolution of
tactical and operational tank doctrine and the formulation and practice of training
tank crews and commanders and the education of senior commanders. This thesis
will bridge this small gap in the current historiography of the Tank Corps in the Great
War.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In seeking to fill this gap in the historiography, the following research questions need
to be addressed. How did tactical requirements first evolve in the absence of combat
experience? How did early training address the perceived  tactical requirements?
How did those requirements evolve in the light of actual battle experience? How was
training implemented? What was the training organisation? What were the restraints
on training, was it effective? How did tank operational doctrine evolve? Who derived
it and how? How was it implemented? How did it fit in with overall BEF operational
doctrine?  Finally,  to  what  extent  did  tank  operational  and  tactical  doctrine  and
training contribute to the outcome of the Hundred Days?
Research  has  been  largely  conducted  in  the  extensive  archives  of  the
Library of the Tank Museum at Bovington, with supplementary work in the records
held in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Research at King’s College London and
The National Archives. Dealing, as it does, with an evolutionary process, the thesis
necessarily follows a largely chronological theme, highlighting specific aspects of the
17
process. It concentrates on operations on the Western Front from the introduction of
the  tank  in  September  1916  until  the  Armistice  in  November  1918.  It  will  not
consider nor be influenced by the post-war debate on the future role of armoured




The organisation responsible for armoured warfare underwent a number of changes
of title during the Great War. It began as the Heavy Section (later, Heavy Branch) of
the  Machine-Gun  Corps,  before  being  renamed  the  Tank  Corps.  Many
contemporary  histories  and  references  use  these  titles  without  strict  regard  to
chronology.  In  general,  this  thesis  will  follow  chronological  usage  but  may
occasionally use the generic title of ‘The Tank Corps’.
In this thesis reference will  frequently be made to operational and tactical
doctrine. In identifying the difference between these two levels of military activity,
useful  definitions are provided by Gary Sheffield:  ‘The tactical  level refers to the
conduct of battles. The operational level refers to the conduct of campaigns, and
serves as a link between strategy and tactics, the highest and lowest levels of war.’36
Mearsheimer  similarly  defines  tactics  as:  ‘tactics  is  a  more  narrowly  focussed
concept [than strategy]: the focus is on the specific battlefield employment of the
different elements that comprise an army or its supporting air forces. Tactics deals
with questions about how specific military units are used to win particular battles.’37 
Doctrine is a concept that is more difficult to define and has received much
attention among military historians. In 1922 Fuller defined doctrine as:
The  central  idea  of  an  army......To  be  sound  [it]  must  be  based  on  the
principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit
of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance......this central idea
or doctrine is nothing else than common sense- that is, action adapted to
circumstances.38
36
 Sheffield, Gary, Forgotten Victory; The First World War: Myths and Realities 
(Headline Publishing Group, 2001), p.xxii
37
 Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart, p.16
38
19
Sheffield argues that although the British Army ‘went through the First World War
without a formal doctrine in the modern sense’ it did ‘however, have body of doctrine
in the form of the Field Service Regulations’ and that ‘rather than being prescriptive,
FSR set out broad principles for action.’39 Other historians have attempted to define
doctrine, among them Bidwell and Graham, Christopher Pugsley, Hew Strachan and
Albert Palazzo.40
In  this  thesis,  the  rather  more  ‘traditional’  definition  of  doctrine,  as
representing a body of  ‘common standards and routines’  or ‘standard operating
procedures’ will be adopted.  It will be shown that, as the Tank Corps expanded in
size and learned lessons from combat experience, tactical and operational doctrine
emerged. The newly formed Tank Corps embracing recruits from civilian life as well
as from all levels of the army social hierarchy from smart cavalry regiments to the
ASC, had to create its own esprit de corps through its training processes. It had no
traditions or history to look back on and the creation of  esprit  de corps featured
heavily in the outcomes of the various training programmes which will be discussed
further.
 Fuller, J.F.C., quoted in Sheffield,  ‘Doctrine and Command in the British Army: E-1 
An Historical Overview ‘, in Army Doctrinal Publication - Operations Annex (Shrivenham, 
2010), p.E-2
39
 Sheffield, ‘Doctrine and Command’, p.E-9
40
 See Bidwell, Shelford and Graham, Dominic. Firepower; The British Army Weapons
& Theories of War 1904-1945 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004 [1982]);Pugsley, Christopher, 
‘We Have Been Here Before: The Evolution of the Doctrine of Decentralised Command in 
the British Army 1905-1989’  Sandhurst Occasional Papers No.9 (2011); Strachan, Hew, 
‘Operational Art and Britain, 1909-2009’ p.97 quoted in Pugsley ‘ Been here before’ p.6 and 
Palazzo, Albert, Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical 
Warfare in World War I (Lincoln and University of Nebraska Press, 2000)
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CHAPTER ONE - EARLY TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND TRAINING
THE EVOLUTION OF EARLY TACTICAL DOCTRINE
The  design  of  the  first  operational  tanks  clearly  had  to  be  based  on  the  early
perceptions of the role of such an armoured vehicle. Paradoxically, the role of this
novel weapon of war could not be fully assessed until it had gone into action for the
first  time.  Equally,  the  training  of  crews  and  commanders  depended  on  the
production of a sound tactical doctrine on which to base training. The dilemma was
neatly summarised by Major-General Hugh Elles, commander of the Tank Corps in
France: ‘There was no guidance as to training - the entire system had to be thought
out  from  the  beginning,  and  continually  modified  by  the  experience  of  the
battlefield.’41 As a modern historian argues: ‘the best method of using tanks could
only be worked out by practical experiment.’42
It was perhaps Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Swinton who first articulated the
tactical requirement for an armoured fighting vehicle on the Western Front. As the
Assistant Secretary to the CID, he was sent to the Western Front in October 1914
as  the  official  war  correspondent,  ‘Eyewitness’,  to  report  back  on  the  current
situation  there.  He  witnessed  and  was  deeply  concerned  about  the  effects  of
German MGs and the difficulty of breaking through barbed wire entanglements. He
described to Maurice Hankey,  the Secretary of the CID, the impasse which was
developing.43 Faced with indifference at higher command levels, on 28 December
41
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1914,  Hankey  produced  his  ‘Boxing  Day  Memorandum’.44 This  included  various
proposals  for  overcoming  the  stalemate  on  the  Western  Front,  among  them
Swinton’s  idea  of  an  armoured  ‘caterpillar’  vehicle  capable  of  crossing  and
destroying enemy trenches. An informal committee was authorised to look into the
question.
Hankey’s proposals were taken up enthusiastically by Winston Churchill, the
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  who,  unbeknown  to  the  War  Office,  was  already
sponsoring independent  trials of various armoured vehicles for use by the Royal
Naval Air Service [RNAS] and the Royal Naval Division [RND] in Flanders.
What was lacking was a considered appreciation of the tactical requirement
for the proposed vehicle; in effect, a tactical doctrine. Swinton, clearly frustrated by
his  unsuccessful  attempts  since  October  1914,  both  by  ‘verbal  and  personal
representations’ to get his concerns taken up by GHQ, sent a memorandum entitled
‘The Necessity for Machine Gun Destroyers,’ to the Sub-Chief of the General Staff,
Major-General Henry Wilson, on 1 June 1915. Swinton saw the principal need as
being for what he termed ‘Machine Gun Destroyers’.45
He identified German MGs as the ‘chief factor which has rendered abortive
our attempts to penetrate their positions’, for which he proposed two solutions; the
use of ‘Artillery and high explosive ammunition to blast a way through the German
positions’, or ‘some other means of destroying these weapons’. As sufficient artillery
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and HE was not yet available, ‘Armoured Machine Gun Destroyers’ might  be ‘the
other means’. His description of such a vehicle was remarkably close to what was
actually produced more than six months later. He emphasised the need to build the
machines in secrecy and not to disclose their existence until enough were available.
In attack he suggested that 50 destroyers might be available, deployed in
line at 100 yard intervals covering a frontage of around 5,000 yards or three miles. A
preceding artillery bombardment would cut the wire entanglements and, at dawn,
the destroyers would climb out of their pits and advance on the German lines at the
rate of  three miles  an hour.  They would  crush any identified  MGs and enfilade
trenches using  their  2  pounder  guns and MGs.  Artillery  would  thus  be freed to
concentrate  on  counter-battery  tasks.  The  infantry  would  advance  ‘practically
unscathed’ by MGs. Once through the first line of trenches, the destroyers would
turn and attack them from the rear, then proceed forwards supporting the first wave
of  attackers  and  ‘the  mass  of  troops  forming  the  main  body  of  the  attack.’  In
defence, Swinton saw the tanks being used as ‘mobile strong points’ to be driven
forward against any enemy penetration, a use to which many tanks were indeed put
during the German March offensive in 1918.
Swinton’s  memorandum  was  the  first  attempt  at  formulating  a  tactical
doctrine for the use of armoured vehicles on the Western Front. In hindsight, it is
easy to identify obvious flaws. For example, the use of artillery as envisaged by
Swinton,  would have a number of  consequences; first, the ammunition and fuses
available at the time were not effective in cutting barbed wire or of destroying deep
dug-outs; second, a preliminary bombardment  would give away the vital element of
surprise and allow the defenders to man their trenches once the bombardment had
lifted  and  third,  intense  preliminary  bombardments  would  crater  the  ground  and
render it difficult, if not impossible, for machines to cross. However, Swinton must be
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credited with giving some constructive thought to overcoming the impasse on the
Western Front and producing an early attempt at tactical doctrine for the armoured
vehicles.
Field Marshal Sir John French, the C-in-C of the BEF, thought ‘there appears
to be considerable tactical value in the proposal’ and forwarded the memorandum to
the War Office suggesting that Swinton’s proposal be placed in secret before an
experienced firm for further investigation.46 He stated that he understood that the
Admiralty was already conducting experiments indicating that the Admiralty and the
WO  were  not,  at  this  stage,  co-operating  in  a  development  that  more  directly
affected the Army than the Navy. 
Swinton returned to the UK in July 1915 as the Acting Secretary of the CID
and was in a position to push forward the development of a suitable machine. He
was concerned to co-ordinate the separate efforts of the Admiralty and the Army: ‘I
am  doing  my  best  to  help  to  get  the  different  designs  of  machines  under
consideration co-ordinated.’47 Swinton called an Inter-departmental Conference on
28 August 1915 with representatives from the War Office, the Admiralty, and the
Ministry  of  Munitions.  The  conference  was  held  specifically  to  ‘Consider  future
procedure as to the design and construction of “land cruisers” or armoured motor
cars propelled by the “caterpillar” principle, for the use of the Army.’ It was agreed
that  the  Churchill’s  Land  Ship  Committee  would  continue  to  supervise  the
experimental  work  in  design  and  construction  of  the  land  cruiser  but  taking
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instructions about the design requirements from the War Office. The whole was to
be co-ordinated by the Inventions Department of the Ministry of Munitions.48
As the possibility of a suitable machine was fast becoming a reality, thoughts
were turning to the manning and training of the future crews. French had already
indicated in his letter of 22 June 1915 that he wanted the training to be carried out in
the UK. The conference reported that:
For  the  manning  of  these  machines,  also,  special  technical  men will  be
required. The crews  must include drivers experienced in handling caterpillar
vehicles who will have to be trained almost as trick drivers in order to get the
best  out  of  the  cruisers;  mechanics  in  order  to  maintain  and  repair  the
machines; and skilled machine gunners able to shoot from moving platforms.
These  duties  will  have  to  be,  to  a  large  extent,  interchangeable;  and  to
enable them to be carried out will necessitate the collection of a body of men
of a far higher class than that usually found in the ranks or amongst military
motor transport drivers.49
The  next  significant  move  in  the  development  of  a  tactical  doctrine  came  from
Winston Churchill. Despite being demoted from First Lord of the Admiralty in May
1915 he managed to remain closely involved in the development of a ‘land cruiser’
by the Admiralty. Whilst serving as a battalion commander in France from January
to May 1916 and witnessing at first-hand the stalemate, he considered the problem
of breaking the trench deadlock on the Western Front. In early December 1915 he
forwarded  a  paper  entitled  ‘Variants  of  the  Offensive’ to  Sir  John  French  and
others.50 
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Under the heading ‘Attack by Armour’, Churchill envisaged the use of small
armoured shields to protect advancing infantry. These could be propelled by hand
‘during the short walk across from trench to trench.’ In addition, he had a vision of
larger  ‘caterpillar  engines’  which  would  pass  ‘through or  across  our  trenches at
prepared points.’  Armed with two or three maxims and ‘flame apparatus’ they would
turn parallel to the enemy trenches sweeping them with fire. The engine would be
capable of crossing any known obstacles and be invulnerable to anything other than
a  direct  hit  from  a  field  gun.  In  his  enthusiasm,  Churchill  stated  that  70  such
machines were nearing completion and should be inspected. What he clearly did not
know was that  a tentative order for 70 machines had been abandoned and that
experimental  work  was  concentrated  on  a  single  machine  that  showed  some
promise. Although much of his paper was somewhat fanciful and did not reflect the
practicalities of what machines were then currently available, his tactical proposals
were  remarkably  similar  to  those  propounded  by  Swinton  earlier.  There  is  no
evidence that the two men had colluded in their proposals.51
Churchill’s  paper  stirred some action within  the Government  departments
involved. In late December, the existing Land Ship Committee was replaced by an
inter-departmental  Tank  Supply  Committee  under  the  presidency  of  Lieutenant
Stern,  RNVR,  who  had  been  responsible  for  much  of  the  Admiralty’s  earlier
experimentation.  The  Admiralty  did  not  want  responsibility  for  further
experimentation  and the production  and supply  of  future armoured vehicles  that
were clearly for the benefit of the Army. The WO wanted the establishment of a
specialist corps of skilled drivers and mechanics to man the estimated 50 machines
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required. Existing personnel from 20 Squadron RNAS were to form the nucleus of
the new corps.52
A further meeting of the Tank Supply Committee sat on Christmas Eve, 24
December 1915, and recommended an ‘approximate establishment’, based on the
suggested number of 50 tanks, of one officer and 10 rank and file for every tank plus
a 50% reserve. They therefore needed to recruit 75 officers and 750 other ranks. It
was ‘thought both officers and men should have some mechanical knowledge and
aptitude, and that they should be drawn from those now serving in any branch of the
forces or from civil life.’ It considered ‘that each member of this body of men should
be trained to perform every duty which he might be likely to be called upon to carry
out.’  Personnel  from  20  Squadron  RNAS  were  to  be  given  the  opportunity  of
transferring into the new corps which would form a ‘Tank Detachment’ of the existing
MGC. 53
In  early  January,  the  first  experimental  tank,  nicknamed  ‘Mother’,  was
demonstrated  in  Lincoln  in  front  of  a  number  of  members  of  the  Tank  Supply
Committee. Sir Douglas Haig, the new C-in-C of the BEF, had read Churchill’s paper
and, after enquiring; ‘is anything known about the Caterpillar referred to in para. 4,
page  3?’  sent  one  of  his  Operations  Staff  Officers,  Major  Hugh  Elles,  (later  to
command the Tank Corps in France), to witness the new weapon and report back to
him. Demonstrations of the new tank were held in late January at a secret location in
Hatfield Park over an obstacle course of representative British and German trenches
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and wire entanglements. The Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, attended
and  was  apparently  unimpressed.  The  King  attended  a  trial  a  few days  later.54
Having received reports from his staff, Haig reported to the WO:
The reports of the officers who represented me at the trials...lead me to the
conclusion  that  these  ‘Tanks’  can  be  usefully  employed  in  offensive
operations by the forces under my command.55
He ordered that between 30 and 40 tanks be ready by mid-May and asked whether
further tanks might be ready by mid-July. He recommended that personnel should
be ‘supplied and trained at home.’ He emphasised that ‘Secrecy is of the highest
importance in order to get full  advantage from the use of these machines.’  This
endorsement by Haig of the new weapon indicates that GHQ was supportive of new
initiatives.  Following  the  trials,  100  machines  were  ordered  by  the  WO,  later
increased to 150.56
Until now, any consideration of the training of tank crews and commanders
had been directed towards the mechanical aspects of their role; gunnery, driving
and maintenance. There had been no mention of tactical training and little in the way
of  doctrine on which to base it.  However,  once the acceptance of  the tank was
assured, Swinton expanded his former thoughts into a more substantial document,
‘Notes on the Employment of “Tanks”’, published in late February.57 This important
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seminal document formed the basis for tank tactical doctrine for the remainder of the
war, although it was much altered in detail in the light of combat experience.  A note
inserted at the beginning of Swinton’s document reads:
These notes as to measures of preparation and suitable tactics for tanks are
not intended to imply that the whole of our offensive operations are to be
subordinated  to  their  action.  They  are  put  forward  as  a  basis  for  early
discussion of the possibilities and requirements of an entirely new weapon,
so that by the time that it is ready for employment everything possible may
have been done to ensure its success.
The first sentence is significant in that it foreshadows the debate that ensued during
the following years over the operational role of the tank.58 
Swinton described the characteristics and armament of the current tank. The
trench crossing ability had been increased to 10 feet as a result of the analysis of
captured German trenches.  The current  armament was Hotchkiss machine guns
with two naval Hotchkiss 6 pounder QF guns with an effective range of 2000 yards,
mounted either side of the machine in detachable sponsons. Enemy machine guns
would be destroyed either by crushing by the tank itself or by being engaged by the
QF guns. The tank was rendered practically invulnerable to rifle and machine gun
fire and shell splinters by 12mm hardened steel plate. Swinton proposed various
methods  of  communicating  with  the  accompanying  infantry;  small  ‘wireless
telegraphy’  sets,  a  trailing  telephone  cable,  miniature  kite  balloons  and  smoke
rockets. In practice, effective communication with the infantry remained a problem
throughout the rest of the war.59
There were limitations to the machines as yet unresolved. The crossing of
rivers and canals would be difficult;  existing bridges in the battle zone would not
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carry  the  weight  of  the  tanks;  woods  and  soft,  muddy  ground  would  impede
progress. He recognised that the chief weakness of the tanks was their vulnerability
to direct fire from artillery or even to high velocity, small calibre rifle fire which the
Germans were thought to be developing.  They would also be vulnerable to land
mines.  However,  preparatory  artillery  counter-bombardment  counter-measures
could be devised to deal with these problems.60
Swinton re-emphasised the important point that successful use of the tank
depended on ‘its novelty and in the element of surprise.’ They should therefore ‘not
be used in driblets’ [emphasis in original] and ‘the fact of their existence should be
kept as secret as possible until the whole are ready to be launched.’61
Swinton discussed various tactical matters. The operational sector needed to
be carefully chosen in view of their limitations and in good time to allow for their
deployment.  Deployment  routes  needed  to  be  carefully  reconnoitred,  bridges
strengthened and river crossings prepared. In deployment the tanks should not be
further than 150 yards apart and, with the 100 tanks ordered, allowing for reserves
and flanking operations, a total frontage of some 9000 yards or three miles was
envisaged. In a footnote, Swinton noted:
This calculation as to the extent of frontage will hold good whether the tanks
are forward in one continuous line or in groups with intervals between the
groups so that certain areas may be ‘bitten off’  by a lateral movement as
soon as sufficient forward progress has been made. The selection of either
method is a matter of general tactics, and not one specially connected with
the employment of tanks.
This comment indicated an early, less prescriptive tactical doctrine resulting from, no
doubt, general uncertainty about how the tanks would actually perform in battle. The
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tanks would assemble in line about two miles in rear of their starting points to which
the  routes  would  be  reconnoitred  and  lit  by  lanterns  for  a  night  approach.
Alternatively, tanks would move by night into previously dug pits close to the front-
line from which they would emerge when the attack began.
The timing of the advance of the tanks in conjunction with the infantry was to
be the subject of much debate over the following years. Swinton believed that the
ideal  time  was  at  first  light  when  there  was  sufficient  daylight  for  the  tank
commanders to make progress. The tanks would advance first, sweeping the enemy
trenches with machine gun fire. When they had advanced about three-quarters of
the way through No-Man’s-Land attracting enemy fire onto themselves, the infantry
would sweep forward as the tanks enfiladed the trenches from the parapets. He
rejected the alternative view that the infantry should advance first  and the tanks
would then only advance if and when the infantry got held up by uncut wire or MGs.
He  reasoned  that  the  tanks  would  be  needed  from  the  outset  to  maintain  the
momentum of the attack.62 When the infantry had closed up, the tanks would then
proceed at ‘full speed’ (i.e. four miles per hour) for the enemy second-line trenches,
following and crushing the line of communications trenches to prevent the arrival of
reserves and reinforcements.
Swinton discussed ‘the Extent to which the Attack is pressed’. He debated
the merits of the step-by-step operation with a strictly limited advance after artillery
preparations, followed by a pause for consolidation and further artillery preparation
before another advance. The alternative operation was of an all-out violent effort to
burst through the enemy defensive lines. He stated that whichever course is taken
depended on the wishes of the C-in-C and the strategic situation. However, with the
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advent  of  the  tank,  the  ability  to  break through the defensive  zone  was  now a
feasible proposition. Swinton could foresee an advance of 12 miles in a day into the
heart  of  the  enemy  artillery  positions  providing  plans  were  made  for  the
replenishment of the tanks and their crews.63
On the question of co-operation with other arms, Swinton emphasised that
‘tanks cannot win battles by themselves. They were purely auxiliary to the infantry.’
They needed to be protected by reducing the effect of enemy artillery to which they
are most  vulnerable.  This could only  be done by the British artillery or  by aerial
bombardment concentrating not on the first-line defences,  which the tanks could
deal with themselves, but on the second-line artillery positions. Swinton concluded
by  saying  that  experiments  were  being  conducted  on  methods  of  clearing  wire
entanglements.64
Swinton’s important paper represented more his vision of the employment of
tanks than a prescriptive laying down of tactical doctrine. He posed a number of
questions which needed to be considered and perhaps could not be resolved until
the tanks had actually deployed in action. 
On 26 June 1916, a conference at GHQ attended by Swinton agreed on the
tactics that would form the basis of training:
... the tanks should move forward so as to reach the German first-line trench
before dawn followed up by our infantry which is to start forward from our line
as soon as the tanks reach the first line of the enemy; that in the further
operations that  will  ensue by day-light,  tanks should  precede the infantry
from place to place as quickly as possible; that the ultimate objectives of the
tanks during this period of attack should be:-
1. The German artillery positions
2. The German 2nd or 3rd lines;
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That the German artillery positions might be assumed at an approximation to
be at a distance of 2000 to 3000 yards from the German front line; that the
training of the Tanks should proceed on these lines and that the maximum
interval at which they should be spaced for the attack should be 150 yards;
that the crews should be trained to drive in the dark; that the movement from
the position of assembly to the starting point tapes may be laid forward up to
a distance of about 1,000 yards from our firing line or the tanks may be led
forward by guides up to that  distance;  further progress will  be guided by
disks painted with luminous paint.65
At last Swinton had some firm guidance on which to base the training of his tank
companies. In a letter of 8 July enclosing a copy of a provisional memorandum on
tactical training addressed to the BGGS, he shows that he was anxious to proceed
and could not wait to receive further views based on the experiences of the fighting
on 1 July 1916.66 He was no doubt aware that the likelihood of a major offensive,
using tanks for the first time, was not far away.
The next significant progress in the production of tactical doctrine came with
his  memorandum  produced  in  July  1916,  entitled  ‘The  Handling  of  the  Heavy
Section, Machine Gun Corps’. It was, according to a pencilled note on the copy in
the KCL archives, written jointly by Swinton and his staff officers at HQ HSMGC.
The memorandum emphasised, in capital letters:
THE PRIMARY OBJECT OF THIS UNIT [HS MGC] IS TO ASSIST THE
INFANTRY BY DISPOSING OF THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE
WAY OF THEIR ADVANCE IE, BARBED WIRE AND MACHINE GUNS. 
BATTLES CANNOT BE WON BY TANKS ALONE AND IT IS BY INFANTRY
AND INFANTRY ALONE THAT A DECISION CAN BE REACHED.
The section on training emphasised the following: ‘all officers should be able to read
a map- particularly a trench map - and understand the compass fitted in the Tank’;
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‘they should be practiced.... in synchronising their watches’; ‘they should be trained
in the issue of precise and concise verbal orders to subordinates’; and ‘they must
also be taught to exercise their imagination and to inspire that of their subordinates’.
Section Commanders were to be encouraged to find rapid solutions to problems set
by  the  Company  Commander  and  to  decide  exactly  how they  would  overcome
various obstacles. Tank crews should be taken on foot around the training area in all
weather  conditions  to identify  likely  enemy MG posts.  Practice in  laying  out  the
routes  of  deployment  needed  to  be  practiced  by  day  and  night.   Training  with
infantry  should  be  carried  out  to  ensure  that  they  followed  the  tanks  and  not
preceded them.67
Swinton produced some further ‘hints on the use of tanks’ on 27 July 1916
for  ‘circulation  amongst  those  who  will  have  control  of  them  in  action’.  These
included observations by Captain Martel, the GSO3 at Tank HQ. In the light of his
experiences on 1 July 1916, Martel thought it ‘absolutely imperative’ that the ‘hush-
hushes’  should  be used without  the usual  preliminary bombardment.  He did  not
think  the ‘hush-hushes’  would  be in  any danger  of  counter  bombardment  in  the
German front line trenches and that they could therefore precede the infantry. He
also  recommended that  the  tank  should  not  proceed  from the  first  line  until  all
Germans had been mopped up in their deep dug-outs. Swinton’s letter included a
single page of  ‘Tank Tips’  obviously  written for the benefit  of  tank commanders,
although it is not known if the tips ever made it to the battlefield.68
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All  these  various  views  were  coalesced  into  a  succinct  paper  issued  by
Major-General Launcelot  Kiggell,  CGS at  GHQ, on 16 August  1916.  It  was sent
personally to the commanders of the Fourth and Reserve Armies as they began
their planning for the forthcoming September offensive. The covering letter gave a
brief summary of the C-in-C’s intentions, listed the characteristics of the tank and
invited  the  two  commanders  to  consider  how  they  could  best  employ  the  new
weapons.  Kiggell  listed a number of points for consideration by the commanders
and emphasised that ‘the objectives of the “tanks” must be clearly stated and as
simple as possible, as it is difficult for the “tanks” to manoeuvre’.69
The paper  reiterated the  primary  object  of  the  tank;  ‘to  help  the  infantry
forward and especially to deal with enemy machine guns.’ It realistically pointed out
that  the  original  concept  of  an  advance  in  line  of  large  numbers  of  machines
involving  ‘an  approach  march  and  deployment  under  cover,  a  surprise  start,
accurate keeping of alignment and direction.....renders this a difficult operation’. It
cautioned that ‘a tank cannot, except at great risk, cross a heavy barrage of H.E. or
gas shells and it cannot lie out in the open under shell fire’.  The employment of the
tanks would be limited ‘unless we are prepared to risk the loss of all the tanks by
pushing them as far forward as they can go, if possible right through to the enemy’s
gun positions’.70
By the time the guidance was issued it was clear that large numbers of tanks
would not be available for their first deployment and the document therefore outlines
a number of ways the limited number of tanks could be employed:
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(a) The advance in line in large numbers;
(b) The attack in groups, or pairs, against selected objectives;
(c) Employment singly, or in pairs, for special purposes;
(d) Employment as mobile light artillery
The document ends on a cautious but realistic note:
The tank is a novel engine of war, and untried. Its use will require careful
study and preparation on each separate occasion...every attack  by tanks
must be combined with an infantry attack and it will be the special duty of the
infantry to co-operate closely with the tanks...
It is not known who the author of the document was, possibly Kiggell himself,
but it is clear that the document does not take Swinton’s original proposals at face
value. It is a more thoughtful and considered appraisal of the limitations of the new
weapon as well as of its potential. It is an important document in that it encapsulates
GHQ’s views on the tactical employment of tanks on the eve of their debut on the
Somme in September 1916. It illustrates the fact that elements of GHQ had given
some considerable thought to the practical use of this new addition to its armoury.
The document could be criticised for  being unduly cautious but,  on balance,  the
author was pointing out the known limitations of the new weapon which had not at
this stage been tested in combat.
What  is  remarkable  is  that  in  the  very  short  period  between  the  first
appearance  of  an  entirely  new  weapon  of  war  in  February  1916  to  its  first
deployment in September, a body of tactical doctrine had emerged, been refined
and  disseminated  to  the  commanders  involved.  All  this  was  done  against  a
background of uncertainty as to how many weapons would be available and how
they would actually perform, with the added constraint of maintaining secrecy. In
addition,  the headquarters staff  were facing other  considerable  pressures at  the
time.
Meanwhile,  Swinton,  the  man charged  with  both  finding  and  training  the




First,  authority  had to  be  sought  for  the  formation  and  organisation  of  the  new
‘corps’. At a WO conference held on 14 February 1916 attended by the Director of
Operations, and representatives of the Staff Duties, Adjutant General and Finance
branches, it was recommended that the new ‘tank detachment’ should form part of
the Motor Machine Gun Service [MMGS] of the MGC, as no further MMGS batteries
were being formed. The committee felt it unlikely that many RNAS personnel would
transfer from 20 Squadron into the MGC as the rates of pay were inferior. It was
more  likely  that  personnel  would  come from the  MMGS.71 On  17  March  1916,
Swinton was approved as the commander of the ‘special Corps’ which was to be
located in part of the barracks at Bisley occupied by the MMGC Training Centre.
The need for secrecy was again emphasised and all matters regarding training and
resources were to be addressed directly and confidentially to the Staff Duties branch
at War Office.72  On 1 May 1916, the WO confirmed that the ‘Tank Detachment’ of
the MGC would be renamed the ‘Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps’ in order to
preserve the secret nature of the unit.73
Initially, Swinton wanted the unit organised into three battalions each of five
companies of two sections with six tanks apiece. GHQ rejected this idea and wanted
a company to be an independent tactical unit.74 So the organisation was set at six
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companies  each  with  25  tanks  in  four  sections  of  six  tanks  and  a  spare.  This
organisation required an establishment of 184 officers and 1,610 other ranks.75
Attention  turned  to  the  recruitment  of  officers  and  men.  Swinton  had
recommended that the officers and men would be ‘trained at home ... to steer and
operate over an imitation British and German trench zone by the aid of trench maps
similar  to our aeroplane maps of  the German defensive positions.’76 Confidential
letters were sent out in January 1916 to the COs of Special Reserve and Training
Regiments in the UK for officer volunteers. Officers had to be under 25 and capable
of driving cars. No particular requirements appear to have been laid down for the
NCOs and soldiers although a number of ASC MT drivers who had worked on the
experimental Admiralty machines elected to transfer.
The  former  commander  of  the  MMGC,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bradley,
transferred as  Swinton’s Second-in-Command. In April,  he and Swinton made a
tour  of  officer  cadet  units,  in  particular  the  18th,  19th and  20th (Public  Schools)
Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers,  to spot  potential  officers with some mechanical
experience.77 They  even  enlisted  the  help  of  the  popular  magazine,  The  Motor
Cycle, to attract men from the motor engineering trades.78 Some personnel from the
MMGC transferred into the new unit but not a single man of 20 Squadron RNAS
 No reason was given for this decision. It is possible that, at this stage, GHQ 
regarded a company of tanks as a tactical addition to an infantry unit rather than part of a 
newly-created, independent organisation. 
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volunteered to join. This was hardly surprising when Naval pay was almost three
times that being offered by the Army.
Training was carried out initially at Siberia Camp, Bisley, the former training
centre of the MMGC. Two new companies of the MGC were formed, K and L, which
together formed the Heavy Section MGC.  No tanks were yet available to train on,
so training concentrated on the weapons; the Vickers and Hotchkiss machine guns
and the Hotchkiss 6 pounder QF gun. Captain D.G. Browne, who joined the Tank
Corps around this time, described those early days at Bisley:
There being as yet no tanks available for training purposes, the programme
of work at Bisley was limited virtually to drill and courses on the Hotchkiss
guns.  It  would  be  absurd  to  pretend  that  any  of  this  was  taken  very
seriously... the new formation suffered inevitably from a lack of competent
and energetic senior officers... Of the subaltern officers probably about 75
per cent represented as good material as could be found anywhere- a high
proportion, in view of the extraordinary and haphazard processes by which
the commissioned ranks of the New Army were filled, and one that compared
favourably with that of most infantry units.79
One  of  the  first  officers  to  volunteer,  Lieutenant  Raikes  of  the  South  Wales
Borderers,  met his  section of  recruits for  the first  time in April  1916.  They were
mainly men from a wide variety of backgrounds who had enlisted under the ‘Derby’
recruiting scheme and ‘no attempt had been made to pick men with mechanical
experience or who could even drive a lorry!’ They were taught how to handle the
Hotchkiss and Vickers Machine Guns and the 6 pounder gun at Bisley and with the
Navy at Portsmouth.  Their first encounter with an actual tank was not until June
when part of the HS had moved to Thetford to conduct its training there in greater
secrecy. They then had less than two-and-a-half months to learn how to drive and
maintain the machines before going into action for the first time in September 1916.
Raikes remarked:
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It is amusing to think that the first tanks were actually taken into action by
men who had not been in the Army for more than four months although a lot
of the Officers had seen service in France before.80
The training facilities at Bisley proved to be unsuitable. The training area was not
sufficiently remote to provide necessary security. Attempts to fire practice rounds
from the borrowed 6-pounders proved dangerous when the shots strayed outside
the range boundary. As a result, the 6-pounder practice had to be carried out on the
Naval ranges at Portsmouth and Chatham and on the artillery ranges at Larkhill.
Firing practice at sea with the Navy proved useful training for moving target practice
from the tanks.81
A more suitable, remote area was sought and found on Lord Iveagh’s estate
at Elveden, near Thetford in Norfolk, to which the HS began to move in June. A
secure training area was created with a branch railway line to receive and despatch
tanks. A practice area was constructed:
The area was turned into an imitation of the trench front in France...  this
practice battlefield was designed by Captain G. LeQ. Martel  RE,  who was
sent  over  by  GHQ  for  the  purpose  and  constructed  by  three  Pioneer
battalions.  The ‘section’  was one and a half  miles  in  width and in  depth
embraced the British support and front line, No Man’s Land and the German
first,  second  and  third  lines.  It  included  all  forms  of  obstacle  and
entrenchments likely to be met in the enemy’s defensive zone.82
Delays in the production of tanks meant that driver training could not start
until the arrival of the first batch in mid June. ‘The men were both clever and keen,
and the most serious trouble was the insufficient supply of tanks on which to train
them. Many drivers had spent no more than an hour or two in a tank before they left
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for France.’83 The imperative from GHQ was to use whatever tanks were available
for  an offensive in  mid-September.  Even when a few arrived in  late June,  there
remained  the  problem  of  what  form the  instruction  should  take,  other  than  the
mechanical and gunnery skills.
It would be difficult to over-estimate the difficulties which confronted those
officers responsible for the preliminary training of the Heavy Section of the
Machine Gun Section; no-one had actually fought inside a Tank...There was
no manual to guide them.84
Training concentrated on mechanical knowledge of the tank and peculiarities
of particular vehicles; thorough knowledge of the 6 pounder gun and MGs; crew
duties;  physical  fitness  and  revolver  shooting.  Some aspects  were  not  covered
either through lack of  time, lack of  resources or lack of knowledge of  what  was
needed: 
We had no reconnaissance or map reading...no practices or lectures on the
compass...we had no signalling...and no practice in considering orders...We
had no knowledge of where to look for information that would be necessary
for us as Tank Commanders, nor did we know what information we should
be likely to require. We had no signalling and only one day revolver drill and
one day revolver shooting on the range. In England we were issued with
goggles and the old type of the gas helmets but the men never had a gas
drill and did not know how to put on their helmets and goggle when we got to
France. Nearly all these things would have been rectified had we had longer
time in which to do the training which was on the syllabus. Perhaps the most
important point of all is that we had only once fired from a moving tank... I
cannot emphasise too strongly how much I feel that it is essential that the
crew and Tank  Commander  should  fire  from a  moving  tank  at  unknown
targets.85
Swinton was under constant pressure from GHQ to provide more tanks and
trained  personnel.  In  April,  GHQ  had  increased  their  order  to  150  tanks  and,
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following a meeting in London with Haig on 14 April 1916, Swinton was invited to
produce these tanks by June for the planned Somme offensive. This was an entirely
unrealistic request and on 26 April 1916 Swinton wrote to GHQ to explain the supply
position, stating: ‘it is best to be categorical as to what we expect can or cannot be
done, and so as to avoid disappointment and the reversal of plans’. He explained
that no tanks would be ready by 1 June, that some tanks would be available by July
but  these  would  not  be  suitable  for  combat  (they  were  non-armoured  Mk  1s
designed for training only). He thought that all tanks would be ready by 1 August,
‘strikes and Acts of God excepted’, and that 75 trained crews would be ready by
then, provided sufficient tanks were received on which to train.86 
On 15 May 1916 Swinton wrote again to Butler, the Deputy Chief of Staff at
GHQ, stating that the supply position was unchanged and that he had got nearly all
the officers he wanted and most of the men; MGs were arriving but there was a
‘hitch’ with 6-pounder ammunition. Driving was progressing slowly as he only had
one tank, Big Willie,  for training.87 On 14 June 1916 he sent a detailed progress
report to Butler. Having sent Stern to the manufacturing works at Lincoln to check on
progress, he gave a breakdown of when he anticipated tanks would be ready for
despatch to France. He was optimistic that all 150 would be ready, in batches, by
the beginning of September, but there were delays in the supply of machine guns, 6-
pounders and sponsons.
Training on the 6-pounders was limited by the fact that he had had to borrow
five guns; four from the Navy and one from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich,
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and even these had different mountings. He had difficulty finding suitable ranges but
hoped that problem would be solved when the entire unit moved to Elveden. Driver
training was progressing but with only one tank, progress was slow. He anticipated
getting another 25 tanks by the end of July which would coincide with the completion
of the practice battlefield. At that point three companies would be located at Elveden
and tactical training could begin in earnest. In practice, as Swinton later recorded:
There was no time for practicing the Tanks in accordance with any elaborate
tactical scheme. All that could be taught was the art of manoeuvring together
with the straightforward object of searching out and destroying machine guns
emplaced in every kind of artfully concealed position. Had there been time
the next step would have been combined operations with the infantry.88 
By 21 July, training had advanced to the extent that a tactical demonstration using
25 tanks could be held at Elveden for the benefit of the CIGS, representatives from
GHQ, and Lloyd George, the new Secretary of- State for War. On 8 August 1916,
Swinton reported to DSD that because of problems with the delivery of ‘accessories
[guns and sponsons] and spares’ which would not be available until 1 September,
tanks that had already been sent to France could not be used in battle although they
would be suitable for training with the infantry.89
Three companies of tanks were allocated to the September offensive. The
first company of tanks was sent to France on 13 August 1916 in two batches. The
tanks were in such a poor state of maintenance, having been used continuously for
training, that they were only got battle-ready with the help of a large volunteer party
of fitters sent from the manufacturers. The companies went first to an improvised
training facility at Yvrench then onto a concentration area at The Loop close to the
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front. A second company followed in late August arriving just two days before the
planned attack.  The third company arrived in France too late to take part  in the
attack.
The  precious  little  time  available  for  further  training,  critically  with  their
supporting battalions, was curtailed by essential  battle preparations and constant
demonstrations of the new weapon to ‘embarrassing numbers’ of Staff Officers and
curious on-lookers.90 
Meanwhile, the Tank crews and commanders had been enjoying three or
four days of almost comically complete nightmare. In the first place they had
all manner of mechanical preoccupations - newly arrived spare engine parts
to  test,  new  guns  to  adjust,  box  respirators  to  struggle  with,  and  an
astonishing amount of ‘’battle luggage” to stow away. But worst of all they
found themselves regarded as the star variety-turn of the Western Front. At
Yvrench they had performed in front of General Joffre, Sir Douglas Haig and
the greater part of the GHQ staff.91
Swinton commented:
Some of the machines were asked to force their way through a wood and
knock down trees -  tricks which they had not been designed to play and
which  were  likely  to  damage  them  seriously.  I  protested  against  these
‘stunts’ and the frequent exhibitions, which were wearing out both machines
and personnel. In addition to the almost continuous work of repairing, leaning
and tuning up their Tanks, the men barely had time to eat sleep and tend
themselves. I speculated as to how many machines would be one hundred
per cent to go into action when the day arrived.92
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At  a  demonstration  with  7  Middlesex  on  26  August  Haig  made  his  prescient
remark:93 ‘Altogether the demonstration was quite encouraging, but we require to
clear our ideas as to the tactical handling of these machines.’94 
On 13 September 1916, the tanks moved out of the concentration area at the
Loop to their assembly areas and the following night to their starting locations just
behind  the  front-line.  It  was  a  salutary  experience  for  the  debut  of  the  tank.
Exhausted crews, and for many it was their first experience of a battlefield, faced the
reality of two, short night moves across muddy, shell-cratered ground. At this stage,
reconnaissance and planning of routes for the tanks was the responsibility of the
supporting  divisional  staff.  ‘It  is  to  be  feared  that  in  many  cases  young  and
inexperienced  tank  commanders  found  themselves  overburdened  with  directions
and instructions, which, in many cases, had to be memorised, as there were not
enough copies to go around.’95 Only 36 of the 49 tanks reached their starting points
for the attack the following morning. 
CONCLUSION
On 15 September 1916 British tanks went into action for the first time. The results of
that  engagement,  the  lessons  learnt  and  their  influence  on  future  tactical  and
operational  employment  doctrine  and  training  will  be  examined  in  subsequent
chapters. The eve of battle, however, is a convenient moment to take stock of the
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evolution of tactical doctrine and the progress in the training of commanders and
crews in the eight  months between the first  appearance of a practical  armoured
fighting vehicle in February and its deployment in September 1916.
Did the commanders involved,  namely the C-in-C,  Haig;  the GOC Fourth
Army, Rawlinson and, to a lesser extent, Gough of Reserve Army, have sufficient
knowledge and guidance in the tactical use of the new weapon? Credit  must be
given to Swinton for his tireless efforts to produce a workable body of doctrine for
the employment of the tanks. In addition to his early unofficial and verbal lobbying,
Swinton produced no less than three substantive memoranda on the subject, the
last in July 1916. He sought the views of other experienced commentators and sent
a staff officer to GHQ to elicit their views.  His recommendations were eventually
amended  and  condensed,  by  GHQ,  into  the  Notes  sent  to  the  two  Army
commanders in mid-August, giving them just over a month to prepare their plans for
the offensive and the part that the tanks were to play in it. Rawlinson planned for the
use of the small number of tanks allocated to him but in ‘penny packets’ of two and
three tanks to help achieve his ‘bite and hold’ objectives. Haig, however, saw the
tanks as an opportunity to achieve the breakthrough that he desperately wanted and
encouraged Rawlinson to make a bolder use of the tanks. By the time Rawlinson’s
amended plan was approved at the beginning of September, there was just over two
weeks  before  the  start  of  the  offensive.  Arguably  this  was  insufficient  time  to
promulgate plans and orders down through the chain of command to the battalions
and tank companies to allow for effective combined infantry and tank training.
Were the tank crews and commanders sufficiently well trained for the task?
Swinton  had  the unenviable  task  of  not  only  setting  up  the new unit,  recruiting
officers and men for it, writing the tactical doctrine, acting as a liaison between the
demands of GHQ for more tanks and the realities of supply from the manufacturers,
47
agreeing modifications and improvements to the vehicles, finding a suitable training
area and in addition supervising the training of the crews and commanders with
insufficient resources. Swinton was consistently hampered in the training of his unit
by lack of vehicles to train on. It wasn’t until July that sufficient vehicles had been
produced to begin  driver  training in  earnest,  resulting  in  some cases,  of  drivers
having had only two or three hours experience before going into combat. Gunnery
training  was  also  restricted  by  lack  of  guns  on  which  to  train.  Some essential
aspects, such as vehicle maintenance and navigation, were barely covered in the
time available. The question of communications between tanks and the supporting
infantry was unresolved. Above all was the inevitable problem of lack of practical
experience . There is little doubt that the crews were not adequately trained, despite
the best efforts of Swinton and his staff.
Finally,  there is the question of whether Haig was right to commit so few
tanks to battle.  50 tanks were sent to France with 10 in reserve. On the eve of battle
on the 18 September 1916, 49 were available for the attack of which only 36 arrived
at  their  starting  points,  the  remainder  having  broken  down  through  mechanical
problems or ditching. This was far short of the 150 tanks that Haig had requested in
April. Following the disastrous results on the first day of the Somme offensive and
subsequent actions, and facing criticism from home and pressure from the French,
Haig  persisted  in  the  use  of  whatever  tanks  were  available  to  achieve  a
breakthrough in September. 
Haig was under pressure from the CIGS, encouraged by Lloyd George, to
delay the introduction of the tank until the following spring when many more would
be available and there would be sufficient time and resources for training. 
While there is no question of dictating to you the methods to be employed in
the use of this new weapon, The Secretary of State feels that the decision as
to whether to employ a small number at once and to send out further Tanks
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as they become available or to wait until a large number can be placed in the
field at one time is one of great importance upon which he would be glad to
have your views as soon as possible.96
In a somewhat terse response to Robertson, Haig replied that:
I am fully alive to the disadvantages of using the tanks before the full number
on order are available... if opportunity should offer to gain valuable results in
the  present  struggle  by  the  use  of  even  a  few  tanks,  I  should  have  no
hesitation in taking advantage of it, and I consider it of very great importance
that such small number of tanks as can be made available should be sent to
France  without  delay...  it  is  not  my  intention  to  employ  tanks  in  small
numbers unless and until I am convinced that the advantages to be gained
by doing  so are  great  enough  to  outweigh  the disadvantages  of  making
known to the enemy the existence of these new weapons of war.97
Nonetheless, he wrote to Robertson, on 22 August:
Even if I do not get so many as I hope, I shall  use what I have got, as I
cannot wait any longer for them, and it would be folly not to use any means
at my disposal in what is likely to be our crowning effort for this year.98
In conclusion, the premature use of the tanks was not entirely negative. Liddell Hart
contended that:
Whilst the disadvantages of introducing this ‘secret weapon’ on such a petty
scale are obvious,  it  can be argued that  this premature disclosure had a
compensating advantage in the experience gained, and the time it gained for
improvements to be made in the light of lessons learnt. Some of the most
senior officers in the wartime Tank Corps considered, in retrospect, that on
balance the benefit outweighed the forfeit.99
Haig was under  considerable pressure to demonstrate success to his  allies and
critics at  home. As it  was unlikely  that  the secret  of  the tanks could have been
maintained until the following spring, Haig was probably correct in using them when
he did.
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CHAPTER TWO -  FIRST ENGAGEMENTS, LESSONS LEARNT AND
GROWTH OF THE TANK   TRAINING ORGANISATION
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS
On  16  August  1916,  Kiggell,  Haig’s  Chief  of  Staff,  wrote  personally  to  the
commanders of Fourth and Reserve Armies, advising them that they could expect to
have between 50 or 60 tanks available for the coming operations. He included a
note  detailing  the  characteristics  of  the  new  weapon.  He  outlined  the  C-in-C’s
intentions for the operations and emphasised that:
As  time  is  short,  it  is  of  paramount  importance  that  Army  and  Corps
Commanders should study the use of these “tanks” with the actual problem
which will confront them on the ground.
He listed six points for consideration in the use of the tanks:
(a) Assembly places under cover. These should not be difficult to find behind
the ridge we at present occupy.
(b) Their use with infantry. It will be especially necessary to train the divisions
who may be earmarked to work with the” tanks”.
(c)  Although the recommendation is  that  the tanks should  be 100 to 200
yards apart,  it  may probably suffice, in view of the nature of the German
defences opposite us, to use these “tanks” at a wider interval, from 200 to
250 yards apart.
(d) One section of “tanks” would thus appear to be a suitable distribution for
an infantry division covering 1,200 to 1,500 yards of front.
(e)  The  infantry  will  have  to  work  close  behind  the  “tanks”,  occupying,
clearing  out  and consolidating  successive  positions  soon  after  they  have
been reached by the “tanks”. Some tanks might be required to work with the
infantry in clearing up strong points overrun by the leading tanks and troops.
(f)  The working of our artillery barrage in conjunction with the “tanks” will
require careful consideration.
Kiggell concluded by emphasising that:
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the  objectives  of  the  “tanks”  must  be  clearly  stated  and  as  simple  as
possible, as it is difficult for the “tanks” to manoeuvre.100
Kiggell’s note to the commanders was, in effect, a form of tactical doctrine,
but it was not prescriptive in the sense of laying down procedures that had to be
followed by commanders. It was in line with contemporary doctrinal practice in the
British  Army  whereby  the  senior  commander  stated  his  intention  but  left  the
subordinate  commander  to  plan  the  ways  and  means  of  achieving  it.  This
encouraged initiative, speed of response and decentralised decision making at the
lower  command level,  albeit  subject  to  the  ultimate,  overall  responsibility  of  the
senior commander.101 At this stage, with no experience of the use of the tanks in
battle to go on, Kiggell could only issue general guidance to the commanders; hence
the use of such phrases as: ‘it may probably suffice’, ‘would thus appear’, ‘might be
required’ and ‘will require careful consideration’. 
On 28 August, General Rawlinson, commander of Fourth Army, submitted
his plans for the September offensive to Haig.  Rawlinson argued that,  in normal
circumstance, i.e. without the use of tanks, capture of the enemy’s first defence line
would be perfectly possible given the troops at his disposal, but that capture of the
second and third lines would require a pause of several days to enable the artillery
to  come forward.  The  presence  of  tanks,  however,  raised  a  number  of  issues.
Should they be used simply to assist in taking the first line of defences or, if they
failed to take the further defences, would the vital advantage of surprise of the use
of the new weapon be lost? He contended that: 
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Till the enemy know exactly what they have to deal with they cannot arrange
or  prepare an antidote.  We must  therefore endeavour  to keep them [the
tanks]  a  mystery  as  long  as  possible.  The  really  important  question  for
decision therefore is how we can best do this.
Rawlinson proposed that the available tanks should be used in small packets of 1 or
1½ sections (i.e. 6 to 9 tanks) spread around the attacking divisions. He suggested
that not too much should be expected of the tanks initially and that they should be
used just to take the first  line of defences. They would advance by night,  under
moonlight, to assist the infantry in taking the first line then withdraw under cover of
darkness before the Germans realised what had hit them. The whole process would
then be repeated on the following nights to take the further defences.102
It is clear from Haig’s pencilled notes on Rawlinson’s original document that
he was not happy with Rawlinson’s somewhat cautious, step-by-step, ‘bite and hold’
plan. There was a long-standing disagreement between Haig and Rawlinson over
his  conduct  of  operations  dating  back  at  least  to  the  battles  of  1915.103 Haig
questioned whether it would be possible to carry out the operation during darkness
and bring all  the tanks back safely to be used again the following night. He was
worried that numbers might be left out in no-mans’-land in daylight and be destroyed
or  captured.  He  anticipated  taking  all  three  defence  lines  in  the  initial  assault
opening the gap for the five cavalry divisions to exploit. He wanted ‘greater boldness
shown from the outset... so use tanks boldly, press success, demoralise enemy and
try to capture his guns.’104 
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Kiggell sent a further instruction to Rawlinson on 31 August 1916, enclosing
Haig’s hand-written intentions for the coming offensive.105 Kiggell made it clear that
the C-in-C wanted the tanks to be used more boldly to achieve the breakthrough he
desired  as  soon  as  possible,  exploiting  the  element  of  surprise  of  the  new
weapon.106
Rawlinson duly submitted a ‘fresh plan’ to GHQ the same day.107 He did not
argue with Haig’s  proposals and adjusted his plan accordingly.108  In the artillery
plan,  however,  there  was  a  modification  to  the barrage plan  which  dramatically
affected the fortunes of both the tanks and the supporting infantry. Rawlinson was
concerned about the rate of advance of the tanks compared with the infantry. There
could be two consequences;  either the infantry would arrive at the first  objective
ahead of the tanks and not benefit from their support, or, alternatively, if the tanks
arrived  before  the  infantry,  the  tanks  risked  being  hit  by  the  friendly  barrage
advancing in front of the infantry. Rawlinson therefore planned to leave artillery-free
‘lanes’ of about 100 yards wide, along which the tanks would advance on the hostile
MG posts.109This decision proved heavy in terms of casualties to both tanks and
infantry.
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On their debut on 15 September 1916, the tanks achieved limited and mixed
success.  Of  the  36  tanks  that  made  it  to  the  assembly  positions,  mechanical
problems further reduced the numbers to the 30 that actually crossed the start line.
Of these, five became ditched and nine broke down with mechanical problems. The
remaining 16 were used in the ‘driblets’ that Swinton had cautioned against.110 The
only significant success was in the centre of XV Corps where seven tanks led an
attack by a British and the New Zealand Division on the village of Flers. Even here,
four  tanks  were  knocked  out  by  direct  artillery  fire  whilst  the  remaining  three
penetrated into the centre of  the village accompanied by parties of  infantry who
found that the German defenders had fled in panic. According to the Official History,
‘less than a dozen tanks played a part in the capture of strong points and trenches,
although  in  certain  localities  the moral  effect  of  the  new engine  of  warfare  was
considerable.’111
Further attempts to use the surviving tanks followed. On 25 September 1916,
on an attack on Gueudecourt, a solitary tank destroyed a field gun battery, captured
a mile of trenches and 400 prisoners, enabling the infantry to capture the objective,
all in under an hour. In mid-November, 52 tanks, including many recovered from the
battlefield, were assembled for an attack on Beaumont-Hamel, the last remaining
strongpoint  on  the  northern  end  of  the  Somme  sector.  Due  to  poor  ground
conditions and bad weather only eight of these could be brought into action.
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At  the  beginning  of  October,  GHQ invited  the participants  to  comment  on  their
performance.  GHQ  consolidated  the  comments  and  circulated  them  to  all  five
Armies in the BEF. GHQ Notes on the Use of Tanks produced by Advanced GHQ
on 5 October 1916 included the following comments:
 In the present stage of their development they must be regarded as entirely
accessory to the ordinary methods of attack i.e., to the advance of infantry in
close cooperation with Artillery.
In  cases where they  have  reached  a  hostile  trench a  little  ahead  of  the
Infantry they have undoubtedly done valuable service. Their moral effect on
the enemy’s infantry has been considerable. They have also not only drawn
a great deal of the hostile machine gun  and rifle fire on themselves, and
therefore  off  the  attacking  infantry,  but  have  also  been  able  to  cause
considerable loss to the enemy in the trench, to knock out in many cases his
machine guns and... to bring about the enemy’s surrender or retirement.
The decision to leave the ‘artillery free’ lanes was criticised:
In the Fourth Army an attempt was made... by leaving lanes in the barrage
up which the tanks moved; so far as this attempt failed the cause of failure
appears  to  have  been  due  to  the  breakdown  of  several  Tanks  and
consequently to there being lanes in the barrage up which no tanks were
moving.
Tanks exposed while stationary to the enemy’s artillery are likely to be soon
knocked out. The number of Tanks actually knocked out by hostile artillery...
has so far been very small  as compared with the number which broke down
owing to mechanical trouble.112
Some commentators, Liddell Hart in particular, interpreted these comments to show
a ‘reserved verdict’ by GHQ.113  It seems more likely that they were a cautious and
realistic summary of the results of the first use of an untried weapon of war with
suggestions for improvements based on practical experience. 
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Some after-action reports were initiated at a lower command level. On 13
October 1916, for instance, Fourth Army issued a memorandum summarising the
‘causes for non-success of the Fourth Army attack on 12 October 1916’ which was
circulated,  not  only  amongst  its own Corps,  but  to  flanking Armies including the
French Sixth Army.114 Hammond argues that
From these after-action reports,  conclusions (although not necessarily the
‘correct’  ones) were drawn and incorporated into subsequent  training and
doctrinal publications. This was a sound and valuable process. However, it
should  not  be  taken  as  implying  rigid,  centralised  control  of  tactical
development.
Thus,  for  example,  when  Kiggell’s  Notes were  circulated  they  were
specifically  designed  ...  to  inform and  educate  but  not  to  dictate.  It  was
information based  on  combat  experience  and  was  not  theoretical.  These
Notes constituted the first steps in learning the lessons of tank fighting and
the beginning of a continual cycle of action, review and refinement that was
maintained until well after the war had ended.115 
Whilst Hammond’s views might be true of the development of tactical doctrine in the
British Army as a whole,  within the confines of the Tank Corps, a much smaller
organisation, it could be argued that operational and tactical development was more
rigidly controlled. This process will be examined later in the thesis.
In general, the lessons learnt from the Somme actions could be summarised
as follows. First, the mechanical unreliability of the vehicles directly resulted in a
large number of tanks either failing to make it to the start line or, once committed to
battle, breaking down whilst  in action. Many were worn out by the intensive pre-
battle training and none had been tested in battle. Facilities for the recovery and
repair of ‘battlefield casualty’ tanks and the provision of spares were practically non-
existent. 
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Second, crews were inadequately trained in many aspects of handling the
vehicles. In addition, because of time constraints, little or no co-operative training of
the  handling  of  the  tanks  with  the  supporting  units  had  been  possible  before
operations  commenced.  Furthermore,  largely  because  of  the  need  to  maintain
secrecy, higher level commanders had little appreciation of the capabilities – and
constraints- of the tactical use of the new weapon. 
Third,  at  the operational  level,  the decision to use the available  tanks in
‘driblets’ or ‘penny-packets’, contrary to the advice given by Swinton, contributed to
their  failure.  Rawlinson’s  modified  plan  depended  in  many  key  aspects  on  the
success of the various tank actions. When these failed, his plan inevitably suffered.
It became clear that tanks were not physically capable of traversing ground cratered
by a sustained artillery bombardment. The decision by GOC III Corps, Lieutenant-
General Sir William Pulteney, to send tanks through High Wood against the advice
of  the  tank  officers  and  the  Divisional  Commander  showed  a  fundamental
misappreciation  of  their  cross-country  capabilities.116 In  addition,  too  little
consideration  was  given  to  the  necessary  co-ordination  required  between  the
infantry and artillery plans and the tank actions. In particular, the artillery-free lanes
contributed significantly to the tank, and infantry, battlefield casualties.
It could be argued that, aside from the factors mentioned above, the tanks
available  at  the  time,  given  their  limitations  in  terms  of  reliability,  speed,
manoeuvrability, protection and firepower, would not have achieved much more than
they did, even had sufficient numbers been available. What they had shown, to a
somewhat sceptical  audience, was their potential for future use once the various
shortcomings were resolved.
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Not all the results were negative: ‘in perfecting and exploiting a new weapon
it is wise to proceed by a process of trial and error both on the testing ground and in
the  field:  one  can  hardly  expect  to  arrive  at  sound  tactical  methods  by  theory
alone.’117 Arguably, one long term result of the tanks initial introduction in September
1916 was the effect on the Germans’ attitude to the potential of tanks as a weapon
of  war.  Having  witnessed  the  limited  success  of  the  tanks  on  the  Somme,  the
Germans made little effort to pursue the idea themselves although they did produce
effective anti-armour projectiles for use by their infantry and artillery, although this
reluctance may have resulted as much from economic and political factors.118
GROWTH OF THE TRAINING ORGANISATION
Despite a general lack of enthusiasm and some degree of scepticism among the
staff at GHQ about the utility of the tanks, Haig nonetheless felt the weapon had
potential.  He had invited both Swinton and Stern to GHQ to witness the debut of the
tanks on 15 August and two days later he announced that he intended placing an
order for a further 1,000 tanks.119 A number of other matters needed to be resolved
both in France and Britain, such as the command and administration of the Heavy
Branch, revised establishment, recruitment of additional personnel and creation of
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training facilities. It became apparent that Haig did not want Swinton in command of
the  expanded  Corps.  Although  there  is  no  record  other  than  Swinton’s  own
account,120 it seems that, despite his intimate involvement with the creation of the
Heavy Branch and its baptism of fire in September 1916, Swinton no longer ‘fitted in’
to the revised organisation of the expanded corps. He was told by the CIGS: ‘that
France wanted a big expansion of the Heavy Section and that I was not considered
to be the man to carry it out.’121  
Swinton had previously recommended Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Elles to be
the commander of the HSMGC element in France: ‘I  could think of no-one more
suitable,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  knew  as  little  about  the  tanks  as  his  two
predecessors did about the niceties of the current tactics in France.’122 Ironically,
Elles ultimately replaced Swinton as commander of the Tank Corps following Elles’s
appointment as commander of the HSMGC in France on 29 September 1916.123
The increase in the numbers of tanks required increases in establishments
both in France and at Home. On 9 October 1916, GOC BEF suggested that the four
companies then in France should be increased to six, formed into two battalions. On
20 October 1916, the WO demonstrated its faith in the future role of the tank by
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approving  a  more ambitious  establishment  of  four  battalions  in  France and five
battalions At Home, each battalion was to have three companies of four fighting
sections each of five tanks and a HQ section of four tanks giving a fighting strength
of 72 tanks in each battalion.124
The  Heavy  Branch  was  effectively  split  into  two  elements:  the  fighting
organisation  in  France  commanded  by  Elles  and  an  administrative  ‘tail’  in
England.125 In France, Elles was to be responsible for the tactical employment of the
tank units  in  the  field  under  the operational  control  of  the C-in-C.  He  was also
responsible  for  the  advanced  training  of  crews  arriving  from  England.  A  tank
workshop organisation was to be set up at the HQ in France and mobile workshops
added to each battalion.126
On 18 November 1916 Elles moved from Advanced GHQ at Beauquesne to
set up a new tank headquarters in Bermicourt, near St Pol. The various tank units in
France moved into billets  in villages in the surrounding area and the process of
expanding the existing companies into battalions began.127
A confidential notice was circulated on 9 November 1916 around the BEF
inviting  applications  for  men  to  transfer  into  the  Heavy  Branch.  Officers  were
required from battalion commanders down to tank commanders and from warrant
officers down to private soldiers as tank crew, drivers and workshop mechanics. For
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tank  crews  the  essential  requirements  were  laid  out  as;  ‘good  muscular
development, a high standard of intelligence and good eyesight.’ The desirable, but
not  essential,  requirements  were:  ‘mechanical  knowledge  and  mechanical
aptitude.’128
With Swinton’s departure, the WO asked GHQ for a nomination for the post
of Superintendent of the Training Centre of the Heavy Section [Branch], MGC then
being established at Wool (or Bovington) in Dorset.129 The appointment of Brigadier-
General Frederick Gore Anley on 20 October 1916, was something of surprise. Gore
Anley was an experienced infantryman with no previous experience of tanks; indeed
he is said to have professed to have no interest in them.  It  seems that he was
appointed  to  ‘sort  out’  the  perceived  lack  of  discipline  among  the  volunteers
gathering at Wool from a myriad of different units.130 Gore Anley’s duties were laid
down by the DSD.131 He was to command the portion of the HSMGC in UK and be
responsible for preliminary training and the supply of men, vehicles and spares to
France. Initially, Gore Anley was to be located at the HSMGC’s new base in Dorset,
and a staff officer was to be based in London to keep the Army Council informed of
the general requirements of the branch. 
Five  WO departments had responsibilities  for  the  new organisation.  DSD
dealt with policy, organisation, establishments, and provision and training of Officer
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Cadets; AG9 with administration, officers and personnel; DTS dealt with transport,
tanks and workshops and MOM supplied armaments and stores under the Director
of Artillery.132  This dual and complex control of  HSMGC in France and in England
was not well thought out and unlikely to stand the test of combat. 
The  importance  that  Haig  placed  on  the  expansion  of  HSMGC  was
emphasised in  a directive forwarded on 8 November to the various branches of
GHQ and the commanders of the five Armies in France:  
 ...  the  Commander-in-Chief  wishes  it  to  be  known  that  he  attaches
considerable  importance to this  branch of  the  Machine Gun Corps  being
brought up to a high state of efficiency in personnel and equipment as soon
as possible, and with this view he desires that every facility should be given
to enable the expansion to be carried out rapidly, as the time for training of
these units is already short.133
Haig no doubt  had in mind the need for  tanks and crews for the coming spring
offensive.
HSMGC began the move from Elveden to Wool on 27 October. The reasons
for the move seemed to be that the training areas and gunnery ranges at Thetford
were deemed to be inadequate.  Also  as the home establishment  became more
involved in the despatch of completed and tested tanks to the BEF, a location on the
south coast closer to the Channel ports was desirable. 
Wool Camp was an established hutted and tented camp then being used by
convalescing Australian troops. It was situated in a relatively remote part of Dorset
where  secrecy  and  security  could  be  maintained.  As  the  War  Diary  of  the  5 th
Battalion, described it: ‘the wooded country around Bovington is particularly adapted
to the training of tank battalions, the rolling downs, the woods and the small streets
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being very similar  to and as equally deserted as the battlefields of France.’134 In
addition, there were subsidiary camps nearby at Worgret (Wareham), Swanage, and
Lulworth, which in due course were also taken over by the Tank Corps.
On 10 November, he outlined his plans to GHQ for the new Training Centre
at Wool.135 An organisational diagram showed the links between the WO and the
HSMGC office in London, the HQ at Wool, the Supply Depot in England and the
Tank Store in France. For training at Wool, Gore Anley envisaged a Chief Instructor
responsible for technical instruction in four schools:  tactics, driving,  machine gun
and gunnery. There would be five battalions of trainees with battalion commanders
responsible for discipline and non-technical military training. Looking to the future,
he stated: ‘Later on when the training at Wool is more advanced and the Officers
and men have been individually instructed in Tank duties, and when we know better
the requirements in France, I  propose to alter  training and train Companies and
Battalions as Tank units.’136
Gore Anley lost no time in organising the new training facility at Wool. The
camp was officially inaugurated on 25 November 1915 and handed over to men
from  711  Mechanical  Transport  Company,  ASC from France,  the  unit  that  had
supplied drivers for the tanks at  Elveden and for  the initial  engagements on the
Somme.  These  battle-experienced  men  provided  the  first  driving  instructors  at
Wool.137 Various  specialist  schools  were  set  up  in  the  following  weeks.   The
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remaining 15 tanks sent from Elveden were in such a poor state of repair that most
were returned to the manufacturers in batches for refurbishment before they could
be  used  for  training.  Meanwhile,  men  recruited  in  France  and  the  UK  for  the
expanded Heavy Branch were arriving in such numbers that the existing Divisional
Infantry camp at Worgret, near Wareham, was taken over as a Depot.
On 5  December  1916,  Gore Anley  sent  a  progress  report  to  DSD.  Five
schools had been established at Wool:  Tank Mechanism and Driving,  6-pounder
Hotchkiss gun, Vickers and Hotchkiss Machine Guns and Physical Training classes.
Gunnery  practice  was  still  being  carried  out  on  naval  ranges  at  Chatham  and
Portsmouth and on the artillery  ranges at  Larkhill.  He was awaiting  the issue of
Lewis guns to begin training on them. He was about to open a class on the use of
compasses, using instructors trained by the Royal Navy. The shortage of training
tanks meant the classes worked in three shifts throughout the day and night. Two of
the five battalions were almost up to establishment and were being organised as
tank units, the other three were only partly up to strength. He hinted that alterations
in the Establishments might be necessary and he was proposing to co-ordinate with
the Tank HQ in France on this matter.138
The Tank Driving and Maintenance School used the extensive training areas
to the north of the camp including practice trenches dug there by the Australians.
The initial week-long courses were for experienced drivers who were to be retained
at Wool as instructors. Following a suggestion from DSD that 75 of the first batch of
100 new tanks be allocated to the Training Centre139, an increased number of tanks
arrived at Wool in February 1917 and the driving course was lengthened to 16 days
 TM E2006.1707. Early Days at Bovington Camp.
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with 20 trainees arriving at Wool daily.140 Training for the drivers was split between a
Mechanical School where they worked on static and sectionalised engines and other
components  and the Tank Parks where running tanks  were used for  basic  and
advanced driver training over obstacles on the training area.  All officers attended
both the Mechanical  School  and the Tank Parks for  basic  familiarisation  on the
machines.141
The demand for trained reinforcements for France increased in June 1917
with the expansion of the Tank Corps, and the depot camp at Worget was used as
an additional  training  centre producing  another  20 drivers  a  day.  As  a  result  of
combat experience from actions during Third Ypres, all crews were instructed in the
use of the unditching beam. At its peak in late 1917, Wool provided four Tank Parks,
each with 15 tanks dealing with 25 trainees arriving each day for a 12 day driving
course lasting day and night. Night driving, an essential combat skill as most tanks
had to move to assembly positions under cover of darkness, was carried out on two
nights of each course. Drivers were also trained to carry out minor repairs on their
vehicles when in action, major repairs being undertaken in the battalion workshops.
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Tank obstacles on the training area were based on the latest intelligence on German
defences and a section of the Hindenburg Line defences was recreated at Gallows
Hill  before the Battle  of  Cambrai.  The replacement  in  the Mark V of  the earlier
cumbersome  steering  arrangements  requiring  four  steersmen,  with  the  Wilson
constant-mesh epicyclic gearbox operated by the driver, required changes in crew
training. However, such was the urgency to get all available Mk Vs to France that
none  was  made  available  for  training  purposes  at  Wool;  this  was  carried  out
hurriedly in France before they were committed to battle for the first time.144
Gunnery  training  was  split  into  two  categories:  training  on  the  various
machine guns used on all the tanks and on the heavier calibre guns carried on the
male tanks. Initially training on both Vickers and Hotchkiss MGs was carried out on
the training areas to the north of the camp. When all new tanks were fitted with the
Lewis light MG in January 1917, training on these weapons was concentrated first at
Lulworth, approximately 10 miles south of Wool, then at Wareham on a range at
Holton Heath. All new gunners were taught the new belt-fed Hotchkiss from June
1917. MG practice from moving tanks was included. The use of a dismounted Lewis
MG in support of neighbouring infantry in the event of a tank being abandoned was
also practised – and much used during the 1918 German offensive.145
The 6-Pounder Gunnery School moved to Wool in November 1916 where
elementary  drills  and  sub-calibre  firing  was  carried  out.  Full  calibre  practice
continued to be fired on the various naval  and artillery  ranges elsewhere until  a
gunnery range was established at Lulworth. Here firing was practiced from static
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sponsons on the firing points and from moving tanks. In due course, sophisticated
moving targets were introduced so that firing could be practiced from moving tanks
against moving targets.146
By early 1918, combat experience dictated that all gunners should be trained
in the use of MGs and the 6 pounder. Therefore in February 1918, The Gunnery
School at Wool was re-organized into a single school under a Chief Instructor with
four  branches.  The Machine Gun Branch at  Wool  and Wareham (where a  new
range was constructed at East Holme) instructed on both Lewis and Hotchkiss MGs
and  included  moving  targets.  The  6-Pounder  Branch  at  Wool,  Lulworth  and
Wareham included firing live shell from moving tanks. The Visual Training Branch
practiced  the  visual  acquisition  of  targets  by  all  members  of  a  tank  crew.  The
Combined  Battle  Practice  Branch  was  the  final  test  of  a  gunner,  carried  out  at
Lulworth, and involved mobile live firing of all weapons at a variety of targets, both
static and moving. Only when a gunner had satisfactorily passed this phase of his
training was he allocated to a battalion for collective training.147 Recent  combat
experience was used to the full in this gunnery training:
To  do  this  all  available  information  gained  in  action  has  been  carefully
examined,  returned  officers  and  other  ranks  from  B.E.F.  have  been
interviewed, and when possible School Instructors have been chosen from








Training in reconnaissance resulted directly from combat experience.149 The need
for prior reconnaissance of routes for the tanks had been noted earlier. In July 1916,
Swinton had emphasised the importance of the prior reconnaissance of the ‘Position
of Deployment’, 
The  actual  marking  out  of  the  routes  for  Tanks  from  the  positions  of
deployment to their points on the starting line will be carried out by the Tank
Skippers working under the Section Commanders.150
In a similar vein, Lieutenant Colonel Brough emphasised that: 
 The selection of the precise route to be followed and the method by which 
the Tanks are moved to a position just behind our front line requires care and
forethought, and time devoted to previous reconnaissance is essential.151
Clearly, at this stage, it was not envisaged that there needed to be a specific role for
a specialised Reconnaissance Officer or for specialised training. However, in the
light of combat experience, this view changed.
The post-action report produced by Kiggell made the point strongly:
In bringing up Tanks at night to their starting positions careful arrangements
to enable them to find their way are necessary...very careful instructions to
the Tank crews as to the route to be followed in the attack and the best way
to find it are essential. Careful study beforehand of maps and photographs
and sketches... marking clearly easily recognisable features by which they
must pass... were found to be most useful.152
When Elles created his Tank HQ in France in October 1916, he selected as his
Intelligence Officer  Captain F E Hotblack of the Intelligence Corps, who was already
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serving on the staff of GHQ.  Hotblack quickly became the reconnaissance expert at
Tank HQ. He recognised the importance of  ground reconnaissance prior  to tank
actions  and  was  much  involved  in  the  training  of  ROs  for  the  Tank  Corps  in
France.153
Meanwhile,  in  December  1916,  GHQ made a  request  for  an Intelligence
Officer to be sent to Wool ‘for a couple of months as an Instructor.’ His duties were
set out: 
 The officer selected will be required to instruct in map reading, the use of
maps  and  in  the  interpretation  of  aeroplane  photographs  and  should,  if
possible,  be  able  to  impart  information  on  the  general  conditions  of  the
country from a ground point of view.
The selected officer was to spend a fortnight working with Captain Hotblack at Tank
HQ in France before moving to Wool.154 Reconnaissance training was carried out
both at Wool and in France. Initial training concentrated on the Intelligence Officers
from the Intelligence Corps attached to each of the Tank Brigades formed in France
from February 1917 onwards.  Subsequently,  Tank Corps battalion and company
ROs were trained who in turn passed on the basic skills to the tank crews. Major
Clough Williams Ellis, one of the pioneer Reconnaissance Officers, commented:
The necessity of regularising and systematising the Reconnaissance Branch
had not been forgotten, and a separate Reconnaissance Service- really a
specially adapted branch of ‘Intelligence’- was set up under Major Hotblack...
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The  course  covered:  topography;  aerial  photograph  interpretation;  panorama
sketching;  contour  layering of  maps;  road,  rail  and river  reconnaissance;  terrain
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modelling in plasticine; and elementary intelligence analysis. The course culminated
in  a  10  day  practical  exercise  in  which  the  students  were  given  a  variety  of
intelligence data and had to reconnoitre approach routes and ‘jumping off’ positions
for an imaginary battalion of tanks. They also practiced the ‘rushed’ reconnaissance
necessary for an emergency deployment of tanks. This latter training was included
almost certainly as a direct result  of the lessons learnt from the emergency tank
actions against the German counter offensive at Gouzecourt in November 1917.156
                           Training of tank company and section commanders in elementary
reconnaissance was started in January 1918 at both Wool and Wareham together
with a Draughtsman School. Thereafter NCO draughtsmen trained to produce route
maps and field sketches were added to the establishment  of  the Battalion  RO’s
sections. The importance attached to reconnaissance training was emphasised in a
report produced in 1918:
The  Battalion  Reconnaissance  Officer  is  the  Reconnaissance  expert,  to
whom  everyone  looks  for  assistance  and  advice,  therefore  the
Reconnaissance Officer must know his subject, to enable Reconnaissance
to be of use in the fighting forces. The Tank Corps has been fortunate in its
Reconnaissance Officers, and in battle they have been well forward, and of
great  assistance  to  the  Tanks,  owing  to  their  special  knowledge  of  the
ground.157
A number  of  other  smaller  instructional  schools  were  established  at  Wool.  The
Signalling  School,  set  up on 4 January 1917,  trained signallers  to communicate
between tanks and from tanks to rear headquarters, and to communicate between
battalion and companies and higher formations. Training in Morse Code, telephone
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and lamps was carried out  initially  by instructors from the Signal  Service of  the
Royal  Engineers  but  was  restricted  by  the  lack  of  suitable  equipment.  Trained
officers and men then returned to their  battalions  to train  others.  In  time it  was
decided that communications other than between tanks would be the responsibility
of a RE Signal Company attached to each battalion. A number of methods were
experimented  with.  Morse  was  abandoned  as  impractical  and  a  system  of
semaphore introduced. Communication between tanks and accompanying infantry
remained a problem that was never fully resolved.158 Carrier Pigeons were also used
as a mean of carrying messages and a Pigeon School was opened at Wool on the
14 February 1917.159
A Revolver  School  was  set  up  at  Wool  in  December  1916  when it  was
realised as a result of battle experience on the Somme that a revolver was the most
practical personal weapon for the tank crews: 
From active service experience it has been found that the revolver, properly
understood and handled, can be a most useful and deadly weapon in the
field. Its simplicity and reliability rendered it  extremely good for use in the
Tank.
 All  the potential  tank crews in the battalions being formed at  Wool classified in
revolver practice on static and moving targets.160
A  Compass  School  was  established  on  4  January  1917,  when  it  was
recognised that, because of limited visibility, tanks sometimes needed to be steered
by compass. Initially, before the effect of deviation caused by the steel mass of the
tank were fully realised,  the issue compasses were thought to be unreliable and
158
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useless.  Once all  tank  crews had received  instruction  in  the  correct  use of  the
compass,  confidence  was  restored.  Training,  initially  carried  out  by  Royal  Navy
instructors, was at first restricted to the officer section commanders but was later
extended to all members of the tank crew.161
A Camouflage School was established as late as January 1918 at Bovington
and later at Wareham.  Prior to this, attempts at camouflaging machines had been
rudimentary. Camouflage nets issued before Third Ypres had not arrived in time to
be trained on before the battle started:
The original purpose and design of nets has been disregarded, very few of
the officers had, of course, had the opportunity of learning what it was. The
result was a risky haphazard effort. Many nets were put on upside down or
wrong way across; thereby losing a great deal of their screening power.162
Gas  Schools  were  established  at  Wool  on  24  April  1917  and  at  Wareham  in
September  1917  to  train  in  the  fitting  of  masks,  and  driving  and  handling  the
armaments whilst under gas attack.163
In February 1917, it was decided that all ranks of the Tank Corps should be
trained in the use of grenades and a Bombing School was established. Instructors
were selected among men who had previous battle experience of bombing. As well
as training Instructors, all ranks from the battalions currently forming at Bovington
passed through the three day course which included dummy and live throwing, as
well as trench fighting and bombing raids. Interestingly, they were also trained how
to throw captured German grenades. The use of phosphorous grenades for clearing









At the end of 1916, Gore Anley issued a comprehensive, 15 page Training
Memorandum  with  six  appendices.  It  covered  general  principles,  policy  and
responsibilities regarding training. It is clear that Gore Anley placed great emphasis
on a high standard of discipline at the Centre (possibly the reason why he had been
selected for the post), on physical efficiency achieved through games and sports
played by all  ranks,  and ‘Esprit  de Corps- the fighting spirit...These are the first
essentials  in  the  Heavy  Branch.  They  must  be  followed  by  expert  technical
knowledge and a sound conception of the tactics and movements of the Infantry, the
arm with which the Heavy Branch will have to co-operate mostly.’ The Memorandum
explained the difficulty of training individuals and crews who had joined the Heavy
Branch with a variety of previous experience, or in some cases as raw recruits, so
that they could proceed to France for  further collective training as formed crews
within  a  battalion.  Nonetheless  detailed  appendices  and  schedules  laid  down
deadlines  for  various  phases  of  training  to  be  completed  in  order  for  the  new
battalions to proceed to France.165 
The Training Centre at Bovington, Wareham, Lulworth and Swanage trained
a remarkable number of men of all ranks in the relatively short period of its existence
from December 1916 to December 1918.166 Great emphasis was placed on ensuring
the training reflected lessons learnt so far during the war. The new battalions were
formed around the nucleus of  a  company which had already had experience in
battle.  Instructors  were largely  drawn from men with  recent  combat  experience.
Close liaison was maintained with the training organisation in France. From March
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1917,  15  officers  and  15  OR instructional  staff  from the  Training  Centre  in  UK
exchanged with a similar number of instructional staff from France for periods of 3
months. Some were then permanently retained in the UK.167
Little of the actual work of training could start till the end of November [1916],
when the ‘veteran’ Tank personnel were at last available as instructors...
They were the leaven - less than one ‘old’ Company to each new Battalion-
who must impart their knowledge and experience to the new men.
A Subaltern who had seen any fighting with the Tanks would suddenly find
himself  regarded as the greatest living expert  on some obscure technical
point, and the newly joined who had never seen a Tank ‘looked with awe on
these battle-tried warriors’.168 
In a  lecture delivered by Lieutenant B L Q Henriques, a battle experienced tank
commander from G Battalion, to a group of aspiring Tank Corps battalion, company
and section commanders at Bovington in March 1917, he graphically described the
deficiencies in the training of the crews who went into action in September 1916.169
By early 1917, it  is clear that lessons had been learnt and the deficiencies were
being tackled energetically by Gore Anley and his replacement as commander at
Bovington, Brigadier-General W Glasgow. 
In the brief lull in fighting between the end of November 1916 and the start of
the Arras offensive in April 1917, the priority was to raise the five battalions in the
UK and expand the four existing companies in France. Instruction was based on the
very limited combat experience gained on the Somme in 1916. The dual nature of
early training, with five entirely new battalions being formed at Bovington and the
existing  companies  in  France  being  expanded  form  a  further  four  battalions,
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complicated the training arrangements for the Branch as a whole with, inevitably,
some duplication in effort both sides of the Channel.
 Initially,  training in the UK was largely concerned with forming a cadre of
trained,  battle  experienced  Instructors,  then  with  the  individual  training  of  crew
members and, in addition, the basic military training of the new battalions. Training
in France concentrated more on the collective training of formed tank crews and on
tactical training. 
TANK TRAINING IN FRANCE
After  the  Somme  fighting  came  to  a  halt,  the  tank  companies  withdrew  and
concentrated in an area north west of St Pol. A depot and workshop facility was
established at Erin and individual battalion ‘tankodromes’ at Blangy, Bermicourt, Erin
and  Pierremont.   Tank  HQ  was  set  up  in  the  chateau  at  Bermicourt.  This
concentrated area was chosen for training ‘to reduce the amount of damage likely to
accrue from the use of tanks in the district.’170
Initially,  training in  France was greatly hampered by the lack of  available
tanks and spares with  only  16 working tanks available  for  the training of  the 4
embryonic battalions: ‘for the purposes of collective training and tactical exercises
recourse was therefore had to dummy tanks, i.e. canvas structures carried by men
equal in number to a tank crew.’ By all accounts, this improvisation caused much
hilarity and not a few injuries among the crews involved.171 
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Preliminary  training  in  the  Erin/Bermicourt  area  consisted  of  nine  day
courses in driving using four tanks per battalion. Lewis gun practice was carried out
on  ranges  set  up  by  the  individual  battalions  in  their  localities.  6-pounder  gun
courses of 3 days were carried out at Pierremont. At this stage much of the training
was improvised and localised:
Training  schemes  were  at  this  time  necessarily  intuitive  and  the  system
adopted was to issue Memoranda, setting forth the principles of training and
supplementing them from time to time with Training Notes to be amended,
withdrawn and substituted as the occasion arose.172
The formalisation and centralisation of training did not finally take place until  the
issue of the pamphlet  Instructions for the Training of the Tank Corps in France in
December 1917173. Training at the various battalion locations was supplemented by
parties of  officers and NCOs being sent  to  the infantry Lewis  gun course at  Le
Touquet and to the various Infantry Schools of Instruction. Some aspects of training
became  more  centralised  with  a  Central  Tank  Driving  School  and  a  Central
Mechanical School being set up near the Tank Corps HQ at Bermicourt in January
1917.174
The cold and wet  winter of 1916-1917, meant that indoor ‘schemes’ had to
be practised among the battalion officers, the closest they could get at this stage to
practical tactical training:
Indoor  schemes  were  carried  out  at  intervals  during  the  winter  months.
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their  Company  Commanders,  the  scheme was  discussed  and  a  solution
arrived at.  Those solutions  were subsequently  discussed at  a meeting of
Battalion Commanders which was summonsed once a week for the purpose.
The common decision come to at these conferences was then circulated as
the final solution among Company Commanders.175
The development of esprit de corps in the newly created organisation formed by the
drawing  together  of  men from diverse backgrounds  was  high  priority  and much
emphasis was given in France as well as in the UK to physical fitness, competitive
games, drill and discipline.
The 6-pounder range near Bermicourt proved to be impractical in terms of
safety and limited range and in April 1917 a tank gunnery school was established in
the  sand  dunes  on  the  coast  at  Merlimont.  Here  there  were  ‘exceptional
opportunities’ for firing out to sea  and the use of the extensive sand dunes and the
beach for moving target practice. Three 6-pounder guns in sponsons were used for
shooting  practice lasting  two days.  Practice  on the Lewis gun and revolver  was
added  to  the  instruction  carried  out  there.  Initially,  there  was  no  official
establishment for the gunnery facilities at Merlimont which were administered by one
of the Tank Brigades formed in France. Complete companies from the battalions in
France carried out the training collectively at Merlimont.176
In June 1917, following the Arras offensive, gunnery training took place at
Merlimont;  driving,  mechanical  and maintenance  training  now took place  on the
recently captured German trenches near Wailly; anti-gas and compass work at Erin
and wireless signalling at Fleury.177 The establishment for the Gunnery School at
Merlimont  was  finally  approved  in  September  1917  with  the  appointment  of  a
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Commandant,  Adjutant,  Equipment  Officer  and  Chief  Instructors  for  the  various
schools. 178
A distinction was made between Schools and Camps. Schools were on a
permanent basis with an approved establishment. They were mainly concerned with
training instructors and reinforcements from the UK. Camps were set up temporarily
by Brigades as the need arose to train their sub-units. Collective training was also
carried out and at Merlimont accommodation and facilities were provided for four
companies at a time, in addition to those receiving instruction at the School.179 
 In time, the improvised nature of the training, instructional staff and facilities
at  Merlimont  were  regularised,  establishments  were  approved  and  sophisticated
Battle  Practice  ranges  using  live  ammunition  were  constructed.  In  March  1918,
following the use in action of tank crews as dismounted Lewis gun teams during the
German  offensive,  extensive  training  in  ‘open  warfare’  was  accelerated.  ‘Extra
Instructors sent from Battalions to meet this emergency. Great lack of knowledge as
to the tactical handling in the open was noted.’180
An area at Wailly, south west of Arras, of former German trenches and dug-
outs was taken over following the Arras offensive in April 1917. The driving facilities
there were described as an area ‘exceptionally adapted both in extent and character
for training... This area contained every feature requisite for practice, it reproduced
the conditions to be met with on the actual battlefields and gave opportunity for
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Establishment for the Mechanical  Maintenance and Driving School  at Wailly was
finally approved in September 1917.181
In July 1917, an area suitable for tank practice was selected near Le Treport
on the Channel coast.
In  probably  a  greater  number  of  particulars  than any area that  could  be
found, it fulfilled the conditions requisite for Tank manoeuvre. Standing on
high cliffs above the shore, it had an unrestricted field of fire in the direction
of the sea. On the landside it formed an extensive stretch of downs, broken
here  and  there  by  sharp  depressions  and  generally  having  sufficient
irregularities  to  provide  variation  in  the  character  of  the  ground  to  be
traversed. Here one Brigade at a time was accommodated from November
onwards and...Special  Battle  Practice  Courses were held  for  officers and
other ranks. The general idea was to make the gunner put into practice the
lessons learnt...in the 6 Pdr, and Hotchkiss Machine guns, the Revolver and
Visual Training.182
Similarly, Special Driving Camps of Instruction were established at Wailly and two
near Bray-sur-Somme, one for each of the three Tank Brigades, where a company
from each of the three battalions could exercise at the same time. Training tanks
remained at the special camps throughout the winter period allowing opportunities
for training whenever operational commitments allowed.183
Training in reconnaissance continued in France following initial  training at
Wool.  Hotblack  was  appointed  GSO2  (Intelligence)  at  Tank  Corps  HQ  and
organised 12 day courses there. The object was to produce specialised Battalion
ROs who would,  in  turn,  run courses in  reconnaissance duties at  company and
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section level in their own battalions. In time, the ROs would become something of an
essential ‘corps d’elite’ within the Tank Corps.184
Cooperative training with the other arms was not neglected. One company of
tanks was attached to each Army and worked in  the Army,  Corps  or  Divisional
Training Areas, as required. Tank Corps officers who had not served with infantry in
the trenches or not yet been into action with the tanks were attached for periods of
14 days to an infantry  battalion  in  the line.  Similarly,  junior  infantry  and artillery
officers were attached to tank battalions for periods of seven days. 185
CONCLUSIONS
By  the  end  of  1916,  the  various  elements  of  the  HBMGC  had  reason  to  be
cautiously  optimistic.  Despite  Elles’  misgivings  about  the  split  in  responsibility
between his  operational  HQ in  France and the administrative  HQ in England,  a
workable system for training tank crews had evolved; individual training at Wool and
collective  and  tactical  training  in  France.  However,  training  both  sides  of  the
Channel was hampered by lack of machines. 
The theoretical tank tactical doctrine formulated largely by Swinton had been
put to the test in the operations on the Somme. The optimistic expectations of this
novel weapon of war had been tempered by the realities of combat; the mechanical
limitations of the tank, the lack of sufficient numbers and the inadequate training of
184
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the crews.  Tactical  doctrine had evolved ‘on the job’,  and in the light  of combat
experience.  Nonetheless, the tank had shown its potential and GHQ had given the
go-ahead for the expansion of the corps.
What was lacking was evaluation of the future potential of the tank and the
formulation of operational doctrine. The brief lull in operations between the closing of
operations on the Somme in November 1916 and the start of the Arras offensive in
April 1917 provided the opportunity for such to take place. The arrival of Major J F C
Fuller as the GSO2 (later GSO1) at HQ Tanks in France in late 1916 provided the
catalyst. 
The following chapter will discuss the role and influence of Fuller and others
in the development of tactical and operational tank doctrine and the training of the
Tank Corps.
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CHAPTER THREE:     THE THEORY - THE EVOLUTION OF TACTICAL
AND OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE
This  chapter  will  concentrate  on  the  development  of  tactical  and  operational
doctrine, and the consequential developments in training requirements following the
combat experience gained on the Somme, limited though that experience was. The
chapter  will  examine the following  research questions:  how did  tank  operational
doctrine evolve? How was it derived and by whom? How was it implemented? How
did it fit in with overall BEF operational doctrine? What training requirements evolved
at  each stage of  the  developing  doctrine?  The chapter  will  look  at,  in  turn,  the
contributions  of  various  personalities;   it  will  examine  the  influence  of  the
‘Mechanical Warfare’ debate; and assess the involvement of GHQ in the production
of tactical and operational doctrine.
THE INFLUENCE OF FULLER
Elles  recommended the addition  to  his  existing  general  staff  at  Tank HQ,  (then
consisting of himself, a Brigade Major and the Intelligence Officer), of a staff- trained
GSO1 whose function would be to co-ordinate and direct the collective training of
the battalions in France:
 (d)  A  senior  General  Staff  Officer  will  be  necessary  next  year  on  full
expansion,  but it  is suggested that the most important part of his work is
before the expansion has actually begun.186 
Haig agreed to Elles’ suggestions and made his own recommendation to the WO on
13 December 1916 for the addition of a GSO to Tank HQ .187
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The man appointed to this post in December 1916 was Major J.F.C. Fuller of
the  Oxfordshire  and  Buckinghamshire  Light  Infantry.  It  was  a  fortunate  and
significant appointment. Fuller’s reputation and legacy has been tainted somewhat
by his dalliance with the occult, metaphysics, spiritualism and, later, with fascism.
He also had a reputation as an unorthodox, innovative and thoughtful, if somewhat
arrogant,  staff  officer  and  trainer,  a  thinker  prepared  to  challenge  conventional
wisdom. The newly-formed corps was the ideal seed-bed for his fertile mind. There
is little doubt that his impact on the training and professionalism of the Tank Corps
and the formulation of tank tactical and operational doctrine during the Great War
was profound. 
Fuller’s two biographers, Trythall writing in 1977 and Holden Reid writing in
1987, generally hold a constructive view of Fuller’s contribution. 188  Other historians
are  more  sceptical.  Harris  considered  the  ‘reams  and  reams’  of  papers  and
instructions  that  Fuller  produced  ‘were  of  little  use  as  guides  to  action.’189 This
judgement  is  harsh.  Fuller’s  initial  contribution  was  the  first  serious  attempt  to
produce a guide to tank tactical doctrine and it remained the only practical guide for
nearly a year.
A picture of him at Tank HQ is provided by Captain Evan Charteris, a GSO3
at Tank HQ: 
Here  I...  first  made  acquaintance  with  Evans  [Charteris’  pseudonym  for
Fuller], the GSO1 of the Tank Corps – GSO1 and brain... He stood out at
once as a totally unconventional soldier, prolific in ideas, fluent in expression,
at daggers drawn with received opinion, authority, and tradition... He was an
inexhaustible  writer,  and  from  his  office  issued  reams  on  reams  about
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training, plans of campaign, organisation and schemes for the use of tanks.
He was an invaluable element both from a military and social point of view,
but  his  brains  would  have  been  better  utilised  at  GHQ  galvanising  that
conservative centre with advanced ideas... He was neither an administrator,
nor probably a good commander, but just what a staff officer ought to be,
evolving sound ideas and leaving the execution to others.190
Another, somewhat effusive, description of Fuller’s contribution is provided by Major
Stephen Foot, who served as BM to 2 Brigade, Tank Corps:
For their success Tanks require tactics no less than petrol; Fuller devised
them. Before an attack can be launched there must be a plan; Fuller made it.
After an attack, lessons must be learnt both from success and failure; Fuller
absorbed them. And, sad to relate, in the case of the Tanks a constant war
had to be waged against  the apathy, incredulity  and short-sightedness of
GHQ; Fuller fought that war, and won.191
Foot, an ardent supporter of Fuller, somewhat slavishly followed Fuller’s hostile view
of Haig and GHQ and arguably over-emphasised Fuller’s role in changing GHQ’s
perceived negative view of the tank, a view that cannot supported by the evidence.
On his  appointment  on 26 December  1916,  Elles  told  Fuller:  ‘This  show
badly needs pulling together; it is all so new that one hardly knows which way to
turn. I want you to do this: to put some discipline, some  esprit de corps, into the
men; then we shall have a good show.’192 Characteristically, Fuller launched himself
enthusiastically into his new role.  Fuller believed there were three main problems to
be solved. ‘The first was to moralise [sic] the men; the second was to instruct the
officers and the third was to assist in organising the whole, so that maximum tactical
power might be developed.’193 By 10 January 1917, less than two weeks after he
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arrived at Bermicourt, Fuller had produced a comprehensive ‘indoor scheme’ for the
tank battalion commanders in France. It was a remarkable achievement bearing in
mind that Fuller came to Tank HQ with no previous knowledge of the capabilities
and limitations of tanks.
 He devised an imaginary ‘scheme’ based on a Fifth Army attack supported
by  tanks  in  the  area  between Puisieux  and  Beaucourt  north  of  the  Ancre.  The
‘scheme’ was conducted in three phases. Having been presented with trench maps,
extracts  from  divisional  plans,  artillery  plans,  intelligence  summaries,  movement
orders, loading plans and other relevant information, the tank battalion and company
commanders were invited to find solutions to various problems set by Fuller. The
commanders would then present the ‘battalion solution’ at a conference of battalion
commanders the following week before being given the next phase of the ‘scheme’.
For  each  of  the  three  phases,  Fuller  produced  his  own  solutions  to  the
various problems. In Fuller’s comprehensive and voluminous solutions, amounting in
all to 24 foolscap pages of typed notes, we can glimpse signs of formal operational
doctrine  emerging.  Most  of  his  solutions  concerned  administrative  and  logistical
matters  but  some strayed  into  doctrinal  matters.  For  instance,  in  describing  his
solution to the overall tank operation, Fuller recommended:
He  [the  Tank  Battalion  Commander]  would  insist  on  one  thing:  that  the
success of  the Tank Operations  would  depend on deciding  on a  definite
policy  of  action which would  not  be upset  by the personal  wishes of  the
Divisional Commanders. 
...Tank operations would therefore have to be divided under two headings (i)
Tanks allotted for co-operation in the taking of the Main Objective (ii) Tanks
allotted for emergency work and definite strongpoints operations within the
main objective. Generally,  (i)  would be under Corps control and (ii)  under
Divisional.194
Drawing on the tanks’ previous experience of combat, Fuller emphasised:
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... it must be remembered that past experience has shown that though the
infantry assault frequently succeeds in capturing the enemy’s 1st line system
it is usually completely held up by his 2nd line of defence, ...The first step in
gaining the main objective will therefore be the enemy’s 2nd line which should
be attacked by Tanks.195
However,  some  previous  combat  experience  was  apparently  ignored.
Despite  the  previous  criticism  of  Rawlinson’s  use  of  ‘artillery-free’  lanes  in
September, Fuller recommended that the Tank Battalion commander ‘might suggest
to the GOC, RA, that it would help the advance of the Tanks through the enemy’s
lines if lanes free from shell fire from Heavy Artillery were left at certain places within
the area of  bombardment.’196 It  is  conceivable  that  Fuller  was not  aware of  the
widespread  criticism of  this  policy  during  the  Somme offensive,  as  he  was  not
involved with tanks at the time, but it is surprising that this comment found its way
into his paper.
Fuller’s own assessment of the value of the exercise was as follows:
A  comprehensive  piece  of  work,  each  officer  taking  part  in  it  giving
something of value towards the common solutions. I say the results were
extraordinary because during the many battles which faced us very few new
problems arose; consequently the exercise was a real intellectual foundation
for our training.197
Although, understandably, Fuller was enthusiastic about the success of his exercise,
one cannot help wonder what the initial reactions of the battle-experienced battalion
officers  were  to  the  opinions  of  a  relatively  junior  staff  officer  (Fuller  was  not
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel as GSO1 at Tank HQ until April 1917)198 from an
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infantry background, with limited combat experience and no previous experience at
all of tanks. Fuller was not known for his tact in expressing his opinions.199 
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TRAINING NOTE NO.16
At  the  conclusion  of  the  indoor  exercises,  Fuller  collated  his  solutions,  and
presumably those of the battalion and company commanders, as the lessons learnt,
into an important doctrinal document, ‘Training Note No. 16: Tank Tactics.’200 Fuller
claimed this to be ‘the first training manual of its kind, for what had thus far been
issued were nothing more than a few platitudinous notes’ and that it  ‘formed, for
over  a  year,  the  foundation  of  tank  tactics.’201 This  comment  appears  to  be
somewhat  dismissive  of  the  work  done  previously  by  Swinton  but  Fuller  later
claimed not to have been aware of Swinton’s ‘Notes on the Employment of Tanks’
written  a  year  previously,  until  February  1918.202 Given  Fuller’s  previous  non-
involvement with tanks, this is entirely plausible and it is all the more remarkable
how closely Fuller’s and Swinton’s views coincide.
‘Training Note 16’ is a 24 page document with five appendices and seven
diagrams. The cover carries a warning:
The  following  tactical  notes,  until  further  experience  is  gained,  must  be
considered as provisional...These notes will be amended from time to time
and reissued.203
Although described by Fuller as ‘tactical notes’, they are in effect a combination of
both operational and tactical doctrine. The first part of the document has chapters on
tank organisation,  tank operations,  tank tactics and tank co-operation with other
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arms and deals with the role of the tank in the corps and divisional battle and would
thus be considered operational doctrine.204 The latter part of the Note has chapters
on  preparations  for  the  offensive,  system  of  supply,  system  of  communication,
reinforcements and methods of camouflage. Much of this material is thus more in
the nature of tactical doctrine. A noticeable omission is any mention of the use of
tanks in defence, an omission that had to be rectified rapidly a year later during the
German offensive in March 1918.
Fuller  defined the tank as a ‘mobile fortress’  immune from shrapnel,  shell
splinters or bullets. It could deliver a high volume of fire from its Lewis machine guns
and the 6 pounder gun and was capable of moving ‘practically over any ground and
through all entanglements.’  It was best fought on the offensive principle and was
‘best suited to give blows at close quarters without receiving them.’205
With the benefit  of  hindsight  we know that some of these attributes were
optimistic.  The tank,  at  least  in its early versions,  was not entirely immune from
small  arms fire and certainly  not  from direct  shell  fire.  It  was very vulnerable to
adverse ground conditions and was only really successful on undamaged ground
that  had  been  partially  chosen  with  tank  operations  in  mind.  Fuller  makes  no
mention of  their  mechanical  frailty,  their  lack of  speed nor  of  their  cumbersome
ability to manoeuvre.
Fuller identified that the weakness in current tactics on the Western Front
was what he described as a ‘great extension of front with little depth of reserves.’ In
other words, attacks on a broad front failed because enemy obstacles covered by
flanking fire exhausted the attackers before reserves could be deployed. Penetration
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was thus never achieved. He believed that the ‘main Tank objectives are those lines
of trenches and wire which will offer the greatest resistance to the infantry advance;
namely, the enemy’s second and subsequence lines of defence.’206
To  achieve  surprise,  ‘essential  to  success  in  a  trench  attack’,  Fuller
recommended  that  both  the  infantry  attack  and  the  artillery  bombardment  be
‘exceedingly rapid’ to prevent the enemy realising that an attack was about to take
place and to stop him drawing in reserves from his flanks. The ideal operation to
take  all  three  defence  lines  would  last  12  to  16  hours  following  an  artillery
bombardment of not exceeding 48 hours. If the artillery was unable to carry out all
the necessary preparatory work on the enemy defences in this time, the tanks would
be able to do so. In so doing, Fuller seemed to be equating the capabilities and
characteristics of the relatively unsophisticated and short-range 6-pounder with the
more technically sophisticated, more powerful and longer-range guns available to
the Royal Artillery. This point illustrates Fuller’s lack of a broader experience of other
Arms and his somewhat myopic view that tanks could readily take over the functions
of, for instance, the artillery or the cavalry. 
Fuller envisaged a line of sections of tanks advancing through the attacking
infantry  onto  the  second  line  of  defences  to  keep  the  enemy  in  a  state  of
disorganisation pending the arrival of re-organised or fresh troops. Thereafter, the
advance on the third line of defences ‘will savour more of a pursuit than an assault’
with the tanks preventing the enemy consolidating in rear.207 Fuller summarised the
object of the tank in the attack as:
(1) To open the way for the infantry.
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(2) To accentuate the disorganization of the enemy.
(3) To cover our own reorganization.
(4) To prevent the enemy throwing up new defences208
Fuller  was  realistic  enough  to  accept  that  ‘as  long  as  the  Tanks  are  limited  in
number,  it  must  be remembered that  the majority  of  them will  have to be used
against  the  enemy’s  second  line  system  for  this  is  the  first  great  obstacle  the
attacking  infantry  will  have  to  surmount  once  the  first  line  is  captured.’  He  did
emphasise, however, that each defensive system would require a separate echelon
of tanks. In dealing with isolated strong points, Fuller thought it would be necessary
to detail certain tank units as ‘moppers up’. A section or half section of tanks ‘will in
a  short  period of  time accomplish  what  many heavy guns and a  large force of
infantry would take several hours to carry out.’209
Fuller considered the distribution of tanks to formations. Those tanks which
were allocated to deal with the main objectives would be distributed to the Corps,
the formations which controlled the artillery; those allocated as ‘moppers up’ or to
attack strong points or other unexpected situations would be distributed to Divisions
as they controlled the attacking troops.  Co-operation between the tanks and the
infantry and artillery was vital to the success of the tank operation.
Dealing  with  tank  tactics,  Fuller  emphasised  that  the  enemy’s  most
vulnerable  points  were  the  flanks  exposed  during  a  penetration.  He  therefore
recommended that columns of tanks should be specifically tasked with dealing with
enemy defence lines exposed by the initial penetration. Fuller did concede that the
creeping barrage would usually be more effective than tanks and ‘the Tank is in no
208




way intended to replace the Barrage but to supplement it when it breaks down or
become ineffective.’210
In implementing these tactics, Fuller arrived at what he termed ‘The Triple
Formation’ – ‘a formation of echelons of [tank] section columns in three... bodies  –
the main body and two wings.’  Each echelon would have definite objectives and
would be followed by ‘a local reserve to meet the unexpected and to “mop-up” points
of  resistance.’   The  section  of  four  tanks  was  chosen  as  the unit  of  attack  ‘on
account of its flexibility and the power it possesses of being able to split itself into
two  half-sections  of  two  tanks,  the  smallest  number  that  should  ever  operate
together with the present type of Tank.’211
Fuller had listed co-operation with other arms as one of his ‘principles’. With
regard to artillery co-operation, Fuller acknowledged that tanks were vulnerable to
artillery  fire.  Therefore,  counter-battery fire  afforded the best  protection  from the
artillery. It  was also important to co-ordinate the movement of the tanks with the
friendly  barrage  to  avoid  casualties  and  to  be  able  to  communicate  rapidly  the
position  of  tanks  to  the  supporting  gunners.  This  latter  requirement  was  never
satisfactorily resolved throughout the war.212 On  infantry  co-operation,  Fuller
emphasised that:
unless the closest bond of sympathy unite these two arms, the infantry will
not be able to take advantage of the opportunities which the tanks create...
The Infantry Commander must remember that the duty of the tank is to open
the way for the infantry and not to pull  the infantry’s chestnuts out of the
fire...  Further  the  Infantry  must  remember  that,  except  in  ‘mopping-up’








the object of the Tank is to accelerate the infantry advance and in no way
impede it by delays which may be due to mechanical trouble.213
Here was tacit acknowledgement of one of the great weaknesses of the early
marks of tank – their inherent mechanical unreliability.
With cavalry co-operation, Fuller suggested that tanks could act as a moving
line of ‘blockhouses’ from which the cavalry could advance or behind which they
could retire. He saw them being used to form a bridgehead or to seize and hold
points  of  tactical  importance  in  advance  of  the  infantry.  In  this  respect,  Fuller’s
expectations  of  the  tanks  in  this  role  were somewhat  fanciful.  The  mismatch in
speed and endurance between tanks and cavalry was considerable at this stage of
their development.214 It is interesting that at this stage of the development of Fuller’s
doctrinal  philosophy,  he was advocating co-operation with cavalry. This contrasts
with his later views. In April 1918, for instance, he produced a short paper, prompted
by the development of what he then termed, ‘a light tank’ – the Medium A Whippet,
on the pros and cons of the cavalry against tank forces.215
Among the Appendices was a ‘Battle History’ report form to be completed,
post operation, by the tank commander. It included such detail as the Unit to which
the tank was attached, the hour at which the tank started for action, time of zero
hour,  extent  and  nature  of  hostile  shell  fire,  ammunition  expended,  casualties,
position and condition of tank after action, orders that were received and a report on
the action. The Battle History Report form represented the first attempt to formalise
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quantity of information, no doubt reflecting the post-action state of the commander,
or, in some cases, of his NCO replacement.216 They were most probably useful in
analysing,  for  instance,  common  mechanical  failures,  ammunition  and  fuel
expenditure and the like but, as they reflected the rather limited visual and actual
combat  experience of  junior  commanders,  they  may not  have influenced  to any
degree the development of subsequent tactical doctrine.
In  summary,  ‘Training  Note  16’   was  a  significant  and  largely  practical
document. Its content, although reflecting Fuller’s vision of the use of the tank to
break the deadlock on Western Front, also contained the distillation of the combat
experience gained so far by the battalion and company commanders and garnered
through the indoor exercise discussions.  It  was, however, still  only based on the
limited use of the tank so far in combat in rather less than ideal conditions. It could
be criticised for being somewhat verbose and overly optimistic about the capabilities
of the tank in its current form but Fuller himself pointed out in the introduction that it
was provisional and subject to revision in the light of further experience.217
Unfortunately,  it  did  not  achieve  widespread  circulation  because  GHQ
ordered the withdrawal of all the copies that had already been widely distributed,
apparently on the grounds that the 48 hour preliminary bombardment recommended
by Fuller was not approved by the artillery hierarchy.218 Fuller did, however, circulate
copies within the Heavy Branch and the Note became the only attempt to impose
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some element  of  coordinated  operational  and  tactical  doctrine  on  the Corps  for
almost a year.219 
In  his  time  at  Tank  Corps  HQ,  Fuller  produced  numerous  papers  which
generally  fell  into  two  categories;  instructions  on  tactical  and  training  matters
resulting from lessons learnt during the tank actions of 1917 and 1918 and his more
philosophical papers on operational doctrine which contributed to the Mechanical
Warfare debate. 
THE MECHANICAL WARFARE DEBATE
In June 1917, whilst the lessons of Arras (see next chapter)  were being absorbed
and when planning for the next use of tanks at Messines was already underway,
Fuller turned his visionary mind to a general theory on the use of tanks in the future.
This was, he said, to allow any proposals to filter through the system and be co-
ordinated with the plans of other arms, to allow time for co-operative training with
other  arms  and,  most  importantly,  to  carefully  select  a  suitable  area  for  tank
operations.220
Fuller’s ‘Projected Bases for Tactical Employment of Tanks in 1918’, (later
called simply, ‘The Tactical Employment of Tanks in 1918’), was drafted on 10 and
11 June 1917. It was a combination of, in his own words, ‘grand strategic thinking
and minor tactics’ and was written; ‘mainly for my own instruction, subsequently it







Increasingly, Fuller was promoting the concept of a ‘Mechanical Army’ with the tank
playing the leading role in future combat.
Today onwards... one thing is certain, and that is that mechanical force is
going to supplant muscular force as regards movement, movement not only
behind the battle front as now, but in the very van of the battle itself. The
following is a suggestion towards the solution of this problem. The creation of
a Mechanical Striking Force...
Mechanical warfare is going to supercede [sic] muscular warfare... more and
more is war[fare] going to depend on the engine rather than man’s legs... the
tank is the first application of this mean of movement to the fighting units...
we should forthwith prepare to raise the mechanical army we shall require
and to select an area of operations suited to its tactics.222 
Once again his fertile imagination ran far ahead of the realities of the current state of
the tank.
This paper led me to see more clearly than I had ever seen before, that the
decisive attack did not depend upon the locality of a tactical point or position;
but that it  lay in a strategical direction, namely in the rear of the enemy’s
army and that consequently the decisive attack should be directed against
the  enemy’s  rear  in  order  to  strike  at  the  foundations [Fuller’s  italics]  of
fighting power.223
By August 1917, Fuller had clearly moved on from the earlier concepts of the tactical
use of tanks to assist the infantry in the initial penetration of the first and second line
defences to the more strategic role of attacking the enemy’s rear nerve centres. This
was a concept he developed more fully the following year.
Fuller claimed that his original paper was presented by Capper and Elles at a
conference at GHQ, Montreuil, on 14 July 1917 but was rejected by Kiggell.224 Fuller
subsequently amended and added to his original version a section on ‘Tank Raids’,
including a proposal for a raid by tanks in the general area between St Quentin and
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Cambrai. He later claimed this to have been the genesis of the Battle of Cambrai,
although he was advocating a limited raid rather than a decisive action: ‘my aim had
nothing to do with fighting a decisive battle, for the area was not suited to such an
operation.’225 Fuller, typically, sent copies of his revised paper to people of influence:
much  doubting  that  GHQ would  even  deign  to  read  it,  I  sent  copies  to
General Sir William Furse [then MGO at War Office], to Lieutenant Colonel
Stern, to ‘Tom’ Holland and to Mr. Winston Churchill, so that the seed might
fall upon fertile as well as barren land.226
There is no evidence that any of the recipients actually read Fuller’s verbose, 28
page missive or that it influenced the Third Army plans for the battle of Cambrai to
any degree but it does seem co-incidental that Diagram 5 in Fuller’s paper shows
part  of  the  area  selected  for  the  attack  later  in  the  year.  Harris  is  somewhat
dismissive of Fuller’s claims.227 He and others have also emphasised the importance
of the various developments in ‘scientific gunnery’ techniques used to good effect on
the opening day of the battle.228
At  much  the  same  time,  Fuller  produced  an  uncharacteristically  short
memorandum on  the  development  of  tactics  ‘since  August  1914,  generally  and
especially in relation to Tanks and Mechanical Warfare.’ Looking to the future, he
wrote:
A total change of tactics is necessary- a surprise which the defence cannot
deal  with.  We  still  have  that  power  of  surprise.  Accumulate  Tanks  and
continue to do so until you have thousands, well-trained and well-organised
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would consist of brigades of tanks of different designs, each organised for its
own particular role; all organised under one head, who would be responsible
for a Mechanical Army (trained with its complement of artillery and infantry,
etc., until ready to complete its task) to win a decisive battle.229
The proponents of ‘Mechanical  Warfare’  gained influential  support.  On 21
October 1917, Churchill in his role as Minister of Munitions, produced a lengthy and
closely argued paper on the munitions programme for 1918, predicting that tanks
would play a more significant role in the coming year: 
the resources for next year will for the first time make available numbers of
tanks with trained personnel sufficient not only to act as auxiliaries to the
infantry in the main battle, but to provide forces necessary for attacks of their
own under the most favourable conditions and on a very large scale.230
Lieutenant-General  Sir  William Furse,  the MGO, felt  that  the conference did not
show ‘sufficient appreciation of the value of Tanks... I would urge that everything
possible be done to expedite the output of the materiel [i.e.tanks] and that we should
lay plans for doubling our present establishment.’231
Fuller backed up his argument with copious statistics culled from the various
operations where tanks did and did not take part, proving, in his view, that the use of
tanks  resulted  in  fewer  casualties,  reductions  in  manpower,  and  savings  in
expenditure. More detailed and less subjective analysis might well have supported
another conclusion but Fuller ignored the simple fact that the tanks available at that
time were unreliable, vulnerable to adverse ground conditions and there were not
enough of them nor likely to be given the conflicting demands on limited supplies of
materials and manpower.
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Major  Stephen  Foot  produced  a  paper  entitled  ‘Petrol  versus  Muscle’.232
From this he developed a memorandum called ‘A Mobile Army’ which he presented
to General Capper:
Why not have a ‘Mobile Army’ of several Divisions, equipped with tractors to
carry supplies of food and ammunition sufficient to enable them to advance
for a period of six days? This would solve the problem of the holding out of
strong-points and places of tactical importance that in the past had held up
every advance...233
Capper  passed  the  paper  to  the  DCIGS  and  it  became  a  subject  at  a  WO
conference on ‘a Mobile Army’. A committee was formed to find suitable tractors to
carry supplies, artillery and infantry rather than fighting vehicles. In due course these
emerged; some were specially designed, some adapted from obsolete earlier marks
of tanks.234
By late December 1917, as a result of increasing manpower problems and
the transfer of German divisions from the Eastern Front, GHQ was adopting a more
defensive  strategy  on  the  Western  Front  pending  the  arrival  of  Americans.  A
‘Memorandum on Defensive Measures’ was produced by GHQ on 14 December
1917.  However, it made no reference to the defensive role of tanks. As a result,
Brigadier-General Elles sent a letter to GHQ on 4 January 1918 pointing this out.
Whilst protection must for some time to come depend primarily on Infantry
and Artillery action, a mechanical striking force [must] be built up behind this
shield so that offensive power may be added to the defensive imposed on us
for the next several months.235 
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The accompanying memorandum, probably written by Fuller, tackled not only the
defensive but also the offensive role of the tanks in the coming year. The author
dismissed a ‘passive defence’ role for the tanks as an ‘absurdity’. He argued that the
two defensive operations for the tanks are: ‘(a) to forestall a hostile attack by a raid
and (b) to counter-attack the enemy during or immediately after the attack.’236 Once
again, he advocated the use of ‘tank raids...A series of periodical Tank and Infantry
raids made at various places down the British Front in the late spring and summer of
1918 would probably force the enemy to retain large forces on this front.’237 Co-
operative  tank  training  between the  Allies  would  be  required:  ‘...  a  closer  Tank
liaison, both Tactical and Training should exist between the Tank Corps of these
three nations than exists at  present.’  The author did not  miss the opportunity to
press  his  case  for  the  massed  use  of  tanks  in  an  improved  Cambrai  type  of
operation.  He finished by emphasising that:  ‘it  is not the intention to lay down a
definite or detailed tactics but to accentuate the possibilities of Tanks (especially
those we shall be receiving in 1918) in both defensive and offensive operations.’ He
warned that ‘the eventual counter to the Tank....can only be a Tank. We have an
opportunity. Once Tank meets Tank, that opportunity will  vanish. The opportunity
may be fleeting.’238
Fuller produced a lengthy paper on ‘Anti-Tank Defence’ which was sent to
GHQ on the 30 December 1917. While there was little evidence at that time that the
Germans had their own tanks or were in the process of manufacturing them, ‘it is
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inconceivable’ that they would not do so in the near future. Fuller envisaged anti-
tank defence under various headings: artillery, using fixed anti-tank guns on likely
tank approaches, using one or two mobile anti-tank guns in each artillery battery and
by the use of bombardments on likely tank assault areas; infantry, using snipers to
target  loop-holes  and vision  slots  in  the tanks as  well  as grenades,  and trench
mortars and the use of tanks as anti-tank guns. He thought that the use of bombing
or shooting by aircraft  was also worth consideration.  He also recommended the
construction of entrenched anti-tank defences of at least 10,000 yards in depth to
break up and exhaust any tank penetration. He called for action as soon as possible
on these recommendations, particularly the identification of likely tank attack areas,
the creation of an ‘anti-tank defence line and the institution of tank and anti-tank
courses.239 Once again, Fuller’s visionary thinking was apparent and many of these
ideas became reality in due course, but they did not reflect the practicalities at the
time.
 With training in mind, Fuller produced another lengthy paper (28 pages and
11 diagrams) on ‘Infantry Co-operation and Training’. Perhaps mindful of the earlier
fate of the more widely distributed ‘Training Note 16’, Fuller only sent this paper to
all Tank Brigades with a caution on the front page: ‘Until an amended copy is issued
by GS, GHQ, this Training Note will be used for training Tanks and Infantry and for
lectures. The principles laid down in it  will  be maintained... the following Training
Note is issued in continuation of the instructions laid down in SS.135, Chap. XVI,
which should be read in conjunction with it.’240 The implication was that Fuller was
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not satisfied with the tank-related operational doctrine and training instructions so far
produced by GHQ, an aspect which will be considered later. 
Fuller describes the characteristics and limitations of the current tank for the
benefit  of  the  infantry.  There  is  then  a  lengthy  discourse  on  ‘The  Problem  of
Firepower’ where Fuller rather surprisingly claimed that: ‘Today, as formerly, we find
that the bayonet, or hand-to-hand fighting, is the true weapon of offence, and that
bullets and shell - weapons for fighting when at a distance and… [are] but a means
to defend the bayonet until it can be deployed.’ He emphasised that: 
All  ranks must  realise  that  the tactics required for  Infantry  and Tank Co-
operation is in detail different from what infantry have recently been asked to
carry out... this necessitates:-
(a) Quick initiative amongst leaders, especially Section Commanders.
(b) Quick movement of the Section241
By means of  text  and  diagrams,  Fuller  then described  in  considerable  detail,  a
number  of  ‘typical’  scenarios;  infantry  and  tank  attack  against  trenches,  against
strong-points,  on  woods  and  in  villages.  For  each  of  these  situations,  Fuller
described appropriate  training  exercises.  He finished with a  section  on anti-tank
defences. 
In this short period of productive output, Fuller produced one further paper
on  28  January  18,  entitled  ‘Tank  operations  Decisive  and  Preparatory,  1918-
1919’.242 According to Fuller, he produced this in response to a letter from Kiggell
ordering ‘us to distribute our four Brigades... as follows; 1st Brigade to First Army, 2nd
& 3rd Brigades to Third Army and 4th Brigade to Fifth Army. Though this facilitated
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unsatisfactory,  I  wrote  another  study  entitled  ‘Tank  Operations  Decisive  and
Preparatory 1918-1919’ which Elles forwarded to CGS on January 28.’243
The paper  was a  foretaste of  Fuller’s  more well-known later  study,  ‘Plan
1919’. In this earlier study, Fuller considered the operations that would be required
for the decisive battle in 1919 and the preparatory measures necessary during the
1918 operations. He believed that the decisive battle required a holding battle along
the entire 400 miles of the Western front to draw in enemy reserves, combined with
an initial  penetration on a front  of  100 miles,  and sufficient  forces to exploit  the
penetration achieved. He believed that such an operation using infantry and artillery
alone would be impossible. However, using ‘mechanical means it becomes feasible
with a comparatively small force.’ He estimated that such an operation would require
12,000 tanks in all and 240,000 men.  He acknowledged that Britain alone could not
produce these resources but that, if Britain, America and France could produce one
third each, Britain’s share would be 4,000 tanks and 80,000 men, the equivalent of
four infantry divisions.244 Given the acute shortages of both manpower and material
among all the Allies, this proposal was clearly unrealistic.
Fuller  set  out  the  detailed  tactical  requirements for  his  ‘decisive  battle  of
penetration’ involving the initial penetration on a broad base and the securing of the
flanks so formed. ‘The Tank is eminently suited to carry out these acts.’ He listed the
types of mechanical vehicles that would be required; 
(a) Tank crossers (Subsidiary uses:- Carriers, Mortar Tanks, Artillery Tanks,
Bridging Tanks).
 (b) Water crossers.
(c) Tank Destroyers (Subsidiary use:- Wood crossers).245
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The elongated Mark VIII  tank,  then under  construction,  would  be the necessary
vehicle.
Fuller included a section on ‘Mechanical Warfare’. ‘The Tank will protect the
infantry machine gunners from the enemy’s machine gunners, and the aeroplane
the Tank from the enemy’s artillery. Low flying aeroplanes must be bullet-proof; in
fact they must become flying tanks. Here is the solution to our problem “how to
make the most of our man-power in the battles which face us next year”. ’246
Turning  to  the  preparatory  operations  during  1918,  Fuller  once  again
championed the use of two types of ‘Tank Raids’-; the ‘deep raid’ on a narrow front
and a ‘shallow raid’ on a broad front. Drawing comparisons from Cambrai, Fuller
estimated the likely casualties and numbers of prisoners taken in a raid. Whilst his
calculations  were somewhat  speculative,  Fuller  finished  by  posing  the rhetorical
question: ‘Whether shallow raids or deep ones are the best [Fuller’s emphasis] form
of  bettering  our  tactical  position  is  immaterial.  Mechanical  Warfare  does offer  a
solution.... If it is not the best solution then what solution is a better one?’247
Whether this latest paper by Fuller had any influence on GHQ is debatable.
Fuller himself acknowledged: ‘The new CGS248 read this paper, or possibly he did
not; for on February 4th it was returned to us without a word of comment.’249 It seems
that GHQ was not swayed by Fuller’s proposals for a more aggressive use of tanks
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Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies and the Tank Corps regarding the ‘principles to be
observed in the employment of the Tank Corps in the defensive.’ GHQ instructed
that the use of tanks would be:
restricted to assisting in re-establishing the battle or rear zones by counter-
attack...tanks may be used in two ways:-
(a) without infantry support-within 24 hours of a hostile assault- for
the  purpose  either  of  checking  an  attack  that  has  succeeded  in
penetrating  the  battle  zone,  or  to  disorganise  the  enemy’s  next
bound.
(b) in co-operation with other arms in the deliberate counter-attack.
In the latter case the operation was to be conducted along the lines of the Battle of
Cambrai and in accordance with instructions laid down in SS135 The Training and
Employment  of  Divisions  in  1918 (to  be  discussed  later).  The  instruction
emphasised that tank units should be concentrated together because, ‘if dispersed
forward, great damage will be done to signals communications and light railways by
lateral movement.’250 Given that GHQ could not with absolute certainty predict where
the anticipated German attack was likely to fall,  the dispersal of the Tank Corps
assets as a GHQ reserve across the British front, concentrated with a Tank Brigade
to each Army, was eminently practical and sensible. GHQ went further and, at a
Conference  held  on  2  March  1918,  Haig,  after  consulting  with  General  Gough,
proposed that the tanks be used as strong points or, as Fuller referred to them,  as
‘Martello Towers’.251 This later developed into a concept, known dismissively within
the Tank Corps, as the ‘Tactics of the Ferocious Rabbits’, whereby individual tanks
would  remain  hidden  in  specially  prepared  pits,  to  emerge  and  engage  enemy
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penetrations.252 Thus, the defensive doctrine changed from tanks being dispersed in
concentrated groups to a thin cordon of individual tanks.
Fuller followed the instruction from GHQ with his own to the Tank Brigades.
In it he emphasised:
The main principle to work on is concentration of force, dispersion must be
guarded  against.  When  discussing  action  with  Armies,  etc.,  it  must  be
pointed out that tanks have not been distributed forward in order to take part
in local counter-attacks. They are in general reserve and consequently their
action must coincide with the normal action of such a reserve, that is the
decisive counter-attack in the Battle or Rear Zone.253
In the absence,  at that time, of a tank advisor at GHQ it  seems that Fuller  was
seeking  to  use  the  Tank  Brigade  commanders  to  influence  the  various  Army
Commanders’ use of tanks in their coming operations. 
In a strategic overview written on 26 February 1918 of how the war might
progress in 1918,  Fuller  once again emphasised the ‘Mechanical  Solution to the
War’:
We must bank not on men but on Machines. We must bank on the cannon,
on the Machine Guns, on Tanks, on Aeroplanes and on gas. If we are to win
the  war  in  1919  we  must  absolutely  outpace  all  possible  mechanical
productive ability of Germany forthwith. As regards Tanks alone, we shall
require 12,000 to 15,000... This is a possible solution. It may not be the best
possible solution. If a better can be found, then what is it?254
No doubt frustrated by what he saw as inertia at GHQ, Fuller, as was his
wont and ignoring military protocol, wrote direct to Winston Churchill, the Minister of
Munitions,  on 2 March 1918. He justified this by stating ‘I feel it is my duty, whatever
consequences  may  follow,  to  set  frankly  before  you  the  following  considered
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opinions relative to this subject [i.e. the possibilities of ending the war by mechanical
means].’ Fuller saw three main problems: ‘GHQ is inert and will lay down no policy...
this means that the Cabinet must decide on the 1919 Tank policy, whether GHQ
likes it or not’; second, ‘no efficient higher organisation exists in the Tank Corps’.
Fuller’s solution to this was ‘we want a Director General, one head, for preference a
civilian, unshackled by 1870 tactics, who has direct access to the War Office, GHQ
and the Ministry of Munitions... The Headquarters Tank Corps to be done away with
and replaced by a General Staff Officer and an Administrative Staff Officer at the
War Office.’; third, ‘Design and Production are not assured ... Design requires a man
who knows what we want in France. Production requires a man who is an expert in
production.’ Fuller then went so far as to propose Lieutenant Colonel Searle, the
Controller  of Tank Workshops in France – ‘  he is one of us, he knows what  we
want’- as the suitable man for the job.255
Even by Fuller’s standards, this letter sent from a non-substantive Lieutenant
Colonel direct to a Minister of State, criticising the higher command and proposing
changes at  the War Office was breathtakingly  arrogant  and naive.  Fuller  himself
acknowledged; ‘as an unconventional soldier I am breaking all the rules of military
etiquette by writing this letter to you. I am not a conventional soldier, and I consider
that I should be siding with the enemy if I was afraid of taking the action I am now
taking.’256 Fuller received a somewhat terse response from Churchill, thanking him
for  his  note,  pointing  out  the  competing  demand  of  the  shipyards  with  tank
255




production and telling him, politely,  that he did not intend to make the personnel
changes recommended by Fuller.257
With the anticipated German offensive imminent, Fuller turned his energies
to operational and training matters. He produced a ‘liaison scheme’ among the Tank
Brigades  ‘in  order  to  establish  a  uniform  system  of  collecting  and  transmitting
information, throughout all  units of the Tank Corps, regarding operations at fixed
hours.’258
On  20  March  1918,  Fuller  produced  an  instruction  on  ‘Training  in  the
Forward Area’.  In it  he emphasised the need for  reconnaissance training,  which
could be carried out  over the actual  routes to be used in battle,  on observation
training, on the techniques of ‘map layering’, on night work and the use of aeroplane
photographs.259 On 25 March 1918,  he produced instructions  for  the improvised
Lewis Machine Gun Battalions that had been formed from the Tank Brigades that
were no longer equipped with tanks through battle casualties. On 29 March, eight
days after the Germans initial assault began, Fuller hastily produced instructions on
‘Tanks in Rear Guard Actions’.
Just  before  the  German  offensive  began  on  21  March,  Fuller  produced
another lengthy paper:
On the 18th [March] I corrected a long paper I had been preparing for some
time past. It was entitled ‘Tank Programme 1919’ and was in fact a kind of
Tank  encyclopaedia  covering  the  whole  problem  from  the  tactical,
administrative,  manpower  and  production  points  of  view.  Again  it  was
pointed out that large raids would disorganise the enemy and compel him to
break up his concentrations and once again it was stressed that ‘there is no
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other military solution to this war than the exploitation of mechanical means
to the fullest...’260
This paper was indeed largely a compilation of previous papers written by
Fuller into a single document of 21 pages and five appendices and contained few
new insights.261 Fuller  recorded that  it  was taken to GHQ by Elles on 19 March
1918.262 Probably  because  of  the  confusion  and  panic  caused  by  the  German
offensive two days later, nothing more is heard of it. Twelve days later, however,
after he had had the opportunity to consider the initial  lessons from the German
assault,  Fuller  produced  a  short  revision  to  his  paper.263  ‘The  present  German
offensive necessitates the partial recasting of ideas as regards the employment of
tanks next year.’ He foresaw the operational difficulties of advancing back over the
40 miles of  devastated ground recently  taken by the Germans.  In his  view,  this
strengthened his case for the increased production and use of mechanical vehicles,
particularly the new Mark VIII heavy tank and a lighter Medium tank.
Once the initial panic over the German offensive was out of the way, Fuller
resumed  his  work  on  training.  ‘I  first  got  out  a  note  for  our  own  people  on
“Elementary Tank Tactical Training” because, since the savage-rabbit insanity was
introduced, training had gone to the wall: further, casualties had further reduced the
tactical knowledge in units. This note was a short one, suggesting: the weekly issue
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of a Brigade tactical note; 10 minute lectures to all ranks on these notes; Company
tactical exercises based on these lectures and so on up to Battalion Exercises.’ 264
The Notes began with this introduction:
There  are  many  Subordinate  Tank  Commanders  at  the  present  moment
who,  when  questioned,  display  a  complete  ignorance  of  Tank  and  other
tactics even of the most elementary nature; this is a serious danger. It is fully
realised that during the last few months training facilities have been limited
and much time expended on Tank Maintenance and the mechanical  side
generally.  There  is  no  doubt  that  mechanical  knowledge  has  greatly
increased.  Now  what  we  want  to  arrive  at  is  the  policy  to  apply  this
knowledge tactically – that is, according to the following points:-
(a) Ground
(b) Formation and action of the Infantry
(c) The resistance that the enemy is putting up
Without this close co-operation between the mechanical side and the tactical
side, there can be no success – only friction and disappointment.265
After witnessing the catastrophic the effect the German offensive had had on
the British command system, particularly in Fifth Army, Fuller began to formulate
new thoughts on operational doctrine for the tanks for the coming year.
PLAN 1919
Fuller produced the doctrinal paper for which he is probably best known on 24 May
1918.  It  originally  had the rather grandiose title  of  ‘The Tactics of  the Attack as
affected by the Speed and Circuit of the Medium D Tank’, later to be known simply
as ‘Plan 1919’.266 As the original title implies, the paper came about because new
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tactics  needed to be developed  with  the anticipated  arrival  of  the  latest  type of
medium tank, the Medium D. ‘From the idea of the machine [the Medium D]... on 24
May I worked out an entirely novel system of tactics.’267
Medium  or  ‘chaser’  tanks  had  been  around  since  late  1917  and  were
designed  to  exploit  a  breakthrough  made  by  the  heavy  tanks.  The  Medium  A
‘Whippet’  tank,  of  which  200  were  produced,  had  proved  their  worth  in  various
actions during 1918. Although faster than the heavy tank (up to 8 mph compared
with around 4 mph), the Whippet was still too slow, and mechanically unreliable, to
be a serious weapon of pursuit. Two improved versions followed but none made it to
the battlefield. At a conference on 28 April at HQ Tanks, the specifications for an
improved medium tank were laid down –a speed of 20 mph, a range of 200 miles
and a weight  of  not  more than 20 tons.268.  It  was the promise of  this  machine,
together with the much improved Mark V heavy tank, that led Fuller to produce his
‘Plan 1919’.
Using the analogy of the human body, Fuller emphasised the need to go for
the enemy’s ‘brain’-  his headquarters and command centres, before attacking his
‘limbs’ – his supply routes and fighting arms. His plan was to use large numbers of
armoured  vehicles  in  three  roles:  a  ‘Disorganising  Force’  of  Medium  Ds  to
breakthrough and thrust up to 20 miles behind the front line targeting headquarters
in rear; a second ‘Breaking Force’ of infantry, tanks and artillery would then make
the major penetration of  the front-line defences and,  once penetration had been
achieved, a ‘Pursuing Force’ of Medium Ds and lorry or carrier borne infantry would
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pursue  the  fleeing  enemy.  To  achieve  all  this,  Fuller  estimated  the  British
contribution to be around 3000 tanks of all types and 37,000 personnel.
Fuller’s paper was a combination of previous ideas and new insights. It can
be criticised on a number of grounds; first, it  is based on the premise that large
numbers of Mark VIII Heavy and Medium D Tanks would be available for a planned
offensive by mid-1919. In reality, tank production had to compete in terms of both
labour  and  material  with  other  war  requirements,  notably  shipping,  and  it  was
unlikely  that  sufficient  tanks  would  be  produced  on  time.  The  Mark  VIII  was
unproven in battle as only five had been produced by the Armistice. Similarly, the
Medium D, although it showed promise, was untried and had not yet been produced
in bulk. Second, Fuller ignored any advances that the Germans might have made by
mid-1919 in terms of their own tank production and effective anti-tank measures. It
was naive to think that the Germans would not have developed effective counter-
measures. Lastly, there was the question of man-power. Even with the American
contribution, it was speculative whether, politically or in reality, additional manpower
would have been found to carry through Fuller’s plans.
In reality, of course, ‘Plan 1919’ was never put to the test. In Holden Reid’s
words: ‘‘Plan 1919’ must be the most famous unused plan in military history.’269 Its
fame rested largely on its influence on the development of mechanised warfare in
the  inter-war  years,  a  subject  which  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis.270
Nonetheless it  is interesting to chart its subsequent progress through the military
269
 Holden Reid, Fuller, Military Thinker, p.48
270
 For the development of mechanised warfare in the interwar years see Martel, Lt. 
Gen. Sir G Le Q Our Armoured Forces (London: Faber and Faber, 1955); Liddell Hart, 
Captain B H The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its Predecessors, The Heavy 
Branch Machine Gun Corps, Tank Corps, & Royal Tank Corps  1914-1945. Volume I. 1914 -
1939  (London: Cassell, 1959)
113
command system and evaluate  the role played generally  by GHQ, WO and the
Supreme Headquarters in developing tank operational and tactical doctrine.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF HIGHER COMMAND IN TANK DOCTRINE
Although Haig’s support for the tanks did not meet Fuller’s unrealistic expectations,
Haig and GHQ generally could not be accused of being hostile to the use of tanks in
favourable  circumstances.  GHQ  also  became  involved  to  some  extent  in  the
production of tank tactical and operational doctrine. 
In  his  analysis  of  the  doctrinal  instructions  produced  by  GHQ,  Beach
discovered  that  out  of  hundreds  of  SS  instructions  produced  by  GHQ  between
March  1916  and  the  end  of  the  war,  of  the  65  that  related  to  operational  and
doctrinal matters, only six related specifically to tank matters. (By comparison 12
were on artillery matters). Of the six only three: SS 164: Notes on the Use of Tanks
and on the General Principles of their Employment as an Adjunct to an Infantry
Attack, May 1917; SS 204: Infantry and tank co-operation and training, March 1918,
and SS 214: Tanks and their employment in co-operation with other arms, August
1918, could be considered strictly tank operational doctrine. 271
A Training Directorate had been established at GHQ on 30 January 1917,
under  Brigadier-General  Arthur  Solly-Flood,  with  the  intention  of  codifying  and
disseminating  doctrine  within  the BEF and rationalising  the training  system.272 It
seems  likely  that  the  first  formal  tank-related  publication  from  GHQ,  SS  164,
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published in  May 1917 was produced by the Training Directorate.  Dismissed by
Fuller  as  a  ‘slim  volume’,  the  instruction  served  to  give  front  line  formations
information about the characteristics and limitations of the improved Mark IV tank,
then making its first appearance on the battlefield. 
It was thin on doctrine as such, admitting that only limited combat experience
was available.  It  did  point  out,  however,  a number of  operational  considerations
which became enshrined in tank doctrine:
the action of the artillery and the employment of tanks should be carefully co-
ordinated... The best moral effect is obtained... from the employment of large
numbers of tanks attacking several objectives simultaneously... a proportion
of tanks should be kept in reserve... it will seldom be advisable to detail less
than  a  section  of  tanks  for  any  one  objective...  very  careful  previous
reconnaissance is essential.273 
There were several  matters which proved controversial  in due course:  ‘It  should
seldom be necessary to employ  tanks at  the commencement of  an offensive  to
assist  the  infantry  assault  on  a  hostile  front  system of  trenches,  which  can  be
adequately  dealt  with,  and  destroyed,  by  our  own  artillery  bombardment.’274 In
reality, it was the prolonged artillery bombardment that in many cases rendered the
ground unsuitable for tanks. On the question of ‘flattening sunken or concealed wire
which cannot be cut by artillery fire’ the instruction stated ‘the chances of success
are not great, and their use for such an abnormal use should be rare.’275 In practice,
admittedly once a method, i.e. grapnel hooks, had been developed, the crushing
and clearing of wire became one of the principal tasks for the tanks.
273






 No  further  tank-specific  doctrinal  instructions  were  produced  until  the
publication  of  SS 204:  Infantry  and  Training  Tank  Co-operation  and  Training in
March 1918. Fuller claimed to be the original author of this paper. ‘For some time
now I had urged that my paper on “Infantry and tank Co-operation and Training”
which we had issued to our own units on January 27 should be printed for circulation
down to Battalions.  He [General C Bonham-Carter at GHQ] told me it could not
possibly  stand as it  was written and when I asked “ why?”,  he replied:  “it  is  not
written in “GS” language.”  ’276.   An edited version was produced by the Training
Directive in March and its content was essentially as already described. 
The third of the three doctrinal  papers was  SS 214: Tanks and their Co-
operation with other Arms published in August 1918. This we know was written by
Major Cuthbert Headlam, the editor of numerous publications emanating from the
Training  Directorate  at  GHQ.277 Fuller  recorded  Headlam  visiting  Tank  HQ.  ‘I
received a request...  to give all  assistance to Major  C Headlam,  who had been
instructed to write a Tank Manual. At the time it seemed a little strange that I had not
been asked to do so; for thus far all notes, etc., on tank tactics and training had
been  written  by  myself...  He  stated  quite  frankly  that  he  knew  nothing  about
tanks.’278 Headlam briefly recorded this meeting, ‘satisfactory meeting with Fuller.
Lunched with the Tank people and saw an interesting demo afterwards.’279
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SS214 was issued in August 1918 and superseded both SS164 and SS204
as  well  as  the  brief  mention  of  tanks  in  SS135. It  was  a  very  much  more
comprehensive  document  reflecting  the  lessons  learnt  since  publication  of  the
previous documents. It  probably arrived in the hands of the Corps and Divisional
Commanders too late to influence the operations beginning in August 1918. There
was great emphasis on co-operative training between the tanks and infantry with an
appendix devoted entirely to this aspect. Notes on co-operation with aircraft were
included for the first time.280
 Headlam’s own comments on the reaction to the publication were: ‘I find my
Tank Book has made me quite famous – because I have succeeded in producing a
work on a disputed subject  to which no-one can find an objection.’281 Fuller  had
another view. He made one further dismissive comment on this document when he
wrote direct to the DCIGS on 5 June 1918: ‘Genl. Dawnay... decided that a tactical
manual on Tanks should be produced. I offered to take this on, but instead a GSO2
at GHQ who knows nothing about Tanks at all has been detailed to do this work. I
saw some of  his  notes  – he has not  a tactical  idea  in  his  head,  let  alone  any
knowledge of Tanks... please excuse me for being so frank...’282 Typically, Fuller’s
comment was somewhat caustic, reflecting the fact that he was not chosen for the
task.  Headlam  was  given  the  task  of  collating  various  differing  views  on  the
operational use of tanks. He was not, and admitted as such, a ‘tank expert’ and took
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pains  to  talk  to  Fuller  and  others  on  the  subject  before  producing  a  balanced
doctrinal document for the benefit of all users, not just the Tank Corps.283
Following changes of appointments at WO after Robertson’s resignation in
February  1918,  and  as  Inter-Allied  co-operation  progressed,  higher  command
showed increasing involvement  in tank doctrine.  General  ‘Tim’  Harington,  on his
appointment  as  the  new  DCIGS,  could  find  no  comprehensive  policy  on  the
employment of tanks at WO or at the Supreme Headquarters at Versailles.  In a
letter  of  21  May  to  Major-General  J.  Sackville-West,  the  British  Military
Representative at Versailles, he wrote:
Re Tanks, I am trying hard to get a General Staff Policy laid down and am
now  waiting  for  a  reply  from  GHQ  France  on  certain  points.  It  is  quite
hopeless at present and there are far too many people playing with it. I have
got CIGS to agree that he will produce a GS policy in a few days which must
be our doctrine... and so get some systems into the business and stop all
this outside pressure of views by cranks by every post.
 
I have had more difficulty in getting the hang of the Tank question since I
arrived than all the other questions put together.284
Major-General Guy Dawnay at GHQ professed himself ‘at sea’ over the question of
tank doctrine. In not recommending Fuller’s appointment to the proposed Inter-Allied
Committee at Versailles, he wrote:
 I do not think that he represents the General Staff view here at the least. In
fact he represents an extreme Tank view, which is a view to which the Tank
Corps in France has been unable to secure the adhesion of the General
Staff... I do not know the views of the General Staff. The fact is... the views of
the General Staff have not solidified on the subject. We have not enough
data on which to base a body of tactical doctrine at present.285 
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On 23 May 1918, Sackville–West forwarded two papers written by his staff officers
to Harington.286 In his covering letter, he expressed his concern about the lack of a
common doctrine for tanks among the allies:
 we  must  get  a  G.S.  policy  of  employment  [of  tanks]  evolved  and
accepted...if we can get a policy, allocation of tanks and construction, etc,
may be easy but  at  present,  everyone is  pulling  in  opposite  directions  –
Capper in England, Stern in Paris, Ellis at G.H.Q. and G.S. at G.H.Q.: unless
some definite policy is adopted and adopted at once, there is very little hope
of progress.287
Harington sent Sackville-West on 30 May 1918, a ‘preliminary General Staff policy
of which the C.I.G.S has approved and I am waiting for remarks on it from France.’
He stated: ‘I am absolutely certain we must get tanks brought inside the Army and
their policy controlled by General Staff... In the meantime, no-one is more anxious
than I am to get this business on proper lines.’288
The General Staff policy was a comprehensive, succinct document listing 12
tank policy matters ‘to be put in hand forthwith.’ A large scale offensive using tanks
was planned for around June 1919 on a frontage of between 40,000 and 100,000
yards using fighting tanks, infantry carrier tanks and cavalry. The basic tactic was to
be a breakthrough with tanks and carrier-borne infantry  with Lewis  guns.  These
would hold the ground until the arrival of infantry on foot. Infantry and supply tanks
would be used to bring up supplies so that another advance could be made without
delay. Further tanks would exploit the flanks to widen the breach and smoke would
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be used. In order to implement this policy, CIGS wanted the output of carrier and
supply  tanks  increased  at  once.  In  view  of  manpower  shortages,  it  would  be
impossible  to  increase the number  of  Tank Corps  personnel  so  ASC and other
personnel would be transferred temporarily to man the infantry carrier tanks. British
Tank Corps schools were to be established by early autumn 1918 to demonstrate
proposed operations and the same methods would be used by the Allied School of
Instruction then being set up. The CIGS wanted these proposals to be shared with
the Allies at Versailles to see what they could assist with in terms of tanks, tank
personnel and infantry.289
This  document  represented  the  first  positive  direction  on  the  matter  to
emanate from the CIGS and the War Office in the absence of any existing policy
and reflects the ‘new broom’ approach by the new CIGS, General Sir Henry Wilson
and his deputy, Harington. Haig had a staff paper prepared on the proposals and
responded to the War Office on 12 June 1918 with his views on tank policy. He
stated that he ‘found it difficult to formulate, except on very general lines, an opinion
on a matter which cannot be considered from the point of view of the British Army
alone.’ He felt that the proposed proportion of tanks to infantry to be faulty, the tank
force being too large and the infantry force too small. He did, however, agree that a
large force of tanks would be an invaluable adjunct to a general offensive. He was
‘strongly of the opinion that units of the fighting Tank Corps must take their place as
Army and Corps Troops, and further that Gun Carrier Tanks, Infantry Carrier and
Supply Tanks, Trench Mortar Tanks, etc, must be handed over to the Artillery, Army
Service Corps, etc, instead of forming part of the Tank Corps.’290 A few days later,
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he wrote again giving his view that Tank Corps HQ in France ‘should be formed into
an experimental headquarters and tactical training school... it is agreed that officers
of  the General Staff,  Administrative Staff  and Commanders of  formations should
study  at  this  school  and  that  anti-tank  tactics  should  also  be  a  subject  of
instruction... the formation of a central inter-allied school should be desirable for the
purposes indicated.’291
Fuller’s ‘Plan 1919’ re-emerges at this stage in an altered form. According to
Fuller, 
Concerning this plan so far as I am aware, nothing happened until July 1,
when General Capper placed a paper entitled ‘Armoured Striking Force for
1919’  before  the  C.I.G.S.;  a  paper  representing  the  ‘G.S.  edition’  of  my
Novelette [ie. Plan 1919] in which picturesqueness vanished in arithmetic...
later  in  the  month  a  letter  was  drafted  for  C.I.G.S.’s  signature  to  be
despatched to G.O.C. Allied Forces [General Foch]. It dealt with the 1919
offensive numerically not ideologically. In it was openly stated that it was ‘not
necessary  to  consider  the  actual  method  of  attack’,  which  was  not  very
helpful for the recipient.292
He also commented:
The ‘Memorandum on the Requirements for an Armoured Striking Force for
an Offensive in 1919’ was based on Capper’s paper of July, which, in turn
was based on mine of May 24 [i.e. Plan 1919].293
In his covering letter to General Foch, Wilson explained that the plan ‘is based on
the employment of tanks on a large scale.’ He suggested to Foch that ‘we obtain a
definite  decision from the Supreme War Council  that  it  shall  be carried out.’  He
made the following three points for Foch’s consideration:
 Fuller,’ Journal’, appx. B72, Haig to War Office, 12 June 1918.
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(i) That an allotment be made between the Allies as to what forces they are
to raise and what material they are to provide
(ii) That the whole-hearted concurrence of the Allied Governments and of the
Armies must be given to the scheme and their utmost efforts be made to
render it effective.
(iii)  the  appointment  of  a  small  body  of  officers  representing  each Allied
Nation to assist you in co-ordinating all work in connection with tanks.294
Wilson’s paper was clearly based on Fuller’s Plan 1919, in some cases using
the same phraseology.  His proposed plan for 1919 was essentially the same as
Fuller’s: an attack on a broad front of 160 kilometers of which 80 kilometers would
be penetrated by medium tanks targeting ‘the brain and stomach of the enemy’- the
headquarters and communications; the reduction of the artillery preparation to the
minimum;  assist  in  getting  forward  guns,  ammunition  and  supplies  and  make it
possible to carry out a rapid and sustained attack and ‘provide the means of pushing
the  blow  beyond  the  range  of  our  field  and  medium  artillery  and  ...  ensure
penetration of the enemy’s main system of defence.’295
In order to achieve this, Wilson’s plan required large numbers of Medium
tanks for the initial penetration capable of travelling long distances and able to cross
wide trenches and rivers, large numbers of heavy and light  tanks to support the
infantry and large numbers of ‘cross country mechanical vehicles’ in support. The
paper went into some detail on the tactics of the attack, detailing the requirements
for wire-crushing tanks, bridge-layers and communications tanks. The numbers of
troops required for such an attack were calculated at 70 divisions and tanks of all
kinds at 10,500 of which the British share would be around 3,000. Wilson concluded
by  emphasising  that  ‘no  time  should  be  lost  in  deciding  the  broad  lines  of  the
294
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scheme and more particularly on the numbers of tanks, etc which will be required.’
He was realistic enough to point out that the provision of tanks in time might well be
the limiting factor.296
The  same  criticisms  of  Fuller’s  plan  can  be  applied  to  Wilson’s.  It  was
essentially a plan for the future conduct of the war into 1919 based on a number of
untested assumptions. Critically, it relied on the provision of sufficient numbers of a
medium  tank  whose  design  criteria  had  been  agreed  upon  but  was  still  at  the
experimental  stage. Nonetheless,  Wilson’s  paper represented practically  the final
involvement  of  higher  command,  the War Office,  the Supreme War Council  and
GHQ, in tank operational matters. Fuller was posted to the War Office to set up the
new tank branch, SD7, there and devoted his energies to the re-organisation of the
Tank Corps ‘to bring it  more into the Army’,  the details of which are outside the
scope of this thesis.
CONCLUSION
Tanks first went into action in 1916 using tentative operational and tactical doctrine
based on the best guesses of a few enthusiasts but without any combat experience
to go on. As the tank crews and commanders gained more experience, so doctrine
developed and training methods evolved to put theory into practice. It required the
enthusiasm and persistence of such luminaries as Fuller and Elles to develop and
codify  tank  operational  doctrine  and  persuade  some  elements  of  the  higher
command of the potential of the tank. Throughout the period under consideration,




resources of  both  manpower  and materials  which  limited the actual  numbers of
available  tanks.  Unreliability,  limited  range  and  speed  constantly  dogged  the
effective  use  of  the  weapon,  despite  significant  improvements  in  design.
Nonetheless, by the time of the Armistice, WO, the CIGS and the Supreme War
Council  had  become fully  involved  in  the  development  of  tank  operational  and
tactical doctrine and there is little doubt that, had the war continued into 1919 and
beyond, the tank might well have developed greater potential, though possibly not to
the degree predicted by Fuller.
The  next  chapter  will  consider  how  the  doctrinal  theory  translated  into
practice in the various tank engagements of 1917 and 1918.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE REALITY – TANK ACTIONS, DOCTRINE AND TRAINING
This chapter will  examine the extent to which the major tank operations followed
existing doctrine or, conversely, materially brought about changes in doctrine and
training for subsequent actions in the light of combat experience and mechanical
developments of the tanks.
ARRAS - 9 APRIL TO 16 MAY 1917
The Battle  of  Arras was a diversionary  attack by the British Army in  support  of
General Nivelle’s offensive on the Aisne, some 50 miles to the south. British tactical
and  operational  doctrine  in  general  had  been  set  out  prior  to  the  battle  in  two
publications. The first edition of SS135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for
Offensive Action was published in December 1916 and SS143 Instructions for the
Training of Infantry Platoons for Offensive Action  in February 1917. Whilst  these
both radically changed tactical and operational doctrine for the infantry, there was
little  mention  of  tanks.  SS135  merely  states  that,  ‘In  the  present  state  of  their
development, tanks must be regarded as entirely accessory to the ordinary methods
of attack, i.e. to the advance of Infantry in close co-operation with the Artillery.’297 For
tactical  doctrine,  the  tanks  had to  rely  on Fuller’s  ‘Training  Note  16’,  discussed
above.
Commanders had expected to have 96 tanks of the improved Mk IV pattern
available for the beginning of the offensive. Because of the delays in production,
only 60 tanks were available and these were a mix of old Mk Is and Mk IIs, and even
297
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25 unarmoured Mk III training tanks hurriedly rushed out from Bovington. Forty tanks
were allocated to Third Army in the centre, twelve to Fifth Army on the right flank
and eight to the Canadian Corps of First Army, for its assault on Vimy Ridge to the
north.298
Generally, the contribution of the small number of tanks distributed in penny-
packets across the entire 32,000 yard frontage of the offensive was limited and fell
far short of the expectations of the Heavy Branch commanders. At the end of the
offensive, the various tank unit commanders submitted their after-action reports.299 A
conference of all tank unit commanders involved from Brigade down to Company
and  Workshop  Commanders  was  held  on  26  April  1917.  At  the  conference  24
specific  questions were discussed ranging from tactical  issues,  such as  ‘should
Tanks operate in advance of the Infantry?’, ‘were tanks able to keep up with the
infantry?’, and ‘what were the main difficulties Tanks experienced in crossing the
German  trenches?’,  to  technical  matters,  such  as  ‘whether  any  difficulty  was
experienced in using the Lewis guns?’, ‘whether the torpedo unditching gear worked
successfully?’, and ‘whether Tanks ran short of petrol and water’?’300
The responses to the questions and additional material were collated into a
lengthy  document  ‘published  for  the  information  and  instruction  of  the  Heavy
Branch.’  The  document  is  unattributed  but  bears  all  the  hallmarks  of  Fuller’s
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authorship.  The  author  summarises  his  deductions  and  lessons  under  four
headings: training, technical, tactical and administrative and command. 
Under training, the author considered that the preparatory training had been
sound  and  practical.  There  were  however,  a  number  of  points  which  required
attention:
(a) More Tank driving over difficult ground must be carried out
(b) Frequent driving with the differential locked must be practiced
(c) All work and duties within the Tank must be reduced to a drill
(d) Want of being able to apply “immediate action” to Lewis gun stoppages
prevented many targets from being engaged.
(e) More practice must take place in all types of signalling...
(f) Crews must... understand that if they are given a definite objective, and
are ordered to rally having accomplished their work on it, they must do so. It
must be impressed on them that though it be most gallant to proceed further,
it is inexpedient to do so...
On technical lessons, the paper highlighted the following ‘serious considerations’
(a) Bellying. A large percentage of failures by Tanks to reach their objectives
was due to this trouble. If this difficulty were eliminated it  is probable that
more than 90% of starters would reach their objectives...
(b) Stopping... it appears that a high percentage of the direct hits received
occurred  whilst  Tanks  stopped  to  change  speed  or  turn.  Whatever  new
means of control is adopted, it should be a one man one.
(c) Ventilation. Better ventilation is required...
(d) Armour. The present armour is known not to be proof against the latest
pattern of German armour-piercing bullet...
On tactical  lessons,  the author  made the general  observation  that,  ‘the frontage
allotted  and  the  number  of  tanks  available  did  not  permit  of  a  tactically  sound
operation...’. He summarised the tactical lessons and referred each of them to the
advice given in ‘Training Note 16’. 
(a) Tank Echelons. That Tanks should be distributed in echelons in depth
according  to  the  main  objectives,  by  this  means  continuity  of  action  is
maintained...
(b)  Reserves.  That  a strong reserve 25% to 50% of  the total  number  of
Tanks employed should be kept in reserve...
(c)  Sections  to  be  kept  intact...  each  section  having  one  and  only  one
objective.
(d) Effect of Ground. That the present Tank should not be used on heavily
shelled ground if this ground is wet, nor should it  proceed without artillery
support...
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(e) Mass Tactics. That normally Tanks must be used in large numbers so as
to obtain concentration of power,  continuation of  effort,  mutual  protection,
certainty of action and reduction of artillery resistance...
(f) Moral effect of Tanks. That the moral effect... is very great, so great that
now  tanks  have  been  employed,  infantry  in  future  will  look  to  them  for
assistance.
(g) Tanks draw fire.  That  the appearance of a Tank at  once draws fire...
From this may be deduced...(i) Infantry must not bunch around Tanks...(ii)
Tanks must be absolutely proof against all types of armour piercing bullets.
(h) Counter battery work. That Counter battery work is as essential to Tank
operations as to Infantry... The closest co-operation must exist between the
Gunners and Tanks
(i) Signal tanks. Experience points to the necessity for Signal Tanks...
On administration and control lessons, three ‘outstanding’ matters were identified:
(a)  Establishments  and labour.  That  the  present  establishments  render  it
impossible  for  Tank  units  to  provide  the  labour  required  during  the
preparatory stage or the operations themselves.
(b) That the introduction of Tank tenders as first line transport is absolutely
necessary...
(c) Command. It is considered that for the present it is sound to keep Tank
units as Corps troops... their allotment to objectives and their general role
should be fixed by the Corps and that the reserves are held in the hands of
the Corps... The duty of a higher Tank commander is to act as adviser to
Armies and Corps in framing the plans, allotting objectives and routes to be
followed.301
If the author was indeed Fuller, it is not surprising that he should link the identified
failings  to  the ignoring  of  his  advice  in  ‘Training  Note  16’.  Some problems,  the
insufficient numbers of adequately armoured and mechanically reliable tanks, were
out of the hands of the higher commanders. These defects were in the process of
being remedied for the next generation of tanks. Other problems, such as the large
proportion  of  tanks  that  bellied  in  the  mud or  shelled  ground,  could  have been
avoided  if  higher  commanders  had  heeded  the  previous  advice  of  the  tank
commanders over the choice of ground.
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As  the  Official  History  stated:  ‘the  tank  was  still  important  by  reason  of
promise [rather]  than performance’.302 ‘There was no cause...  to doubt the future
value of  tanks ...  with better  handling,  a better  model ...  and,  above all,  greater
numbers, they would make a powerful contribution to victory.’303 The Heavy Branch
had the opportunity to prove its value and promise two months later.
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MESSINES 7-14 JUNE 1917
In General Plumer’s  attack at Messines Ridge, 2 Brigade of the Tank Corps was
allocated to Second Army; A and B Battalions each had 36 fighting tanks of the
latest Mark IV pattern. In addition, implementing a lesson learnt from Arras, each
battalion had eight Mark I and II tanks converted into supply tanks.304
 The  attack  was  preceded  by  a  five  day  artillery  barrage  and  by  the
detonation of 19 large mines along the ridge. Once again the tanks showed their
vulnerability when crossing ground badly cratered by artillery fire and mining. Of the
72 tanks  that  went  into  action,  48 tanks  bellied  although 16 were subsequently
recovered and resumed action; 17 broke down mechanically and 11 were put out of
action by shell or armour-piercing bullets.305 
Both tank and infantry commanders could derive some doctrinal guidance
from SS164 produced in May 1917, following lessons learnt at Arras and the arrival
of the Mark IV tank.306  The tanks were generally employed ‘as an adjunct to the
Infantry attack’ principally in attacking those strongpoints not already destroyed by
the  artillery.  Except  in  a  few  isolated  instances,  the  tanks  did  not  contribute
significantly to the success of the operation, the main problem being their difficulty in
crossing cratered ground.
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  SS164. Notes on the use of Tanks and on the general principles of their 
employment as an adjunct to the Infantry attack. May 1917,(General Staff, 1917)
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General lessons from the operation were published by GHQ in SS172 in July
1917.307 Lessons  relating  to  tanks  were  brief:  ‘no  new lessons  were  learnt’  but
emphasis was needed on a number of points; ‘the tendency for Infantry to bunch
behind tanks, [resulting] in an increase in casualties as Tanks invariably draw fire,’
also ‘a tendency ... to retain tanks to meet possible eventualities: it cannot be too
strongly  emphasised  ...that  when once the Infantry  are  firmly  established  on an
objective, the Tanks should be withdrawn.’308
 Colonel Courage, the commander of 2 Tank Brigade, produced a much more
comprehensive post-operation report listing the deductions from the operation. On
the  technical  side,  he  noted  that  the  new armour  plate  (12mm hardened  plate,
distributed  in  the  more  vulnerable  areas)  was  ‘satisfactory  and  gave  complete
confidence to the crews’, and he recommended that a better form of unditching gear
should  be  carried  by  each  tank.   On  the  tactical  side,  Courage  noted  various
operations which were in line with the advice given in  SS164. 24 of the tanks, for
instance, were held in Army reserve and used for the assault on the final objective
line. He recommended that where fresh assaulting troops were used on the further
objectives, they should be supported by fresh tank units, noting ‘O.C. Tank Unit and
his Staff are only human: they cannot go on fighting continuously’. This echoed the
advice in SS164 and Fuller’s recommendation for the use of successive echelons of
fresh  tanks.  Courage  emphasised  the  importance,  and  difficulty,  of  good
reconnaissance work, particularly of the subsequent objectives.309
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Courage reported that,  both at  Messines and Arras,  the danger  of  tanks
being hit by the enemy barrage at the starting point was not excessive, particularly if
artillery counter-bombardment measures had been successful.  He recommended
that the starting point for the tanks should be about 800 yards behind the front line
and that tanks should not attempt the crossing of no-man’s-land before first light.310
On liaison between tanks and supporting units, Courage considered that this
had been satisfactory at all levels from Army down to Battalion commanders, with
the distribution of operation orders between the various units. Courage echoed the
point  noted  in  SS172 that,  after  the  initial  objectives  had  been  achieved,  tanks
should not be used for minor actions but return to rallying points where their further
use in reserve could be co-ordinated by higher command.311
Although  in  general,  important  lessons  had been learnt  at  Messines,  the
overall impact of the tanks was limited. The overwhelming problems continued to be
the  mechanical  failings  of  the  machines  and  their  vulnerability  to  poor  ground
conditions. Unfortunately this latter lesson had still not been fully appreciated by the
higher command when the tanks went into action again just over a month later.
THIRD YPRES – 31 JULY TO 10 NOVEMBER 1917
The pause between the end of the Messines operation and the beginning of Third
Ypres gave little time for the Tank Corps to improve upon the lessons learnt. Early
reconnaissance of the area of operations by Tank Corps staff had caused Elles to






was not intensive shelling. When the attack was postponed from the original date to
the 31st July,  I  pointed out to the Fifth Army G.S. as strongly as I could that our
chances  fell  with  every  shell  fired.’312 Churning  of  the  ground  by  shell  fire  was
compounded by the predicted appalling weather conditions which broke on the first
day  of  battle  and  continued  for  days.  However,  the  strategic  importance  of  the
Flanders area could not be compromised by the need to select better ground for the
tanks.
Nonetheless,  216  fighting  tanks  were  deployed  at  the  opening  of  the
offensive on 31 July 1917, all Mark IVs from the three brigades of the Tank Corps.
Roughly  one-third were allocated to clearing strongpoints,  one-third to assist  the
infantry in the advance to the second objective and one-third in reserve. With one or
two exceptions, notably the assistance in the capture of strongpoints near St Julien
and the capture of the Cockcroft feature on 19 August, the tanks achieved very little.
In the opening offensive, of the 136 tanks in the first wave, 77 tanks became ditched
and 42 were lost to artillery fire, leaving around 19 tanks operational at the end of
the day.313
The heavy tank losses and casualties in the unfavourable conditions were
such  that  Elles  wrote  to  Haig  on  7  September  requesting  the  withdrawal  of  5
battalions  from the battle  for  training with a view to further  operations  on ‘other
fronts’:
The state of the ground on the YPRES battle front is such that it will not be
able to use Tanks until the line is advanced 1,000 to 1,500 yards.
When this is done there will be considerable difficulties unless the weather is
exceptionally good, which will prevent the use of Tanks in large masses.
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There is therefore no prospect of using Tanks until towards the end of the
month.314
Five days later, GHQ agreed to the withdrawal of all  but four battalions from the
Ypres sector.315
Once again, Courage of 2 Tank Brigade collated the lessons learnt from his
sub-unit commanders and sent a comprehensive report to GHQ. Courage reported
that the ‘new Unditching Gear was of the greatest assistance... The Mark IV Tank
showed  itself  proof  against  the  A.P.  Bullet’.316 On  the  tactical  side,  Courage
emphasised the most important lesson:
(i) It is clear that the nature of the ground, over which Operations will take
place, is still by far the most important factor from a Tank point of view. It
may  be  possible  to  advance  over  certain  swampy  areas  by  use  of  the
Unditching gear, but it is certainly not possible to fight over them’.
Courage identified a new threat, anti-tank guns:
(iii) This is the first occasion on which Anti-Tank Guns were a really serious
matter... A lesson to be drawn would appear to be that on a front where there
are only two or three narrow Avenues of Approach... Tanks should not be
employed until the ground has been captured which overlooks them’.
He recommended that  all  crews should be trained in  driving  whilst  under a gas
attack. Courage noted that many crews of disabled tanks used their dismounted
Lewis  guns  to  assist  the  infantry  and  recommended  that  this  should  become
standard practice. Finally,  he concluded that if  an attack was held up, it  was not
practical to send in further tanks unless they were accompanied by fresh troops.317
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With the exception of a few minor actions, Third Ypres did little to enhance
the confidence of higher command in the tanks. What was badly needed was an
operation  on  ground  more  suited  to  the  limited  manoeuvrability  of  the  existing
machines. The Battle of Cambrai provided that opportunity.
CAMBRAI – 20 NOVEMBER TO 30 DECEMBER 1917
Credit for the inception of the Third Army attack on the Hindenburg Line at Cambrai
by various parties has already been discussed. Elles was warned on 20 October
1917  in secrecy, of the likelihood of an operation and preliminary reconnaissance
was started.318 By 13 November 1917 final plans were issued for an operation to
penetrate the German defences around Cambrai.  It  was to be a surprise attack,
using  all  available  tanks  and  with  no  preliminary  artillery  bombardment.  The
operation was to take place one week later on 20 November, leaving little time for
preparation and planning by the units involved. 319
The Tank Corps was faced with the task of moving 476 tanks and crews into
the area of operations under conditions of utmost secrecy, the majority being tanks
recently  deployed  in  the  Ypres  Salient,  many  needing  repair.  In  addition,  a
comprehensive training programme was required of the tank battalions with their
supporting infantry divisions.320 Fuller drafted a ‘Training Note’ issued by Third Army
on 30 October to ensure ‘Tanks and infantry are trained to the same system’ and
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issued a revised version to the Tank Brigades on 10 November, after collating the
training reports from the Tank Brigades. 321 As no preliminary artillery bombardment
was  permitted  by  General  Sir  Julian  Byng,  the  commander  of  Third  Army,  the
primary role of the tanks was to crush the extensive wire entanglements to allow the
infantry through. With the aid of diagrams, Fuller set out in detail how this was to be
achieved. Special wire-crushing tanks were to be deployed with grapnel hooks to
drag away the wire. An innovative solution was found to the problem of the widened
German anti-tank ditches. A number of fighting tanks carried fascines (bundles of
brushwood) to be dropped into the trenches enabling the tanks to cross.322 
Fuller emphasised that training exercises should be simple, that the actions
of the section of three tanks and the accompanying infantry unit should be practiced
as a drill, that frequent practice in crossing the crushed wire should be carried out
and that means of dealing with the unexpected should be carefully thought out by
both the tank and infantry commanders beforehand.323 With one notable exception,
training  on  the  recommended  lines  went  ahead  within  the  six  infantry  divisions
initially involved.324 An impressive initial breakthrough was achieved on the first day,
with most tanks breaking through the wire with comparative ease. However, out of
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the  350 fighting  tanks  deployed,  176 were out  of  action  by  the end of  the day
through mechanical problems, ditching and anti-tank fire. Thereafter the momentum
of the attack petered out and the operation was finally brought to a halt after the
successful German counter-attack on 30 November, with little achieved in terms of
ground gained.325 
After-action reports were received from the three Tank Brigades.  Colonel
Baker–Carr, commanding  I Tank Brigade, commented on training and co-operation
with his two infantry divisions prior to the attack: 
The principle of co-operation between Tanks and Infantry as adopted in this
battle was so satisfactory that it  rather suggests the desirability of always
training the same Tank formations with the same Infantry formations thus
making a composite force...
I consider the greatest factor of success in the operations under review was
the preliminary work done at WAILLY between the Infantry and the Tanks.
He  included  a  section  on  recommendations  for  future  training.  ‘A  great  deal  of
attention’ should be devoted to further training on the 6-pdr and Lewis guns; ‘a good
deal of practice’ should be given to approach marches under service conditions; the
standard of driving was generally good but ‘is capable of further improvement’; ‘the
driving course at WAILLY proved most valuable and every officer and driver should
undergo the course during the training period’;  ‘the mechanical knowledge of the
crews has very much increased and... should be able to deal with most forms of
mechanical trouble.’ He recommended the distribution of notes on infantry and tank
training to divisions and suggested the attachment of infantry and cavalry officers to
tank  units  for  a  fortnight  and  for  tank  officers  to  lecture  at  Army  and  Corps
Schools.326
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The  report  from  2  Tank  Brigade  emphasised  that  the  eight  day  period
allowed for training with the infantry was far too short and that at least a month was
needed for future operations. There were problems in the later stages of the battle
with infantry reinforcements that had not undertaken any co-operative training with
the tanks. Courage also recommended that tank officers should assist in the training
of divisions over the coming winter to improve co-operation. He believed that the
Tank  Section  Commander  should  be  co-located  with  the  infantry  unit  he  was
supporting rather travel in a tank. He recommended that tank NCOs could be trained
to command a tank in place of an officer.
Colonel  Courage  stated that  visibility  from the  tank  should  be  improved,
particularly  if  fascines  were  being  carried;  that  more  fuel  should  be  carried  to
increase  the  operational  range;  and  that  the  Lewis  gun  mountings  should  be
armoured. The use of smoke was an important factor in tank operations and he
made various suggestions for tanks to produce their own smoke cover rather than
rely  on the artillery.  His  recommendation  on tactics  was that  the accompanying
infantry should adopt skirmishing drills when advancing with the tanks. To lighten
their personal load, he suggested that some infantry and engineer equipment could
be carried in special infantry carrier tanks.327
Colonel Hardress Lloyd’s report for 3 Tank Brigade reinforced many of the
points made by the other two commanders. It appears that his tanks experienced
more mechanical problems, particularly with the track pinion wheels. On training, he
came up with a radical suggestion: ‘A Brigade of Infantry to be attached to each
Brigade of Tanks during the training period in the winter. As soon as Operations in
the Spring are decided on, the trained Tank Infantry will  be split  up amongst the
327
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Infantry Divisions with which the Tanks are going to work.’ This foreshadowed the
concept of Mechanised Infantry used successfully in future conflicts.328
Third Army produced its own comprehensive report on lessons learnt. The
report  emphasised  that  the training  of  infantry  to  advance behind  tanks  was as
important as training to advance behind a barrage. In particular the infantry needed
to practice assembling and advancing behind tanks, crossing through the gaps in
the wire, trench clearing and that these techniques needed to be practiced in the
dark. Various tactical lessons were learnt: the need for a large reserve of tanks to
replace casualties; tanks were vulnerable to field guns at short range; tanks could
not deal with enemy in built-up locations; tanks should not get ahead of the infantry
but remain until trench clearing operations have been successful; tanks needed to
make  more  tactical  use  of  the  ground;  lateral  movement  of  tanks  across  the
battlefield should be reduced to the minimum to avoid damage to communications
and tracks. An important  and realistic lesson for  the future was that the infantry
‘must not expect too much from the Tanks.’329 They must be prepared to provide
their own protection using platoon weapons and to assist the tanks in countering
anti-tank guns. Foreshadowing the role that tanks had to adopt in the following year,
the  report  pointed  out  that  tanks  were  useful  in  defence:  for  counter-attack,  as
mobile machine gun posts and for forming a defensive line.330
Major-General  Capper,  the  Director  General  of  the  Tank  Corps  [DGTC]
summarised the lessons  learnt.  He believed  that,  if  surprise  could  be achieved,
328
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small numbers of troops, even if  tired, could achieve great results.  However, the
troops were worn out after advancing between five and six miles and they should be
followed by successive waves of fresh troops. He confirmed that Infantry Supply
tanks were essential to prevent the infantry becoming exhausted and that the supply
system for the tanks needed careful study. The front on which the tanks operated
was too narrow to give decisive results and the numbers involved were too few.
‘Numerous tanks for exploiting success at once are necessary.’ 331
Capper made a surprising comment about cavalry, the arm that many tank
advocates saw as being made redundant. ‘I do not [Capper’s emphasis] think that
the battle confirms the view of those that hold that Cavalry are out of date. They
should be invaluable to obtain speedy and decisive results.’332 Capper considered
that  initial  success  was  useless  unless  heavy  reserves  were  available  and
everything depended on the depth of penetration over a wide front in the first 24
hours. 
On the use of tanks in villages, as at Flesquières, La Fontaine and Bourlon,
Capper recommended that the tactics needed ‘systematizing’. The village should be
treated as a trench attack, with parties detailed for specific tasks with ‘moppers-up’
on hand with Engineers to deal with strong-points. Surprisingly, he recommended
that tanks should remain until the village is secured, ignoring the fact that the tanks
used at Cambrai proved to be very vulnerable when used in attacks on villages.
Capper ended by emphasising that ‘the Tank Corps requires much Tactical Training
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in  itself  and in  conjunction  with  other  arms,  and other  arms in combination  with
Tanks.’333 
In summary, the use of tanks at Cambrai provided useful lessons for the
following year. In assessing the extent to which the tactics used complied with the
doctrine so far produced by the Tank Corps the following points emerge. The tanks,
because of mechanical and physical limitations, could only operate effectively over
firm  ground  that  was  not  already  cratered  by  an  extensive  artillery  barrage.  At
Cambrai, the natural topographical conditions of the ground were practically ideal for
tanks. Moreover, the short, surprise artillery barrage had not cratered the ground to
anything like the same extent as at the Somme or Ypres and presented no real
obstacle. Co-operation with the supporting infantry and training with them prior to
operations was carried out as well as it could in the short time available and was
invaluable. The weakness was that in most cases reinforcing infantry units had no
similar training. Also, the somewhat random re-allocation of surviving tank units to
infantry units after the initial breakthrough meant that many tanks were left operating
with units with which they had not been trained.  Contrary to the advice given in
SS164, the tanks proved to be very effective in creating passages through the wire. 
What doctrinal principles were neglected?  The most serious and obvious
omission was the lack of tank reserves to exploit the initial breakthrough. Almost all
the initial wave of 350 tanks was tasked with breaking through the wire. There were
then insufficient fresh echelons of tanks to exploit the initial successes. The follow-
through actions to take the canal crossings and Bourlon Wood were delayed and
ineffective because the by- now exhausted tank crews had to rally to refuel and
rearm before redeploying. 
333
 WO 32/5933. ‘ Lessons from the Cambrai battle. 19 December 1917.’  
141
The Official  History  concluded:  ‘The  sudden  and  swift  penetration  of  the
Hindenburg position,  which embodied the latest defence theories of some of the
best brains in the German Army, would not have been possible without the tank.’334
The doctrinal and tactical instructions hastily produced by Fuller and GHQ
during  German  offensive  in  March  1918  have  already  been  described  in  the
preceding chapter. Meanwhile, by mid-May 1918, the Mark V tank was arriving in
France. This was a significant improvement in tank design and reliability. The new
Wilson epicyclic gearbox requiring a single steersman instead of four, the new 150
horsepower Ricardo engine and other design improvements meant that  machine
was more powerful and manoeuvrable and did not need to stop to change gear or
direction, reducing its vulnerability.   Sixty of these machines were available for a
small but significant operation at Hamel in early July 1918.335
HAMEL 4 JULY 1918
The village of Hamel had been taken by the Germans in April  1918. It formed a
salient  in the Allied front  line,  overlooked Amiens and threatened the operations
planned for the summer. Rawlinson allocated the task of capturing it to 4th Australian
Division. Lieutenant-General Monash, commanding the Australian Corps, had the
support  of  5  Tank Brigade,  now commanded by  Courage,  recently  promoted to
Brigadier-General.
Monash was an Australian Militia officer who was an engineer in civilian life.
He applied his commercial and production experience to the meticulous planning of
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this relatively small operation. At the outset, Monash proposed to Rawlinson that:
‘The operation will be primarily a Tank operation – at least one, preferably two, Tank
Battalions will  be employed.’336 In particular,  he fostered the closest co-operation
between  his  infantry  units  and  their  supporting  tanks  with  specific  tank  units
permanently ‘embedded’ with Australian infantry units. This was all the remarkable,
and necessary, as the Australian unit chosen for the operation was the same that
had suffered badly from the poor performance of the tanks at Bullecourt in the Arras
offensive the year before.337
Of the 60 tanks employed, only three failed to reach their objectives and five
were disabled but returned to the fight later. Monash had agreed with Courage two
significant changes in tactics:
Firstly,  each Tank was, for tactical  purposes, to be treated as an Infantry
weapon;  from the  moment  it  entered  battle  until  the  objective  had  been
gained it was to be under the exclusive orders of the Infantry Commander to
whom it had been assigned. 
Secondly, the deployed line of Tanks was to advance, level with the infantry,
[Monash’s  italics],  and  pressing  close  up  to  the  barrage...  Tank  experts,
consulted beforehand, considered that it was not practical for tanks to follow
close behind an artillery barrage. The battle of Hamel proved that it was.338
The latter point, settled, at least for this operation, the on-going debate about where
tanks should deploy in relation to the infantry; in advance of, behind, kept back for
subsequent exploitation or, in this case, forming an integral component of an all-
arms,  tank-infantry  combat  unit.  The  answer  appeared  to  lie  with  the  particular
circumstances of the action and plans of the battle commander, the experience and
336
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training of the troops involved and the specific threat from enemy artillery. The fact
that no tank casualties resulted from barrage fire at Hamel indicates that it was the
correct doctrine in this instance.
An  innovation,  resulting  from Cambrai  lessons,  was  the  use  of  specially
designed supply tanks to bring forward supplies for the infantry and tanks onto the
objective  shortly  after  it  had  been  taken.  The  outcome  of  the  operation  was
successful,  all  objectives  being  gained,  (in  93  minutes  compared  to  Monash’s
estimate of  90 minutes),  with little  loss to the Australians.  After  the battle,  GHQ
published a document which summarised the lessons learnt, including the comment:
‘The success of the attack was due... [to] the skill and dash with which the tanks
were handled and the care taken over details in bringing them up to the starting
line.’339 Also, the GHQ publication,  Notes on Recent Fighting No. 19, commented
that ‘the Tanks proved of great value in protecting the flanks of the attack’ – a role
for tanks identified earlier by Fuller in ‘Training Note 16’. GHQ also stated: ‘the value
of Tanks in assisting infantry to advance was conclusively proved’ whilst cautioning
that at Hamel there was little wire, that the ground was suitable for tanks and that
the objective was both limited and within the range of supporting artillery.340
HQ Tank Corps held a conference on 10 July 1918 when the main tactical
lessons were identified as: 
(i) Objectives should be tactical points
(ii)Separate Tank Echelons should operate against each main objective line
(iii) Reserves of Tanks should be kept in hand
339
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(iv)Tanks  should  always  be  used  offensively  on  the  flanks  if  the  ground
permits of this341
HQ Tanks produced its own lessons from the action in the form of ‘Battle Notes’: ‘the
necessity  of  previous  training  and  closest  co-operation  with  the  infantry’;  ‘the
necessity of practicing approach marches by compass by night’; ‘practice of moves
from an assembly position in the dark  so as to be at a  place of deployment at a
given hour’; ‘concealment of Tanks and personnel at assembly positions’; ‘taping of
routes  in  a  place  where  growing  crops are  prevalent’;  ‘importance  of  practicing
communication  between  infantry  and  tank  crews’;  ‘training  of  supply  personnel’;
‘practicing of drivers to manoeuvre their Tanks so as to crush machine guns, drive
up and down banks, through orchards, woods, etc’; ‘better co-operation between
drivers and [tank] gunners...to steady the Tank when good targets are observed’;
‘practicing towing other disabled tanks’; and finally, ‘the necessity for training Tank
Commanders that they are in command of their tanks... and must be in a position to
carry out this role... only in the most exceptional cases should they man one of the
guns.’342
Hamel was a relatively minor action in the general scale of operations on the
Western Front but it provided the opportunity to test and prove the new Mark V tank
and the use of supply tanks. It heralded the innovative use of aircraft in a supporting
role. It reinforced the critical importance of previous training and co-operation with
the supporting infantry. It demonstrated that rigid adherence to tactical doctrine with
regard to the positioning of the infantry with tanks was not necessary and depended
341
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on circumstances. Finally, it pointed the way to the all-arms combat units used with
such success later in the year.
By late  July  it  was clear  to  Foch that  the Germans had exhausted their
available  reserves  and  were  losing  the  momentum  on  the  Western  Front.  The
Hamel raid had demonstrated the success of the new Mark V tank combined with
support  tanks.  Following the successful  Allied counter-offensive which ended the
Second Battle of the Marne  in early August,  Foch judged that the time was right for
the Allies to turn to the offensive.
AMIENS, 8 – 12 AUGUST 1918, AND THE HUNDRED DAYS
Haig had been considering an August offensive around Amiens using Rawlinson’s
Fourth Army including the Australian Corps and the Canadian Corps which was to
be transferred into Fourth Army for the offensive. All available tanks in France were
to  be employed  in  support:  nine  heavy  tank  battalions  with  324  battle  tanks,  a
combination of Mark Vs and the elongated Mark V*; two light tank battalions with 72
Medium A Whippets  allocated  to the Cavalry  Corps;  120 supply  tanks  (50% as
infantry supply carriers) and 22 gun carrier tanks, a total of 610 tanks in all,  the
greatest  concentration  of  armoured  vehicle  so  far  assembled.343 In  addition,  a
battalion of armoured cars was attached to the Australian Corps. An innovative use
of 30 of the larger Mark V * to each carry two infantry machine gun teams directly
onto  the  third  objective  was  only  partially  successful  because  a  number  were
343
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destroyed. Moreover, the machine gun teams that did arrive were so overcome by
heat, fumes and sickness that most were unable to perform effectively.
Although the tanks contributed substantially to the initial  advances on the
first day, the attrition rate over the following days was significant. Only 145 remained
fit  for  action  on  the  second  day,  only  67  on  the  third  day  and  further  losses
subsequently.  Most losses were attributed to effective enemy anti-tank measures
and to the on-going problem, mechanical breakdowns, in addition to crew sickness
and exhaustion.344 
Tank related lessons from Amiens were collated by Fuller’s  successor at
Tank  HQ,  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  Karslake.  His  comments  were somewhat  more
succinct than those of his predecessor. He noted that most tank casualties were
caused  by  direct  artillery  fire  and that  the  supporting  infantry  should  be on  the
lookout  for  such guns.  He commented that  the  infantry  should  push on to their
objectives even if a tank was knocked out. Karslake stressed that mutual assistance
and co-operation with the infantry during operations was essential for success. On
tactics, he pointed out the danger of tanks pushing on around woods and copses
without being sure that they had been ‘mopped-up’. For attacks in daylight, smoke
cover  was essential.  Many lessons had previously  been identified  and were re-
iterated. A reserve of tanks was essential to maintain the momentum and to deal
with  unforeseen  contingencies.  Tanks  should  operate  in  their  units,  not  as
individuals.  When operating over old battle areas,  former defences might  not  be
obvious and Whippets in particular were unable to cross old trench systems. He
344
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emphasised that ‘the enemy of the Tank is the gun’ and that the tanks needed to
move rapidly and with no halts. Finally, Karslake concluded:
The ideal is to break through as far as possible with the heavy Tanks and to
follow them up with the Whippets and armoured cars,  so as to keep the
enemy  on  the  move  and  cause  the  utmost  confusion  on  his  line  of
communications.345
Fuller’s own deductions from Amiens were later recorded as:
(i)  That  once preparations are well  in  progress it  is  almost  impossible  to
modify them to meet any change in objective
(ii) That the staying power of an attack lies in the general reserve. In this
attack the tank general reserve was very weak, consequently after August 8
tank attacks ‘petered out.’
(iii) That the Tank is an assault weapon. Its role is in trench warfare. Once
open warfare is entered on infantry must protect tanks from artillery fire.
(iv)  That the endurance of heavy tanks may, at present,  be put  down as
three days, after which they require overhaul.
(v) That the supply tank is slow and heavy; a light machine such as a cross-
country tractor should replace it.
(vi) That at present wireless and aeroplane communications cannot be relied
upon...
(vii)  That  the attachment of tanks to cavalry is not  a success;  for,  in this
battle, each of these arms in many ways impeded rather than helped each
other. During the approach marches the Whippets were frequently reported
to have been unable to keep up with the rapid movement of the cavalry;
during actual fighting the reverse took place.346
On the specific role of the tanks at Amiens, opinions were divided. Edmonds
considered  that  ‘the  action  of  the  tanks  and  cavalry,  though  they  won  small
triumphs, did not come up to expectations.’347 He believed that the tanks could have
achieved more if they had been held back and used later on the first day when the
early morning mist had cleared. He also believed that they were misused in clearing
woods  and  villages  and  crushing  MG  posts.  He  provoked  later  controversy  by
345
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claiming that the Germans attributed, quite falsely, their defeat at Amiens and in the
subsequent  actions of  the Hundred Days to the massed appearance of  tanks at
Amiens. Edmonds pointed out that:
 no massed tank attack was made, not even planned, and that no attempt at
a raid behind the enemy lines was made except by the 17th Armoured Car
Squadron. Even the moral effect was not so great as claimed... but a legend
which persists to this day was created. Actually the infantry with machine
guns  was  the  instrument  of  success  but  its  vital  assistance  was  the
artillery.348 
Liddell Hart reacted vigorously to Edmonds’ ‘extraordinary assertion’ that the tanks
had not played a significant role in the collapse of the German Army after Amiens.349
Although Liddell Hart’s view was inevitably biased, there is little doubt that Amiens
was a pivotal battle from the tank point-of-view. Harris, whilst conceding that, ‘there
can be little doubt that the exceptionally large numbers actually used contributed to
the  magnitude  of  the  success  and  to  the  modesty  of  its  cost’  believes  that  a
significant victory could have been achieved using fewer tanks. This is a view with
the benefit of hindsight. Clearly, it would have been reckless for Rawlinson not to
have  used  all  the  tank  resources  available  to  him  at  the  time  for  this  critical
operation.350 
Hereafter until the Armistice, Allied operations were largely characterised by
semi-mobile warfare, the conditions that the tank advocates thought would be ideal
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smaller actions which followed culminating in the breakthrough the Hindenburg Line
in late September,  tanks were employed with varying degrees of  success.  They
were once again used in ‘penny-packets’, not as a matter of operational doctrine,
but  reflecting  the  reality  of  insufficient  numbers  of  available  tanks  caused  by
production  priorities  at  home,  mechanical  problems,  lack  of  spares,  increased
casualties from more effective German anti-tank measures and, to some extent, the
allocation of tanks to the Americans operating to the south. Hammond cites other
factors: the lack of training opportunities for replacement crews because of the fast-
moving tempo of operations and lack of time between the inception and execution of
operations;  the  demand for  the  use  of  the  limited  numbers  of  tanks  in  smaller
operations grew enormously, as commanders’ confidence in their utility increased
and Foch’s policy of a series of sequential, dispersed operations put a considerable
strain on the logistics of moving tanks and crews to where they were needed next on
the battlefield.352
For these later actions, doctrinal guidance was provided by SS214. This was
issued to formations in August 1918, too late to be of assistance in the planning for
Amiens  but  available  for  the  subsequent  operations.  The  instruction  dealt  with
‘Special Considerations in Open Warfare’, the operational situation that existed after
Amiens.  The  guidance  emphasised  the  difficulty  in  open  warfare  of  obtaining
information about enemy locations, particularly artillery batteries, and the need for
rapid action. The use of aerial reconnaissance and co-operation with the artillery to
destroy enemy batteries was recommended. Tanks would be particularly vulnerable
to artillery fire during an advance after a breakthrough had been achieved. So it was
Days; The End of the Great War  (Viking, 2013)
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recommended that tanks should not form part of an infantry advanced party but held
back to tackle any strong centre of resistance:
When such centres of resistance are encountered, the closest co-operation
will be necessary between the commander of the formation concerned and
the tank commander in order that an attack may be quickly organised. It is
essential,  however,  that  any  such  operation  should  take  the  form  of  an
organised  attack,  that  the  co-operation  of  the  several  arms  should  be
ensured, and that the tanks should be used as a concentrated force of such
size  as  may  be  necessary.  Some  artillery  support  will  generally  be
required.353
Generally, such doctrinal guidance was followed. The weakness was the increasing
difficulty in ensuring the ‘concentrated force of such size as may be necessary’354 for
the reasons set out before.
Little further doctrinal guidance emanated from HQ Tanks during this period.
This  may be due to a  number  of  reasons:  first,  commanders  at  all  levels  were
becoming more familiar and experienced in operating with tanks and did not require
directions from above. Generally, there was more confidence by higher command in
the ability of lower commanders to take decisions on the battlefield and this attitude
percolated down to the tank and infantry commanders. Second, Fuller had left HQ
Tanks at  the  beginning  of  August  and was involved  in  setting  up the new tank
branch, SD7, at the War Office. However, this did not stop him collating tank action
reports from the various smaller engagements during this period and issuing lessons
learnt through the medium of the Weekly Tank Notes circulated widely by SD7.355
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Major  Foot,  Fuller’s  assistant  at  SD7,  recounted  the  genesis  of  this
publication:
This publication had an interesting history. It was started by Fuller with the
idea of circulating among some of the senior officers at War Office, to give
them the latest information about tanks, Either Fuller or I went over to France
for all  the important tank actions, so that we were able to give in Weekly
Tank Notes an account of recent happenings; to this we added various items
about  new  types  of  Tanks,  carefully  selected  statements  from  German
prisoners,  notes  about  French  and  American  Tank  developments,  and
similar information. Occasionally we would include articles, written either by
Fuller or myself, of a more definitely propagandist nature.356
Although the Weekly Tank Notes were distributed to all branches of the War Office,
Cabinet Office and to Haig’s GHQ, it is not clear whether the content filtered down to
the operational level.
What was becoming clear from the various reports received was that the
constant mobile and frequent, smaller set-piece operations in this last phase of the
war were having a serious effect on the resources of the Tank Corps, both men and
materials. In September 1918, for instance, it was reported that:
The great heat, the long distances travelled, and the amount of fighting has
been a very severe trial for the Tank crews, while the strain on Commanders
and Staffs has been enormous, with the constant necessity of making hasty
arrangements with infantry formations... The Tank Corps is now deficient of
about 250 Officers and 2,000 other ranks (representing about 30 per cent of
the fighting strength)...
During the recent fighting it  has been quite impossible for the small  Tank
Corps in  France to  supply  Tanks in  every  place they  were required and
demanded.357
The number of tanks available for the remaining actions diminished rapidly, despite
the setting up of Tank Salvage Companies which recovered a total of 8,819 disabled
tanks from the battlefield for repair  and re-issue.358 On 8 October,  for the attack
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south of Cambrai, only 100 tanks could be assembled. For the attack on the River
Selle on 17 October, only 48 tanks were available. For the last tank action of the
war, in the Forest of Mormal on 4 November, the remaining resources of the Tank
Corps were down to 37 tanks and a handful of Whippets.359
German  morale  and  discipline  had  been  badly  affected  by  the  Allied
successes. Despite a number of spirited counter-attacks in the following weeks, an
Armistice came into force on 11 November. The concluding chapter will review the
progress in the design and use of the tank, in the period of just over two years, from
its baptism of fire in September 1916 to the Armistice, the development of tactical
and operational doctrine in the light of combat experience and the training of the
commanders and crews.
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CONCLUSION
A number of research questions were posed in the introduction to this thesis. How
did tactical requirements first evolve in the absence of combat experience? How did
early  training  address  the  perceived  tactical  requirements?  How  did  those
requirements  evolve  in  the  light  of  actual  battle  experience?  How  was  training
implemented?  What  was  the training  organisation?  What  were  the restraints  on
training,  and  was  it  effective?  How  did  tank  operational  doctrine  evolve?  Who
derived it  and how? How was it  implemented? How did it  fit  in with overall  BEF
operational  doctrine?  Finally,  to  what  extent  did  operational  and  tactical  tank
doctrine and training contribute to the outcome of the Hundred Days?
Early tactical doctrine was largely formulated by Swinton. Despite having no
combat experience to guide him, Swinton produced a series of memoranda on the
tactical  employment  of  tanks.  Haig  was  anxious  to  use  whatever  tanks  were
available for his planned offensive in September 1916.  GHQ modified and endorsed
Swinton’s proposals and produced its own somewhat cautious doctrine, just before
tanks were committed to battle for the first time. Swinton, meanwhile, in the very
short  period of time available to him, had to raise and train the tank companies
required to man the tanks. He was hampered by insufficient number of tanks and
weapons to train on and a lack of experienced instructors. He also had to cope with
a change of training location from Bisley to Elveden. Early training concentrated on
technical  matters;  driving and maintaining the machines and firing  the weapons.
There  was  little,  if  any,  training  on  the  tactical  handling  of  the  machines  or  of
cooperative training with infantry. Despite the best efforts of Swinton, there seems
little doubt that the first tank crews were not adequately trained when they went into
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action on 15 September 1916. Understandably, at that stage, higher commanders
also had little experience of the capabilities, and limitations, of the tank.
After-action  reports  were  collated  after  each  tank  action  and  the  results
analysed by the various formations involved. The system was formalised within the
Tank  Corps  with  the  production  of  individual  Tank  History  Sheets  and
comprehensive  reports  from  Tank  Battalions  and  Brigades.  While  most  were
concerned  with  technical  matters,  tactical  and  operational  issues  emerged  and
influenced the advice given to GHQ by HQ tanks, usually by way of the various
papers written by Fuller.
Following  the  Somme  and  the  growth  of  the  Tank  Corps,  training  was
expanded and better organised. Under the enthusiastic direction of Gore Anley, the
main tank training centre was established in the UK at Bovington, concentrating on
individual skills.  Much use was made of battle-experienced instructors to train the
new  recruits  before  they  were  sent  to  France.  In  France  collective  training
concentrated on forming and training tank companies and battalions and introducing
some basic  tactical  training  resulting  from  lessons  learnt  on  the  Somme.  Tank
companies  with  battle  experience  formed  the  cadres  around  which  the  new
battalions were created. Throughout the war, however, this split between training in
both the UK and France caused some degree of duplication and friction and it is
debateable whether all training should have been carried out in one or other of the
locations. A particular problem at Bovington in the early days was insufficient tanks
on which to train, whereas in France a tank unit could train on its own machines. A
recurrent  theme  was  the  lack  of  opportunities  for  co-operative  training  with
supporting infantry units.
Doctrinal guidance received considerable impetus with the arrival of Fuller at
Tank HQ in late December 1916. His numerous and voluminous papers on tank
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doctrine, although in many cases far too visionary to be practical, undoubtedly had
an influence, in due course, on GHQ’s views on the use of tanks. In the absence of
guidance from GHQ, initial guidance was largely formulated by Fuller, in particular
his  ‘Training  Note  16’.  In  time,  with  the  establishment  of  Solly-Flood’s  Training
Directorate at GHQ, more formal doctrine was produced. The publications, SS135,
SS164,  SS204 and  SS214,  all  laid  down,  in  varying  degrees,  GHQ’s  doctrinal
guidance on the use of tanks for the benefit, not only of the Tank Corps but, more
importantly,  for the other Arms and Services. The influence of the WO and War
Cabinet on tank doctrine was slight until the appointment of Wilson as CIGS with
Lawrence as his deputy. In the light of greater co-operation with the French and the
Americans over the use and development of tanks, the War Office produced some
firm guidance for future tank operations, clearly based on Fuller’s ‘Plan 1919’ With
the somewhat  unexpected cessation  of  hostilities  in  November  1918,  this  future
doctrine was never put to the test.
The  various  tank  actions  after  the  Somme  produced  lessons  to  be
incorporated into future doctrine and training.  At Arras, the promised Mark IV tanks
did  not  materialise  in  time.  Adverse  ground  conditions  and  the  mechanical
weakness of the older tanks led to disappointing results. At Messines the improved
Mark IV with unditching gear showed promise but  the tanks suffered again from
unsuitable  ground  conditions.  Third  Ypres  was  a  disaster  for  the  tanks.  The
appalling ground conditions led to the early withdrawal of the tanks and for a time
the future of the Tank Corps seemed uncertain. Cambrai offered the ray of hope.
There the tanks operated over  more suitable ground and achieved considerable
success on the first  day.  However,  there was a lack of  tank reserves to exploit
success.  Throughout  1917,  the recurrent themes were of insufficient  numbers of
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tanks, their mechanical weakness and their vulnerability to ground conditions and
enemy counter-measures, resulting in a lack of reserves to exploit opportunities. 
Following the defensive role thrust on the tanks during the March offensive in
1918, for which they were not well suited, the actions at Hamel and later at Amiens,
using the much improved Mark Vs,  Whippets,  armoured cars and supply  tanks,
marked the move to open, offensive warfare, the role for which the tanks were more
suited. However, the almost continuous actions after September over a wide front
placed  enormous  strain  on  Tank  Corps  resources.  Because  of  the  logistical
problems of  moving sufficient  numbers of  tanks to where they were required by
commanders  who were now more confident  using tanks,  tank  actions  inevitably
reverted to the ‘penny-packets’  Fuller  and others had warned against.  The rapid
pace of operations between August and November led to a dramatic drop in the
numbers  of  available  tanks  due  as  much  as  to  mechanical  problems,  lack  of
replacements  and  spares,  and  trained  crews  as  to  determined  enemy  counter-
measures. 
In just over two years from the first use of tanks to their final actions before
the  Armistice,  British  tanks  had  seen  dramatic  mechanical  and  technical
improvements.  Nevertheless,  the  available  armoured  vehicles  remained
mechanically  unreliable,  slow  and  vulnerable  to  enemy  counter  measures.
Furthermore, production had to compete with other priorities and there were never
enough tanks to meet demand. Doctrine for the use of the tanks developed in the
light of combat experience and hand-in-hand with technical improvements. Growing
confidence in their capabilities,  and acceptance of their limitations, among senior
commanders earned tanks a respected place in the all-arms actions towards the
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